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Abstract 
This thesis is a critique of critical pedagogy which questions several of the key political 
assumptions behind critical pedagogy’s calls for social change. Over the past decades 
critical pedagogy has become established as the progressive response to dominant 
approaches to education, first addressing issues of economic oppression and then 
expanding its analysis to include race, gender, sexuality and more. The wide range of 
authors contributing to critical pedagogy reflect this growing field of analysis and 
despite the variation in background and focus, all authors are united by a central 
tenet: education is political, and education can help to change the world for the 
better through greater justice, equality, democracy, and freedom. In recent years 
critical pedagogy has turned its attention to neo-liberal approaches to education 
which emphasise individual competition, personal gain, and free market economics, 
positioning itself as the progressive and critical response to neo-liberal education. 
The aim of this thesis is to question the assumptions behind this call for greater 
justice, equality, democracy, and freedom, and to argue that rather than offering a 
progressive response to neo-liberal practices of education, critical pedagogy leaves 
key structures of neo-liberalism unquestioned. 
Building on anarchist theory and practice, and specifically on areas concerning the 
subject, governance and subversion developed following poststructuralist insights, I 
argue that rather than critical pedagogy offering a response to neo-liberalism, the 
unquestioned assumptions of critical pedagogy reveal a vision of social change and 
individual transformation which is constraining. Developing my critique through an 
anarchist reading of critical pedagogy’s reliance on the state, and Foucauldian 
reading of the attempt to govern the individual subject, I propose and explore a 
subversive approach to educational theory and practice which operates in the gaps 
and tensions created by the education systems. My exploration occurs in the context 
of a UK higher education institution in which I was teaching as a Graduate Teaching 
Assistant for three years, and I examine the tensions and difficulties of working in a 
neo-liberal Higher Education (HE) institution while simultaneously pursuing an 
approach to education entirely alien to it. To this end I utilise autoethnography to 
capture, re-tell, and analyse specific experiences from my teaching practice, using a 
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combination of Gray’s work on exilic space and de Certeau’s work on la perruque 
(‘wiggery’) as a lens to establish the possibility of subversion in constrained and 
constraining systems like neo-liberal HE. 
I contend that the anarchist thought and practice developed in this thesis offers a 
possibility for subversion which avoids the pitfalls of critical pedagogy by creating and 
developing moments in which we take responsibility for our actions, our 
(trans)formation as a subject, and our relationships to others in ways which are 
unaccountable for by neo-liberalism and critical pedagogy alike. I conclude the thesis 
piece by arguing that no matter the practices of governance we are subject too, be 
they neo-liberal in nature or emanating from critical pedagogy, there always exist 
moments and means of subversion.   
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Prologue: A Dusty Hill 
 
A nine-year-old community spread over a dusty hill. A volcano standing guard in the 
background. Ceaseless sun that turns the ground to dust and sand. Water brought in on 
lorries, stored in tanks. A handful of rogue electricity pylons. No sewage system. Single brick, 
two room homes. Incomplete rooftops waiting for the next floor. Thin windows in metal 
frames. Concrete floors. Small shops in front rooms. Gas canisters for cooking. Heavy 
supplies brought up the hill on foot. Warm days and cold nights. Freezing temperatures. 
The rainy season. Dirt pathways collapse in a muddy slide. 
* * * 
I sit on the water tank as the bucket fills below me. I enjoy this quiet moment up here 
in the community, looking back down the foothills to the city below. I’ve been 
working in the community for a charity for around six months now and whilst I feel 
like I’ve found my feet on the day-to-day running of the project, I’ve also began to 
feel a tension between my interpretation and understanding of what we’re doing, and 
the charity’s. “To break the cycle of poverty”: as a tagline, a mission statement, that’s 
a hard one to argue against. Who wouldn’t want to break the cycle of poverty? 
Whatever that may actually mean. It’s the wrong question to ask myself, really. 
There’s something more complex here, something connected to the role I’m playing 
in the actions of a charity which has this as its mission statement. At the beginning 
of my time with the charity, six or seven months ago when I first met the founders, 
I was swept along with the idea of being involved in “making a difference”, in “doing 
something good”, without really thinking any further or deeper about what such a 
role entailed. I didn’t get past the clichéd phrases. Increasingly, in the last few weeks 
I’ve become aware of this tension, and looking back I’ve noticed this in the contents 
of my journal. 
The charity runs a project based in a primary school on the outskirts of Arequipa, 
Peru’s second city. The city proper is a beautiful place of white stone buildings, 
cobbled streets, churches, and squares, and is a popular stop-over for tourists 
travelling to and from Bolivia or Chile, or on their way to Lake Titicaca and Cuzco. 
It has also become an increasingly popular place for internal migration, with people 
moving closer to the city in search of work. With the space available and the seeming 
lack of any regulations about building or planning, communities establish themselves 
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on the outer fringes of the city, occupying land, building homes, and slowly 
establishing a presence. Where I am working now is one such community.  
It was established nine years ago and perches on the foothills of the volcanoes which 
border the north and eastern sides of the city. Communities like this are set up before 
the provision of any utilities and then electricity, water, and sewage systems are built 
in later, although when seems to be a constantly moving time frame. The community 
I’m working in has power, but not to all houses, and has the channels dug for sewage 
systems, but in the six months I’ve been here nothing more has happened yet, and 
speaking to members of the community, the channels have been here for at least a 
year now. At the foot of the hill there is a local swimming pool and the informal 
transport systems only come as far as that. The steep dirt and dust roads leading into 
the community itself aren’t navigable by the small combi buses. This means the 
community is only really accessible on foot, which involves a slog up a steep hill. At 
over 2000m altitude the walk robs the air from your lungs. A combination of the 
buildings, the location, the lack of utilities, the transport links all give this particular 
community a strange feeling. It has a sense of permanence through the houses and 
small shops, and at the same time a sense of the temporary and the unfinished 
through the lack of utility provision. With the informal transport network of combis 
reaching the community there is a connection to the rest of the city, and yet it’s at 
arms-length. The community seems to balance on the edge of separation. 
Most of the male members of the community hold some sort of manual job, building 
seems to be the most common among them, and it’s a fairly stable line of work given 
the amount the city below is expanding. Among the women of the community, many 
are cleaners or cooks in small restaurants nearby. Others collect plastics and cans for 
recycling. I doubt this is what they had in mind when they migrated to the city. There 
are lots of children in the community and most families can scrape together the 
money to buy the uniforms and materials needed for them to attend a school a little 
closer to the city, a school with a good reputation. For those who can’t, their children 
attend the state-run school based in the community itself, the one which the charity 
assists. 
The charity’s primary role is providing a flow of volunteers to act as teaching 
assistants in the school and to lead English classes once a week. We also provide the 
school with extra materials like pens and paper when we can afford them, and fund 
the school lunches, aiming to ensure that the pupils get at least one good, healthy 
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meal a day. I’m the project manager and I’m here to make sure that the volunteers 
are looked after and cared for, that the cooking gets done, and to act as a bridge 
between the charity founders and the staff at the school and the community. On the 
surface this all sounds very good; assisting teachers, teaching English, providing 
meals. But the tension rises when I start thinking about the underlying premise 
behind the charity and the way I’m involved in the assistance we’re giving. 
Behind the charity’s mission statement lies the belief that by helping to educate some 
of the children of the community, and particularly by teaching them some English, 
they will be able to secure a better job in the future. This, in turn, will be better for 
the community as once the children reach working age they will bring more money 
and financial stability to the area. Social change through education. Not a new idea, 
nor a unique project in the area, the country, or the world. 
What I have begun to question in the last few weeks is, what is this social change 
that the charity, and I as a member of it, are promoting? I can’t shake the feeling that 
all we’re doing is getting a handful of pupils into a slightly better economic position. 
That all we’re doing is teaching them the rules to a game which is still crooked. And 
it is here that I’m beginning to feel the tension between my personal position and 
actions and that of the charity. I struggle to articulate what I mean by ‘my personal 
position’, but I seem to have a gut reaction to the claims of the power of economy to 
fix issues, to the claims that if people could just work harder, earn more, and spend 
more sensibly, then everything would be OK, everyone would find their place in the 
social system. It’s based on ideas of meritocracy and a belief in social mobility, but 
doesn’t seem to take into account the array of disadvantages many of these students 
face, and the problem that social mobility can only ever work for a limited number. 
The idea just doesn’t work for me. It doesn’t seem to tell the whole story. I know 
that my reaction stems from a combination of family and social background, my 
formative years, and my own reading, it starts from a time long before I arrived in 
Peru. It’s a feeling that something is deeply wrong with a world which not only 
enables oppression to exist, whether that’s political, social, or economic, but which is 
based on the ongoing exploitation of others and maintenance of that oppression. And 
this is the root of my feelings towards the charity – I am working, directly or 
indirectly as part of the systems that support such a world. 
Of course, through assisting the teachers and helping to provide a healthy cooked 
meal once a day I’m no doubt having a positive effect on the lives of these pupils who 
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I’ve come to know and care about. But the more I think about it, the more I feel that 
my actions as a project manager supporting a charity with this understanding of 
social change and the world are incompatible with my personal views, with my 
understanding of myself and my role in the world. 
* * * 
The volunteers. Mainly young. Four week to six months stay. Travelling through South 
America. Come here deliberately to work with the charity. Western European and North 
American. White. Predominantly women. Well-meaning. Shocked at the condition of the 
school. Shocked at the teaching. Enjoy their interactions with the pupils. Each has a 
favourite. Don’t necessarily know how to teach. 
* * * 
The headteacher steps out of his classroom. Glancing at my watch I’m surprised by 
the time and know what’s coming next. I flick off the tap and lock the access panel. 
As I’m heaving the bucket full of water to the bathrooms the head lets out a short 
blast on his whistle. 10:30. Play time. I refill the two big drums in the bathrooms, 
with no running water the toilets are flushed by dunking a small bucket in the drum 
and then emptying it into the toilet basin. I’ve only just finished by the time the first 
of the pupils is running up. I’m unsure if she’s heading for me or the bathroom so I 
swiftly step aside to clear a path just in case. Bathroom. The next one slams straight 
into my leg and sits down on my foot. I didn’t even see him coming. Scooping him 
up with one arm and the bucket in the other I head over to the concrete play area at 
the front of the school. 
For the volunteers and me this is our favourite time of the day. It’s a chance for us to 
relax and have some fun with the pupils, whether it’s playing marbles, which I’m 
really no good at, hopscotch, which sees a slight improvement, or pushing the swings, 
which is my forte. The volunteers are scattered around the playground and I wander 
about having a quick chat about how they’re getting on. The charity is kept going by 
a steady stream of volunteers who come to help us and I’m always staggered by the 
number who do so. In my more cynical moments I can’t help thinking that the 
younger volunteers are here to pad out their CV: work experience, check; travelling, 
check; volunteering, check. I know from conversations with them that they are, more 
often than not, motivated by the same initial desires as I was, “making a difference” 
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and “doing something good”. When I stop to take a breath, I know this is unfair of 
me. It’s only been in the past few weeks that I’ve began to ask questions of my own 
motivations and role, it would be hypocritical to criticise the volunteers for not doing 
the same. 
I get on very well with this group of volunteers and they clearly get on. It’s a huge 
help to us all when there aren’t any problems between the volunteers. The work 
they’re part of with the charity presents them with some difficult situations as they 
are thrust into a community which is very different to what they’re used to. When 
I’m interviewing potential volunteers, I do what I can to prepare them for the 
community, the school, and pupils, but there’s only so much you can say, sometimes 
people just have to see for themselves. It can be quite a culture shock, particularly for 
those younger volunteers for whom this is the first time away from home and their 
first time facing such conditions. When the volunteers get on well they form a 
support network for each other and they also seem to be more willing to speak to me 
about any problems or concerns they have.  
* * * 
Two brick rooms. Three wooden rooms. And a bathroom with a water tank out back. 
Yellow over blue. A stretch of concrete and dirt. A suspended shade. A swing frame with the 
swings locked in the building. Holes in the wooden walls from break-ins. Broken glass from 
beer bottles. Filling the kitchen water bucket each day. Moving the cooking range from brick 
classrooms to the kitchen. Everything locked away to stop it being stolen. Bright tiles and 
windows in the brick rooms. Dusty floors and gloom in the wooden rooms. White boards 
with jealously guarded markers. A stockpile of workbooks hidden in cupboards. A head 
teacher who likes to fish – on school days. 
* * * 
The head catches my eye halfway through play time and gestures for me to come 
over. One of the teachers is standing with him. The head and I don’t see eye-to-eye 
but I get on particularly well with the teacher standing with him and I have immense 
respect for the amount of work she does. Deciding that two of the pupils, a brother 
and sister with severe learning difficulties and special needs, need special attention, 
the head has given up his class and combined it with the year group below, taking on 
the sibling pair for himself. In practice, this means the head has more quiet time to 
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sit and read the paper while this other teacher now has a class of fifteen pupils with 
an age range of 8 – 12. In a school of 30 pupils on a good day this teacher often has 
more than half the school in her class and one of the dark and dusty wooden rooms 
to work in. 
We make our way into the head’s classroom to try and avoid any disturbances while 
we chat. ‘There’s a problem with one of the pupils,’ the head starts, ‘his parents aren’t 
happy with him having one-on-one lessons outside of the classroom, and no one asked 
them if it would be OK.’ I nod. One of the pupils has some learning difficulties and 
we, the charity and the school, thought it might be beneficial to have one of our more 
experienced volunteers who was going to be with us for another three months work 
with him on a one-on-one basis. To help him concentrate the pupil and the volunteer 
sat at a table set up just outside the classroom. The head continues, ‘They want him 
back in the classroom, taking part with the others.’ I nod again. ‘Did you explain the 
progress that he’s been making, even in these few weeks?’ I ask. ‘Claro. (of course).’ 
I let out a sigh. I’m frustrated and already thinking about the conversation that I’ll 
have to have with the volunteer who’s working with the pupil. It’ll be a hard one. 
She’ll be disappointed and won’t understand the parents’ decision. ‘Is there nothing 
we can do to change their minds?’ I ask, already knowing the answer. ‘No.’ The reply 
I expected. ‘They think he should be in the normal classes just like his brother and 
sister are.’ I sigh again. ‘He isn’t like his brother and sister,’ I exclaim, ‘he really 
struggles to sit and read and copy from a book.’ I know I don’t need to say it out loud, 
the head is well aware that the pupil struggles with the teaching style here, and there 
is only one: copying and rote learning. There’s an implicit criticism of the school in 
what I’ve said, but that passes without comment. It’s the head’s turn to nod. I turn 
to the teacher hoping to find an ally. She shrugs sympathetically, although I don’t 
know if it’s sympathy for me, the pupil, the parents, or all of us. ‘We should have 
spoken to them about it before now’, she says. And she’s right. 
It’s a feature of the way the charity operates and interacts with the community which 
aggravates the tension I’m feeling. There is a sense in which we are here to help the 
helpless community. Here we are with our notions of what progress looks like, what 
makes a happy and healthy child, what education should include, and the importance 
of a well-paying job, and we carry out these ideas without so much as a word to the 
community themselves. We have arrived wielding money and food, and knew what 
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we were going to do before we got here. We have assumed that the community would 
agree with us, that we are “doing something good”. This issue with the pupil is a 
microcosm of this. We have taken our fledgling knowledge of education and applied 
it to the situation without any consideration of the wider context. What if the pupil 
is singled out by his peers for receiving preferential treatment? What if the parents 
are singled out by the community as receiving preferential treatment? What if the 
parents simply don’t want us to work one-on-one with their son for personal, 
cultural, or other reasons? What if the pupil doesn’t want to be isolated from his 
peers? None of these are questions we have asked ourselves, the pupil, the parents, 
or the community.  
* * * 
The head leaves. Another blast on the whistle. 11:30. Break runs 30 minutes over. This is 
fairly normal. The youngest pupils line up. Soap and a bowl of water for their hands. 
Toothbrushes and a cup of water for their teeth. 4-5year olds in one class. 6-7 in another. 8-
12 in the third. Volunteers herd the remaining pupils. Calls to finish marbles. Huffing 
teachers. Scraping chairs. Shouted instructions. 
* * * 
Everyone is settled back in their classrooms and the doors are shut behind them to 
try and stop any distractions. In all but the brick built rooms this also shuts out a lot 
of the natural light, making it hard to see properly. After making sure all the 
volunteers are in place and OK I poke my head around the kitchen door to see if 
there’s anything I can do to help. Each day the lunch is prepared and cooked by a 
mother of one of the school pupils. The charity provides a budget, the cooks 
collaborate, decide what to cook each day, and buy anything they need. If there is any 
food left over at the end of the day the cooks take it home for themselves. I get on 
particularly well with the mother who’s cooking today. Three of her children are 
already at the school, and a fourth, no more than 3 months old, always comes with 
her when she’s working. The kitchen-come-cafeteria is as gloomy as the other 
wooden rooms, but in here the constant dry, dusty smell is over-ridden by whatever 
is being cooked that day, lending the space a less hostile feeling.  
This is the normal rhythm of my day once the volunteers have been here long enough 
to know the ropes. The title of Project Manager may sound grand, but in reality, 
- 11 - 
once things are up and running, and barring any unforeseen occurrences, there’s little 
to manage. Rather than buzz in and out of the rooms making a nuisance of myself, or 
go to help out in a classroom when there’s a chance I’ll be called out and disrupt 
things, I go and spend some time with whoever is cooking that day. By doing this I 
gain two things. On the one hand it gives me something useful to do. On the other, 
it gives me a chance to interact with the mothers, and through our conversations 
gain a better understanding of what is going on in the wider community. I’m hoping 
that by spending time speaking with people in the community about what we, the 
charity, is doing here, how it’s received, and how we might do things differently I 
can relieve some of the imperial feelings about the charity’s approach and my own 
actions. 
The cook beams a smile as I peer into the folds of the blanket at her baby sleeping 
soundly among the constant sounds and smells. ‘We don’t have enough onions, could 
you pick some up from the shop?’ I nod, jog out of the kitchen and turn up the hill 
behind the school. The community is dotted with shops people have set up in their 
front rooms, but there’s only one which usually has fresh fruit and vegetables. 
Wading through a small sand drift and jumping over a trench that’s been redug once 
more in the promise of a sewage system which never arrives, I walk over to the shop 
and rap on the grate over the door with a coin. Someone comes through from the rest 
of the house and opens up. I scoop up some onions and have a quick chat before 
heading back to the kitchen. Time moves surprisingly quickly here and I know it’s 
not long until the first of the classes will come through for lunch. 
‘The potatoes’, the cook says gesturing to a bowl as I hand over the onions. I’ve done 
this enough times to know what she wants me to do and I pick up a serrated knife to 
make a start on peeling off the skins. The potatoes are freshly boiled and even the 
ones on top are still hot enough to hurt my fingertips but I know we don’t have long 
to get them ready. I set about burning my fingers, and being laughed at for doing so, 
and we chat about how she’s doing, how the family is, how the children are getting 
on at school. I’m peeling off the last of the skins when one of the volunteers leans 
through the window to ask if lunch is ready for the youngest students. The cook 
gives a quick nod and the volunteer disappears from the window to reappear 
moments later in the doorway leading a train of four and five-year olds. 
* * * 
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Potatoes, lettuce, tomato, and spicy peanut sauce. Liver, peas, rice. Vegetable rostis and rice. 
Not enough plastic plates. Wash up as soon as one pupil is finished so another can eat. Pass 
out plastic cups of chichi, the sweet corn drink. Make sure each pupil has eaten properly. 
Collect plates and cutlery. Wash up again. Sweep the floor of dust and dropped food. Don’t 
want to attract the stray dogs. Carry the cooking range to the brick classrooms overnight. 
Teachers slip away as soon as they can. Check under tables and chairs for pupils. Padlocks 
swing and snap into place. Locked for the day. 14:00. Students drift away across the 
community. Some wait to take our hands. 
* * * 
I’m tired and coated in dust. Making my way down the hillside with the volunteers 
we talk about how the day has gone and any questions they have. I arrange to talk 
with the volunteer who works one-on-one with the pupil who needs to go back into 
the classroom, but that’s a conversation for another day. We’re both shattered at the 
moment. We’re in luck today and as we make our way past the rubbish dump where 
the community joins the tarmac roads a combi pulls up which can take us back to the 
centre of the city. Combis are what keeps most of the city moving, and at the same 
time stuck in traffic. The community is at the end of the line so we’re the first people 
on. I collapse into my seat, folding my legs up and I can already feel weight pushing 
down on my eyes. It will take around 45 minutes to get to the centre and it’s a chance 
for me to get some sleep before I go to my second job. 
The combi rolls its way down through the foothills of the volcanoes. Outside the 
windows the buildings take on a greater sense of permanence, these are areas of the 
city which are more established and benefit from a full range of utilities. I’m drifting 
in and out of sleep as the volunteers and locals shout to each other to make 
themselves heard over the straining engine. As we approach my stop I unfold myself 
from my seat and start squeezing through the human mass jammed into the combi. 
They’re cheap transport for everyone and make their money by packing in as many 
people as possible. Moving around in them always reminds me of the children’s 
puzzles with a jumbled picture and a single missing tile space: A particular set of 
moves is needed to get the right image. A particular set of moves is needed to get off 
the combi as people shuffle into the space I vacate on my way to the front.  
I climb the shaking iron staircase to my flat. The last thing I want to do right now 
is get changed and go teach at the university for a few hours. I peel off my dusty 
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clothes, shake them out on the balcony and fold them on a chair ready for tomorrow. 
Shower on, and one of the advantages of showering mid-afternoon, the sun has had 
plenty of time to heat the water tank on the roof. The shower works like it always 
does, breathing life back into me. Smart trousers, a shirt, and shoes, and my 
transformation is complete. I head back down the stairs and make the short walk to 
university. From the outside the difference between my work in the community and 
my teaching at the university could not be greater, but similarities exist, and there 
are tensions here in the same way as at my work for the charity. 
* * * 
A private university. Fee-paying students. A foreign language requisite. Students paying 
extra for English classes. Guards at the gate. White walls and bright lights. Large foyers. A 
timetable of classes on the office window. Find my name and room number. Collect the 
necessary text book. Find the classroom. Familiar student faces. Whiteboards. Markers. 
Seats with tables attached. Re-arrange the seating. 
* * * 
The university couldn’t look more different to the school in the community. It’s one 
of several private universities in Arequipa and much like the others the gated 
entrance is guarded by security guards standing like sentinels and checking I.Ds on 
the way in. The inner courtyard has a few plants dotted around defying the relentless 
sun and maintaining their green, and the building towers around me at three stories 
high. I make my way into the main building and up two flights of wide stairs kept 
meticulously clean. High ceilings, white walls and big windows make the university 
feel as airy and open as the wooden classrooms in the community feel closed and 
gloomy. 
I find my classroom and unpack my things. The students start to drift in at 16:00. 
It’s a slow-drip that will quite possibly last until 16:15. Time is a fluid concept in 
Peru. Before I teach a new course, no matter how many times I’ve done so, I get very 
nervous: what if we don’t get on? What if I can’t remember part of the course? What 
if I make an idiot of myself? It’s the first day of a new month of courses and I’m 
teaching the module which leads on from the previous month. This means that I 
know most of the students as I taught them until just a few days ago in the old class. 
Although the university often tries to ensure that you don’t teach the same class for 
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two months in a row, it can happen, and comes with positives and negatives. We 
smile and great each other easily, many of the guys offering me a handshake as they 
enter the room. I got on well with this group last time and it’s nice to see them again. 
I can feel my heart rate steadying as more and more familiar faces come in. 
It’s 16:10 and the stream of students has all but stopped. Someone leans over to pull 
the door to, but a hand shoots into the gap. Then an arm, a leg, a body, a face. Ah. 
He’s here. I failed this student last time round. He didn’t really work or participate 
in the classes, so I couldn’t get a sense of his comprehension or speaking skills. The 
exam did nothing but show that he doesn’t really understand the grammar we had 
been working on either. There was no way that I could let him pass. It would have 
been pointless. It’s not about his failing the exam; exams are far from the best way to 
establish a student’s understanding of a subject. It’s that throughout the previous 
month he rarely showed anything but the most basic understanding of English. For 
him to carry on to the next module, the one we’re starting today, is a waste of time. 
Most of it will go straight over his head, and I don’t have the time in the class to help 
him catch up, even if he wanted to. 
And this is the downside of teaching the same group. I’m stuck and conflicted. And 
more than anything, I’m annoyed that no matter how many times I speak to the 
management in the department, it keeps on happening. The students pay to have 
English classes, and they have to have a certificate in a foreign language to get their 
degree. In many cases, as long as they continue paying, the department is happy to 
keep advancing them up the levels, regardless of their ability. This isn’t education, 
it’s a barely concealed commercial exchange dressed up in a cloak of acceptability by 
taking place in a university. Not that the university is alone in the practice. I’ve also 
worked in two private language institutes where it was exactly the same. It feels like 
something similar is happening at the university as it is at the community; the pupils 
at the school and the students at the community are being taught how to survive or 
thrive in a world based on economics, divisions and hierarchies. 
We greet each other and I hope the smile that I’m working to hold doesn’t slide into 
the annoyance that I’m feeling; it’s not his fault he’s in this class. All he’ll want to do 
is get to the end of the set of courses and receive the certificate which says he can 
speak English. I push my annoyance aside and focus on the class in front of me. 
* * * 
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A textbook and workbook for each course. Three courses per level. Five levels in total. A 
series of pre-planned exercises. From first page to last. Reading. Writing. Listening. 
Speaking. Grammar. Group work. Individual work. Planned progression. Content divided 
by day. A ‘Teachers Guide’ for how to conduct each exercise. A time-frame for each task. 
* * * 
I hold up my copy of the textbook for this module, ‘Does everybody have a copy? Or, 
if you’re waiting for one, can everyone see a copy?’ Nods ripple around the room. 
‘Great’, I continue, ‘can you open up to pages 4 and 5, and we’ll make a start.’ I feel 
like I know the book and the tasks like the back of my hand: I’ve taught this module 
twice before. The first task is a reading piece about the Great Ocean Road in 
Australia, it’s meant to introduce the students to the past participle; have eaten, have 
seen, have driven, etc. Seeing the text again reminds me of how annoyed I got with 
it last time. All of the examples and tasks in textbooks are so far removed from the 
reference points and lives of these students. I know we have to do past participles as 
it’s in the exam at the end of the month, but I’ve thought of a slightly different way 
of doing them this time round. My knowledge of pedagogy is limited to the short 
TEFL course that I took and my experiences of teaching over the last one-and-a-half 
years, so I don’t really have the language to explain what I want to do differently, or 
why, I just know that I want to experiment. 
Sighing, I close the book and place it on the small lectern at the front of the room. 
Pulling one of the chairs round so that I sit at the end of the semi-circle and I can see 
everyone, I sit down: ‘So’, time to jump in, ‘today I have worked at the project. I have 
eaten lunch. I have had a shower. I have walked to work.’ I pause and write the past 
participles on the board. I’m hoping that I can inject a bit more life and interest into 
the work by eliciting the grammar rule from the students and asking them to tell the 
rest of the class about their day using past participles. The pre-packaged work 
included in the textbooks can be so dull and detached, and until now I’ve never really 
had the confidence to try something different. At the same time, I’m painfully aware 
of the time constraints that we have. Just four weeks, five days a week, minus a few 
for exam preparation, means we end up with 17 sessions together. If this doesn’t 
work we’ve lost a session. 
I look at the board and back at the students. ‘Can you spot any patterns here?’ I ask. 
‘Are there any familiar elements in these sentences?’ A pause. It stretches. And 
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stretches. I can almost see it reaching out in front of me. Just as I’m about to speak 
again after what must have been only a handful of seconds, someone catches my eye 
and starts to speak, ‘”Have” is a verb. And the others look like past-tense verbs.’ I 
breathe what I hope is an inaudible sigh of relief. We talk through how a past 
participle is formed, and using a timeline drawn on the board, how it is used. I hand 
over to the students and ask them to write a series of sentences about their days. It 
seems to be working, a different way to talk about past participles which uses the 
students’ own lives and experiences as the starting point. I’m excited about what’s 
happening, but I have no idea how to do it with other topics. 
* * * 
Climb the shaking staircase. A pair of bare bulbs cast the room in a yellow glow. A double 
bed. A small wardrobe. A small fridge. Two gas rings. A patio table and chairs. Two 
wicker comfy chairs. A thin film of dust on the floor. Dump my bag on a chair. Laptop on, 
shirt and trousers off. Into more comfortable clothing. Yesterday’s dinner out of the fridge. 
Balcony door open to let air in. A cacophony of noise from the last combis of the day. 
Exhaustion. 
* * * 
The tension I feel between me and my actions at the charity and the university is 
building. The approach to the community, the underlying belief of social change 
through higher income, the payment for progression at the university, the 
prearranged and irrelevant course content. I’m entangled in all of these practices and 
I’m struggling to see my way through. How do I continue working for the charity 
and the university while I have such strong negative feelings about their actions? Is 
there a way to work for the charity, work with the community, and work towards my 
own vision of the world? Is there a way to teach in these institutions and resist the 
underlying premises of them? A way to cover the content, meet the requirements of 
the university, the needs of the students, while unpicking some of the elements of the 
university I don’t agree with. It’s the end of the long day and I’m drained. My mind 
jumps from one thing to the next, unable to find any rest. 
The work at the charity is good, it’s helping. 
    But it’s not something I’m comfortable with. 
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  The university is driving me mad. 
I love working with the children, and I must be having a positive impact in the community. 
The teaching is fine, I think. I enjoy being in the classroom. And teaching English. 
 What can we do to work with the community differently? 
   I need the work at the university, it’s my only income. 
Maybe I could talk to the department again about moving students up a level. 
It worked today, talking about past participles differently. I should try it with other topics. 
I flick the TV on to distract myself. It’s almost time for the local news and the Spanish 
will force me to concentrate. Despite the difficulties that I have with both jobs, I love 
what I do. The contradictions and conflicts that I’m feeling don’t detract from the 
overwhelming sense that I’m happy here. But equally, that doesn’t detract from me 
looking forward to getting back to the UK. 
I pull a letter down from the shelves. It’s from the University of Kent offering me a 
place on an MA programme. I’ve already been through the modules that are on offer 
numerous times and I’ve got an idea of what I’d like to look at. I can’t wait to get 
back to my own formal education. Being in Peru, in fact, the four years since I finished 
my undergrad, have all been a learning curve; working in a secondary school, 
working in a call centre, learning to teach English, moving to Peru, learning Spanish, 
meeting people, learning the city, learning about running a project, learning about 
myself. But the pull to go back to university and pick up on some of my questions in 
a more formal setting is really exciting. 
The news starts. I put the letter aside and take the pan of yesterday’s left-overs off 
the stove. I grab a fork and a chopping board and set the pan down on the table. I 
listen to the news of protests against the proposal to increase combi prices, 
disturbances near a potential mine-site not far from the city, and the ever-present-
but-never-arriving promise of a city funded bus system. I turn off the TV and pick 
up a book. Only six months more. 
* * * 
A sunny September. A green campus. More buildings than I remember. Student 
accommodation. A conference on Latin America on my first weekend. A chance encounter 
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with a PhD student. A shared interest in Latin America. A talk about experiences. My 
frustrations and questions. His research with social movements. He suggests Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed. I pick up a copy from the library that day. A language to talk about some of 
my experiences of education. 
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1. Introduction 
Critical pedagogy is an approach to education which argues that all education is 
political, and therefore education is always working either to maintain the status quo 
or to change it (Freire 1996). Which politics education follows comes down to those 
who direct the education, be that ministers at the national level or teachers in the 
classroom. In its most recent formulations critical pedagogy has positioned itself as a 
response to neo-liberalism and neo-liberal approaches to education, arguing that the 
neo-liberal state prioritises private wealth over public need, and that neo-liberal 
education is specifically geared towards the inculcation of students into economic 
practices and logic based on privatised and individualised competitive gain (McLaren 
and Kincheloe 2007; Macrine 2009; Giroux 2011; Porfilio 2011; Nikolakaki 2012). It 
was this critique of neo-liberalism which made critical pedagogy so attractive 
following my return from Peru. For critical pedagogy, education is part of changing 
the oppressive status quo of neo-liberalism and working towards a society which has 
greater democracy, social justice, equality, and freedom (Biesta 1998). Critical 
pedagogy aspires to a state which is a reformed entity for the use of progressive 
parties in the inclusion of more participatory forms of democracy (Freire 1998; Carr 
2011a; Wheeler-Bell 2014; Liou and Rojas 2016); of the critical citizen as one who is 
self-reflective, aware of the role she plays in society, and is critical of structures of 
power which maintain oppressive practices (Giroux 1992, Macedo 2009; Saltman 
2009; Sandlin and McLaren 2010; McDonald and Underhill 2014); and of the teacher 
as a transformative intellectual who works tirelessly for the education and creation 
of critical citizens in the classroom and beyond (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987; Freire 
2000, 2001; Darder 2009; Giroux 2011) . However, I argue here that for all its laudable 
critique, theory and practice, critical pedagogy’s vision of the reformed state, critical 
citizens, and transformative intellectuals imposes limits on social change. In 
establishing its vision, critical pedagogy predetermines the social change possible by 
binding it to state structures as the form of social organisation and by establishing a 
very specific form of subjectivity for the student and teacher alike. Therefore, rather 
than enhancing freedom through education, critical pedagogy limits possibilities. 
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My critique of critical pedagogy is informed by postanarchism, a particular 
development of anarchist thought which argues for the ever-present possibility of 
freedom for the subject to (trans)form her own subjectivity and relationships apart 
from external pressures and expectations. Establishing a critique of neo-liberalism 
through the formation of subjectivity, the actions of the subject, and the 
relationships of the subject, anarchism, via postanarchism, puts forward a radical 
response to the pressures of neo-liberalism which attempt to give form to subjects 
through various predetermined identities, roles, and behaviours (Newman 2016). I 
draw on an anarchist framework in my critique of critical pedagogy to argue that 
critical pedagogy exerts similar pressures on the subject to operate in a particular 
predetermined form of social organisation, the reformed state, and to conform to 
particular predetermined forms of subjectivity, the critical citizen and the 
transformative intellectual. This critique has been shaped by several questions which 
form the backbone of this thesis and are borne out of my experiences in Peru and 
following my return to higher education in the UK: How radical is the social change 
called for in critical pedagogy, and how does it operate as a response to neo-
liberalism? How can we approach our own (trans)formation without tying ourselves 
to predetermined understandings of the subject and action? How can we envisage 
and enact an approach to education which does not predetermine forms of 
subjectivity, action, and relationships? And finally, how can I enact an approach to 
education which builds from postanarchist understandings of subjectivity, action, 
and relationships? 
Ultimately, this thesis is a critique of critical pedagogy in the context of a neo-
liberal higher education institution, the aim of which is to explore my attempts to 
create a classroom space which distances external pressures and invites me and the 
students to take control of our own actions and behaviours, i.e. the formation of our 
own subjectivity. In answering the first question, how radical is the social change 
called for in critical pedagogy, and how does it operate as a response to neo-
liberalism?, I explore critical pedagogy’s understanding of the reformed state, the 
critical citizen and the transformative intellectual. It is here that I argue that through 
the lens of anarchism and the subject, her relationships, and (trans)formation, that 
critical pedagogy cannot operate as a response to neo-liberalism. This sets up the 
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subsequent three questions, if critical pedagogy cannot offer a response to the neo-
liberal context I work in, what can? The second question regarding our own 
(trans)formation without predetermination is answered as I expand on anarchism 
and the postanarchist focus on the subject through an engagement with Michel 
Foucault’s work on care of the self. To answer the third question about an approach 
to education informed by postanarchist concerns with subjectivity, action, and 
relationships I explore the possibilities of subversive practice in everyday life and the 
possible creation of spaces in which externally defined roles and behaviours are 
distanced. Finally, I use autoethnographic narratives to explore my attempts at the 
creation of such a space as a response to both critical pedagogy and neo-liberalism. 
Before getting into these questions in more detail it is first necessary to establish the 
background to critical pedagogy which lays the foundations for my critique. 
What is Critical Pedagogy? 
The first step in outlining the aims and scope of this thesis is to provide the reader 
with an introduction to critical pedagogy. Beginning with the early work of Brazilian 
educator Paulo Freire, I take the reader through the development of critical 
pedagogy as an educational, social and political theory and practice. In the course of 
this introduction we track the development of the theoretical underpinnings of 
critical pedagogy through the 1980s to the 2000s, consider the rise of various 
critiques of critical pedagogy through the late 1980s and early 1990s, and explore the 
broadening of the field of critical pedagogy to include a wide array of theoretical 
perspectives of education, society and politics. This acts as both an introduction to 
the field and a literature review, enabling me to place my work in the context of 
existing critiques of critical pedagogy and point the way for the coming chapters. 
Paulo Freire and the Roots of Critical Pedagogy 
To understand the foundations of critical pedagogy means to understand more about 
Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator whose seminal book Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(1993; 2005) lies at the heart of what is now an expansive movement of critical 
educational, social, and political theory and practice. Born in Pernambuco in north-
east Brazil in 1921, Freire describes his family as straddling the social divide between 
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middle and working class, referring to himself and his three siblings as ‘connective 
kids’ (1996, 21-22) – children who occupied areas of both the middle and working 
class life, with the outward markings of the middle classes such as the clothing they 
wore, and with the inner troubles associated with the hunger of the working classes 
(ibid.). After initially struggling with schooling Freire discovered a love of teaching 
which was to stay with him throughout his life (ibid., 50). Although Freire originally 
trained to be a lawyer and went as far as successfully defending his first client, he 
soon changed direction and put his energies into education. 
Freire found work teaching Portuguese to adult learners and later ran the 
education programme of the Social Service of Industry, overseeing the educational 
activities of the service designed to support industrial workers and their families in 
north-east Brazil (Schugurensky 2011, 16). It was during these years of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s that Freire became more involved in politics in Brazil, particularly 
around the issue of social change through literacy and voting. At the time being 
literate was a condition of suffrage in Brazil, and without being able to vote poor 
Brazilians had no say in the running of the state. For Freire, education was political 
because the decisions made about the education of the rural poor, or lack of it, was 
a deliberate move to prevent the poor’s participation in Brazilian politics. Freire was 
actively involved with three key groups in the early 1960s, the Movement for Popular 
Culture, the Cultural Extension Service at the University of Pernambuco, and an adult 
literacy programme in the Rio Grande do Norte region. All the groups shared the 
common theme of a critical understanding of society and the state and engaged in 
various means to increase the role of civil society in the areas surrounding Paulo's 
native Recife. Consisting of a range of intellectuals, artists, politicians, workers and 
teachers, the groups strove for the progression of Brazilian society (Freire 1996, 109). 
For Freire, the greater involvement of a greater number of people had the potential 
to fundamentally unbalance the power of the established political elites and their 
parties. Consequently, Freire began working to improve the literacy levels of the 
urban and rural poor alike in order to empower them as citizens to play a role in the 
development of Brazilian society through participation in state institutions via voting 
(Freire 1996, 109; Schugurensky 2011, 20-21). 
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The success of the literacy projects was to be Freire’s undoing following the coup 
d’etat of April 1964. In his attempts to increase the suffrage of the rural poor Freire 
was seen as a threat to the newly established Brazilian military elite government and 
was arrested as a dissident and charged with being a traitor to the Brazilian people. 
After several months in prison Freire was released and sought refuge in Bolivia before 
being uprooted again three weeks later and moving to Chile. This was the start of 
fifteen years of exile in which Freire and his family would live in Chile (’64-’69), the 
USA (’69-’70), and Switzerland (’70-’79) (Schugurensky 2011, 23-24). 
During the first years of his exile in Chile Freire once again established educational 
programmes working with the rural poor and drew on his experiences in Brazil and 
Chile to write Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1993). Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
represents a first sustained attempt by Freire to explore his criticism of traditional 
approaches to education and his suggestions for an alternative. In the course of the 
work Freire articulates a blend of Marxism, Hegelian dialectics, and liberation 
theology to argue that traditional educational systems act to ensure the ongoing 
oppression of large sections of society resulting in the dehumanisation of both the 
oppressed and the oppressors (ibid., 44). 
Freire’s critique of traditional methods of education set out in Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed is the basis of critical pedagogy. Freire characterises traditional 
approaches to education as “banking”, in which the teacher takes the role of an 
active subject who through narration fills the passive students with knowledge (2005, 
71-72). In so doing, education is reduced to an act of depositing ‘in which the 
students are the depositories and the teacher is the despositor’ (ibid., 72). The result 
of this student-teacher relationship is that there is no communication between the 
students and the teacher, there are only communiqués issued by the teacher which 
are to be memorised and repeated by the students. In this educational approach 
students are not taught to think, create, and question knowledge, but are taught to 
unquestionably accept the knowledge gifted to them in their ignorance by the 
knowledgeable teacher (ibid., 72). Placing this critique of traditional approaches to 
education in the larger societal context, Freire argues that in this educational system 
the students are actively prevented from considering their own position in the world 
and the role they can play in shaping the world around them. This prevention is 
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described by Freire as a process of dehumanisation in which students are prevented 
from fulfilling their uniquely human role of being active agents in the world (ibid., 
25). Instead of engaging students in a process of knowledge creation and self-
affirmation (ibid, 18), the banking model of education holds students in a position of 
oppression (ibid., 55). Freire argues that while those practicing the banking model 
are oppressors of the students, they are themselves dehumanised by their actions as 
it is not part of the ontological vocation of humans to oppress others (ibid., 25). The 
banking model of education as an institution of the state ensures the continued 
oppression of students and the continued dehumanisation of teachers and students 
alike in favour of the ruling elites who are served by a compliant and uncritical 
population (ibid., 73).  
In response to the traditional approach to education Freire proposes an 
alternative, ‘libertarian’, or ‘problem-posing’ education (Freire 2005, 72; 79). At the 
heart of libertarian education is the emancipation of students through their 
involvement in the process of knowledge creation and the creation of the space and 
conditions for them to pursue their self-affirmation and freedom, which is the 
ontological vocation of humans (ibid., 55-56). Libertarian education aims to 
humanise or re-humanise those who have been dehumanised through the 
oppressive practices of traditional education. To do this, libertarian education brings 
critical thinking to the fore and Freire argues that it is through critical thinking that 
students can come to see themselves as actors in the world, rather than passive 
objects of systems beyond their control. In order to highlight the students’ role as 
social actors Freire’s problem-posing education places the context of the students at 
the centre of any educational programme. In contrast to depositing knowledge 
deemed suitable and necessary by others, liberatory education starts from the 
immediate world of the students and draws its material from their knowledge and 
experiences. Freire argues that by posing questions about the community in which 
the students live, students are able to gain a critical distance to their everyday life 
and are better able to consider the active roles they play as citizens in their 
community and society at large. 
An example of Freire’s theory in practice is the culture circle and the use of image 
as a generative theme. In preparation to establish an education programme in an 
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area, Freire and his team would spend a considerable amount of time in the 
community, getting to know the members of the community, their daily routines and 
the language they use. Based on this information Freire would work with an artist to 
produce an image of a particular part or moment from the community to be used as 
a starting point in class. One of the most famous of these images is a farmer standing 
to the side of a well with farm tools around him and a house in the background. 
Arranging the members of the class around the image Freire would begin to ask them 
about what they could see and if the image reflected their own experiences of 
community life (Freire 2005, 96-104). Freire highlighted the human impact captured 
in the image in front of the class: someone had dug the well, someone had built the 
house, and someone had cultivated the land, asking whether it could be that that 
someone is the person in the image. Freire argued that in the critical distance created 
by viewing an image of their own environment the students were able to understand 
that they too have had an impact on the world around them. Were it not for the 
students, there would be no well, no house, no farm. It was crucial for Freire to point 
out that the students’ actions have changed the world in the past, continued to 
change the world in the present, and consequently could change the world in the 
future (ibid., 61). This interplay between action and reflection on action has since 
become a central notion of critical pedagogy: praxis. Praxis is the ongoing 
relationship between taking action and critically reflecting on the action taken to 
inform future action (ibid., 62-65). By entering the process of praxis students come 
to see the world as an arena they are able to shape and transform through their 
thought and action, and as a consequence the libertarian education proposed by 
Freire becomes a vehicle for social change. In exploring the notion of praxis Freire is 
careful to note that it is precisely the interaction between thought and action which 
is crucial in liberatory education, as without thought and reflection, action becomes 
activism – ‘action for action’s sake’ (ibid., 69) – which negates the possibility of 
communication, dialogue and consideration of the action taken. 
Freire’s approach to education brings with it a different student-teacher 
relationship to that found in banking education and focuses on communication and 
dialogue between teachers and students rather than communiqués issued by the 
teacher for memorisation by the students. In order to strive for the humanisation of 
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all involved, liberatory education requires the teacher to engage in an ongoing effort 
to communicate with the students about the world around them, fundamentally 
shifting the understanding of knowledge to a collaborative and co-creative basis 
(Freire 1993, 61). By engaging in dialogue with students to enhance their critical 
thinking and self-affirmation as actors in the world the ‘teacher-of-the-students and 
the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist’ (ibid., 61) and in their place arise new 
terms and forms of relationship, ‘teacher-student’ and ‘student-teacher’ (ibid., 61). 
The importance of this terminological shift is profound as teachers find themselves 
realigned on the side of freedom rather than oppression. In working with the 
students as co-creators of knowledge teachers are no longer replicating the 
oppressive structures of the classroom and society at large found in the banking 
model of education. Rather, teachers are working with students to assist them in 
recognising their ability to be actors in the world, to become active citizens in their 
country, and to challenge oppressive practices. 
For Freire, this realignment of teachers and the pursuit of students’ critical 
thinking and self-affirmation enables dramatic social change through the 
empowerment of the oppressed to change the world in ways which benefit all, rather 
than unquestioningly continuing to conform to educational, social, and political 
circumstances which only serve the interests of the ruling elites. For Freire, and many 
of those who went on to work on critical pedagogy, this social change occurs through 
greater engagement with all aspects of social and political life, ranging from 
community groups, to unions, to organised political parties (Aronowitz 2008, 78). It 
is this notion at the heart of all the strands of critical pedagogy to come in the 
decades which followed the release of Pedagogy of the Oppressed: education is 
political, and education can help to change the world for the better through greater 
justice, equality, democracy, and freedom (Biesta 1998, 499). 
Embedded within this central claim of Freire’s were several other important 
elements of what came to be known as critical pedagogy: the context of the students 
as the starting point of education, the need for praxis, and the importance of 
dialogue. Since Freire’s work critical pedagogy has expanded along many different 
strands, which share a common understanding of the political nature of education 
and the possibility of social change through education and engagement with political 
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life and which have led to critical pedagogy being described as a big tent of ideas 
(Lather 2001; Choules 2007; Amsler 2011). 
The Development of Critical Pedagogy 
From these beginnings Freire’s work was picked up by North American academics 
such as Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Ira Shor, Stanley Aronowitz, Shirley Steinberg, 
Joe Kincheloe, bell hooks, and Donaldo Macedo. Indeed, it was in a conversation 
between Freire and Giroux that the term critical pedagogy was coined as a name for 
the critical educational work these scholars were undertaking. The term ‘radical 
pedagogy’ was initially proposed as a name of this branch of theory and practice, but 
it was deemed as potentially too divisive and off-putting to some, and the softer 
sounding term ‘critical pedagogy’ was adopted instead (FreireProject 2007). This 
collection of thinkers began to work closely with Freire’s original ideas expressed in 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed and started adding greater theoretical depth to Freire’s 
work. All of these scholars have maintained their engagement with critical pedagogy 
over the subsequent decades as they sought to elucidate critical pedagogy’s 
grounding in critical theory (Giroux 1983) and Marxism (McLaren 1989), as well as 
expand Freire’s initial critique of traditional education to include other dominant 
educational approaches (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987; Shor and Freire 1987), and to 
add complexity to Freire’s binary of oppressor/oppressed through the introduction 
of race, gender, class, and culture, and poststructural considerations of power and 
authority (McLaren 1989; hooks 1994; Usher and Edwards, 1994; Giroux 1996; 
Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997; Aronowitz, 2008). 
In order to better understand the big tent of critical pedagogy as it stands now, it 
is important to explore the development of critical pedagogy from the 1980s through 
to the 2000s. This development of critical pedagogy occurred in two main areas: first, 
the development of critiques of different approaches to schooling to include 
orthodox Marxist, liberal, and conservative approaches; and second, the 
development of a critique of more complex and interlinked forms of oppression. Both 
of these areas have played an important role in the spread of critical pedagogy as an 
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educational, social, and political theory and practice.1 The development of critical 
pedagogy through the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s was accompanied by an increasing 
number of critiques of critical pedagogy which sought to further develop and expand 
critical pedagogy as a theory and practice of education. While some of these critiques 
aimed at pushing and developing critical pedagogy through addressing perceived 
blind-spots in its growing body of theoretical work (Ellsworth 1989; Lather 1998; 
2001) others focused on the problems teachers had with translating the abstract 
work of critical pedagogy into the complex and tension-ridden contexts of their 
classrooms (Berlak 1989; Britzman 1991; Weiler 1994; Boyd 1999; Johnston 1999; 
Tinning 2002; McKinney 2005; Power 2008).  
Lifting Freire’s original critique of the banking model of education, and putting it 
into the context of the global north, Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux turned their 
attention to three dominant understandings of education; orthodox Marxist, 
conservative, and liberal, pointing out the limitations of each and the role they play 
in ongoing forms of oppression (1987). In their critique of orthodox Marxism, 
Aronowitz and Giroux describe an approach to education which takes account of the 
relationship between education and society, and sets out to analyse said 
relationship, but does so only through the lens of reproduction. While Aronowitz and 
Giroux highlight the important role such analyses played in breaking open the school 
as a site of analysis, they argue that the human component in education is often lost 
along the way (ibid., 70). Orthodox Marxism models education in three particular 
ways; economic-reproductive, cultural-reproductive, and hegemonic-reproductive, 
each illuminating a particular facet of the relationship between individual and 
society, but none pointing a way out of the system of reproduction (ibid., 73-75). 
Economic-reproductive understandings of education highlight the role education 
plays in the creation of conforming workers who neatly slot in to their predetermined 
economic roles in society. Cultural-reproductive analysis draws out the ways in which 
dominant forms of knowledge and values are reinforced and reproduced through 
education, and hegemonic-reproductive analysis examines the processes which 
                                                 
1 All the thinkers discussed here have been somewhat artificially separated in the pursuit of 
structural clarity. Suffice to say that while some may have a particular focus their work stretches 
across multiple areas and often comes as selections within larger edited volumes. 
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legitimate the ideological imperatives of the ruling elites (ibid., 70). Aronowitz and 
Giroux’s critique follows that if education is approached in purely reproductive terms 
and this reproduction is seen as a form of domination, education loses its 
emancipatory potential and becomes nothing more than a tool in the maintenance 
of established forms of oppression. Aronowitz and Giroux claim that in orthodox 
Marxism there is no allowance for moments of creativity, self-formation, or 
resistance, leading such an approach into a theoretical and practical cul-de-sac (ibid., 
70). Paul Willis’ (1977) study of working class boys in England was central in the 
development of Aronowitz and Grioux’s critique. Willis broke with the assumption of 
unquestioned reproduction in schools by demonstrating that the boys enacted 
multiple moments of resistance throughout the day. Without allowing space for 
resistance and no chance for radical social change orthodox Marxism’s approach to 
education may illuminate the world around the students through encouraging critical 
thought, but it misses out on a crucial element of critical pedagogy: praxis. By only 
considering the reproductive roles of education any chance for students to actively 
engage with social and political life is removed, and as a result education loses the 
vital element of reflection on action (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987, 70). 
Another approach critiqued by Aronowitz and Giroux was the conservative 
approach to education, characterised by a concentration on standardisation, 
technical mastery of subject matter, and the pursuit of qualifications. The 
conservative approach to education is focussed exclusively on the creation of 
effective workers, ‘turning schools into “company stores” and defining school life 
primarily in terms that measure their utility against their contribution to economic 
growth and cultural conformity’ (Giroux 1989, 18). Relying on the same positivist 
epistemology identified by Freire in his critique of the banking model of education, 
conservative approaches to schooling reduce education to an exercise in the 
technical mastery of a subject by way of knowledge transfer and the ranking of 
students according to externally defined standards (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987, 65). 
Aronowitz and Giroux argue that in this approach education is reduced to a technical 
exercise which is unconcerned with students as anything other than parts in the 
continuation of the status quo. They claim that the conservative approach to 
schooling leaves students as functionally literate, in that they are able to read and 
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write, but conceptually illiterate in that students are unable to think on a conceptual, 
and therefore critical, level (ibid., 202). This critique of conservative approaches to 
schooling is perhaps the closest to Freire’s original banking model critique. By 
removing the possibility to think critically students in conservative approaches to 
education are unable to view themselves as actors in the world, are unable to view 
the change they have already brought upon the world, and are therefore unable to 
consider the future change they could bring through greater involvement in social 
and political life. 
Finally, in the early days of the development of critical pedagogy, Aronowitz and 
Giroux took aim at liberal approaches to education premised upon notions of 
meritocracy and social mobility. Aronowitz and Giroux argue that the open admission 
systems of liberal educational approaches which are designed to broaden access to 
education on the basis of ability do nothing more than entrench hierarchies of 
educational institutions (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987, 69). The claim to meritocracy 
ignores the social and economic factors which impact the educational prospects of 
students, cloaking them in language of opportunity and ability. As a result, those 
institutions which traditionally attracted the more traditionally academically 
successful students will continue to do so, while other students will be directed to 
other institutions under the banner of open access (ibid., 3). This meritocratic 
approach goes hand-in-hand with claims of education for social mobility, in which 
education enables the working classes to be lifted into the middle classes by virtue 
of educational attainment and the subsequent employment opportunities. 
Aronowitz and Giroux point out that notions of social mobility are ‘based on the 
assumption of an expanding economy’ (ibid., 28), anticipating the newly educated 
and mobile working classes take on the white collar managerial positions of the 
middle class. However, at the time of writing with the recessions and economic 
volatility of the 1980s, this assumption was shown to be unrealistic, and is equally 
problematic today following the financial and economic shocks of 2008 onwards. 
Without an expanding economy, argue Aronowitz and Giroux, there cannot be the 
creation of jobs necessary to fulfil the liberal promise of social mobility (ibid., 28). 
With these three critiques of prominent educational approaches Aronowitz and 
Giroux sought to build on the foundational ideas found in Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
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to more closely and critically examine approaches to schooling in the global north. 
Along with these developed critiques, critical pedagogy from the 1980s through to 
the late 2000s also developed a more complex and nuanced understanding of forms 
of oppression at work in, and reinforced by, education. From Freire’s work in 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed which established an all-too-straight-forward 
oppressor/oppressed dichotomy, critical pedagogy began to account for the various 
forms of oppression through critical reflection on class, race, gender and culture. I 
concentrate here on two major strands in this development of oppression and critical 
pedagogy: class through a development of Marxism, and issues of race and gender. 
Together Peter McLaren and Stanley Aronowitz represent the development and 
maintenance of Marxism and the role of class in critical pedagogy. McLaren is 
perhaps the most vociferous proponent of the Marxist strand in Paulo Freire's 
original work. In a succession of pieces starting from his early Life in Schools (1989) 
and continuing through to his more recent pieces (2007, 2016), McLaren has 
championed the role of Marxist thought in the development and progression of 
critical pedagogy. Explicitly promoting the role of class in social change and the desire 
for the development of a socialist democracy McLaren rallies against the 
development of a singular mode of production and the integration of ever-more 
numerous countries into modern systems of capital (1999, 2016). McLaren argues 
that with the spread of this singular system of capital the traditional proletariat has 
been transformed into a precariat; ‘a proletariat existing in permanently precarious 
conditions of instability and uncertainty’ (2016, 2), and that this form of capitalist 
social relation is the biggest challenge facing critical pedagogy (ibid., 6). McLaren 
identifies his task as making ‘socialist class consciousness possible’ through ‘building 
historical consciousness through popular organisations and class practice’ (ibid., 8-
9), keeping issues of class at the centre of his work on critical pedagogy (1999). This 
element of popular organisation and class practice is also highlighted in the work of 
Stanley Aronowitz. In his 2008 book Against Schooling Aronowitz focusses on the role 
of trade union education, arguing for the reintroduction of adult education 
programmes run by trade unions as a way of introducing critical social and political 
thought and practice to the public. Aronowitz argues that dominant educational 
approaches, like those critiqued in his earlier work with Giroux, reduce schooling to 
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test-taking and represent the antithesis of the critical thought sought in critical 
pedagogy (ibid., 17). Aronowitz advocates for movements of ‘parents, students, 
teachers, and the labour movement armed with a political programme’ (ibid., 50) 
which can challenge the prevalence of high-stakes testing and establish workers’ 
centres to tackle education around housing, schooling, and the workplace (ibid., 
147).  
bell hooks’ work is central to the development of race and gender in critical 
pedagogy, particularly her three texts explicitly dealing with education: Teaching to 
Transgress. Education as the Practice of Freedom (1994), Teaching Community. A 
Pedagogy of Hope (2003), and Teaching Critical Thinking. Practical Wisdom (2010). 
These works and her wider oeuvre examine gender and race through the lens of her 
experiences as an African American woman from the southern United States. hooks 
sought to expand the understandings of oppression in Freire’s work through an 
elaboration of the sexist and racist modes of oppression at work in education, and 
the difficulties of navigating those oppressive practices while educating for social 
change. It was no longer sufficient to view oppression as a dichotomy between 
oppressor and oppressed, or only through the lens of social class. Education broadly, 
and the classroom in particular, is the site of multiple oppressions often operating in 
a state of tension with one another and the institution itself. hooks sets out to 
elaborate a discussion of race and the ways in which issues of race manifest in 
classrooms inspired by critical pedagogy and how they can be tackled. hooks' earliest 
piece, Ain’t I A Woman (1987) began this process of adding complexity to critical 
social thought by arguing for a more nuanced approach to feminist thought through 
the acknowledgment of a multiplicity of experiences of being a woman. hooks 
opposed the tendency of feminist thinkers during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to 
universalise the experience of women and argued that the experiences of white 
middle class women are as divorced from the experiences of black working class 
women as they are from the experiences of white middle class men. hooks argued 
that to effectively address issues of feminism they cannot be removed from issues of 
race. It was this nuance and complexity of multiple understandings of gender and 
race which hooks sought to introduce to critical pedagogy. hooks criticised Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed for the continual use of ‘man’ and ‘mankind’ as universal terms for 
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all people. As a result, Freire changed subsequent editions to include the terms 
‘him/her’ and ‘his/hers’.  
Through her captivating series of short essays dealing with everything from 
“Critical Thinking” (1994), to “Talking Race and Racism” (2003), to “Humour in the 
Classroom” (2010), hooks elaborates a form of critical pedagogy in both theory and 
practice which helps to account for gender and race in the classroom. hooks’ essays 
are personal reflections on her experiences of teaching with a range of students, and 
how she tackles the complex and overlapping issues of gender and race, often 
difficult and challenging topics for the student and teacher alike. In many of the 
essays hooks deals with the confrontation of difficult topics which are intimately 
connected to the lives of the students, highlighting the need for the teacher to be 
aware of the dynamics between the students themselves and the students and the 
subject matter. One of the issues hooks explores is students who cry when 
confronted with questions of gender and race which they had not previously 
considered (hooks 2010, 77-83). Calling on her own experiences hooks recounts the 
times she would cry during history class as a secondary school student, connecting 
this to the all-too-real context of recent desegregation and her experiences of having 
to attend a school which was officially desegregated but still required black students 
to arrive on separate buses, wait in the gym until the white pupils had entered the 
classroom, and be spread throughout the classes so as to be a small minority 
presence (ibid., 78). hooks draws a connection to her experience as a female 
professor, stating that she is ever-attentive to not crying in front of her class no 
matter how emotive the topic may be, due to the constant struggle of female 
academics to be seen as intellectually equal to their male colleagues: ‘One measure 
of our inferior status in the sexist mind-set is the assumption that at times all females 
will be emotionally overwhelmed, that we will “come undone”’ (ibid., 79). 
The aim of this brief introduction and review of the thinkers who have been 
central to the development of critical pedagogy is to give the reader a grounding in 
the background of this thesis and an overview of the key currents in critical pedagogy. 
This development through the work of Giroux, Aronowitz, McLaren, hooks, and 
others gave critical pedagogy a much greater theoretical depth, but at the same time 
lost the contextual specificity of Freire’s original work. This was a response to a 
- 34 - 
caution from Freire himself about attempts to apply his work as a blueprint in vastly 
different contexts: he asked that his work was not lifted from South America and 
imported without being recreated and rewritten. Freire emphasised the importance 
of treating his work as critically as any other by asking questions of it, challenging it, 
and reinventing it (Macedo 2007, 394). In the rewriting of Freire’s ideas scholars like 
Giroux and McLaren have drawn on their own intellectual backgrounds in deepening 
the theory of critical pedagogy. However, scholars such as Elizabeth Ellsworth (1989) 
and Kathleen Weiler (1994) highlight that the deeper theorisation has come at the 
cost of greater abstraction of the aims of critical pedagogy, and the development of 
a universal and Eurocentric male influence at the heart of critical pedagogy. These 
two elements have combined to cast the student-teacher relationship in specific 
ways around the paternalistic notion of empowerment. The aim of feminist scholars 
like Ellsworth and Weiler was to maintain the underlying vision of democracy, 
equality, social justice and freedom in critical pedagogy, while expanding it to include 
a greater diversity of progressive critical approaches to education (Weiler 1994, 12). 
Starting with the abstract nature of critical pedagogy Ellsworth argues that writers 
on critical pedagogy stripped their work of historical, social and political context and 
instead reverted to the abstract nature of the central concepts of critical pedagogy: 
critical democracy, individual freedom, social justice, and social change through 
critically engaged citizens (Ellsworth 1989, 300). Ellsworth argued that all too often 
the theoretical discussions of critical pedagogy, such as those outlined in the previous 
section, failed to place the theory in the context of practice which could be useful in 
teachers ‘thinking through and planning classroom practices to support the political 
agenda’ of political and social change for greater democracy (ibid., 300). 
Furthermore, Ellsworth argues that the term ‘critical’ is itself highly abstract and acts 
to mask the specific political orientation of the work critical pedagogy does (ibid., 
301). Ellsworth’s critique is supported by Weiler who argues that the abstract nature 
of the goals of critical pedagogy do not deal with the specific experiences of people’s 
lives, and when teachers attempt to enact forms of education inspired by critical 
pedagogy it often ends in ‘anger, frustration, and a retreat to safer or more 
traditional approaches’ (1994, 13). As examples of these attempts Weiler highlights 
pieces by Ellsworth (see above), as well as Deborah Britzman’s work (1991) 
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recounting the difficulties of staff and students alike during discussions of race in a 
class with a single black student, and Ann Berlack’s discussion of treading the fine 
line between discussing critical views of the world and imposing them (1989). Other 
scholars have similarly written with scepticism towards the theoretical basis of 
critical pedagogy (Gore, 1992; Lather, 1992; Walkerdine, 1992) and the difficulties 
faced by those implementing strategies suggested by critical pedagogy (Lewis 1992; 
Luke and Gore 1992a, 1992b; Fernández-Balboa 1998; Lather 1998, 2001; Boyd 1999; 
Johnston 1999; Tinning 2002; McKinney 2005; Power 2008). 
The critique of the abstract nature of critical pedagogy and the resulting difficulty 
of putting critical pedagogy into practice is linked to the concern that the 
development of critical pedagogy has seen it include universalised claims based on 
the Eurocentric male positions of many of the key authors. Throughout her critique 
Ellsworth highlights that the uses of the terms “empowerment”, “student voice” and 
“dialogue” in critical pedagogy comes with an attempt to universalise certain 
practices rooted in Eurocentric white male understandings involving the primacy of 
rationality and rational discussion. Ellsworth points out that this privileges certain 
modes of interaction and action in the classroom which denies other forms of 
engagement (1989, 303-305). Other feminist scholars echo the point, and in their 
introduction to an edited volume on feminism and critical pedagogy Luke and Gore 
argue that all of the contributors have gone through an ‘apprenticeship’ of the canon 
defined by the Eurocentric male and are looking to articulate their positions as 
‘women within a patriarchal system of knowledge, scholarship, and pedagogical 
relations’ (1992b, 3). The risk in attempting to introduce feminist theory and practice 
into the academy is that many male academics, even those who purport to be 
influenced by critical pedagogy, see their position under threat (Britzman 1991, 62). 
Ultimately, a range of feminist academics came together in an ‘effort to break with 
the kinds of discourse and theory-building that have remained under the control of 
men’ (Greene 1992, ix). These feminist scholars sought to decentre the heavy male 
influence in critical pedagogy’s development and linked this attempt to the specific 
student-teacher relationship encouraged in critical pedagogy. 
Weiler argues that the claims to universal truths and collective experience 
contained in critical pedagogy do not address the tensions the teacher faces working 
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in the classroom (1994, 13). While critical pedagogy acknowledges the ‘socially 
constructed and legitimated authority that teachers/professors hold over students’ 
(Ellsworth 1989, 306), there is a lack of attempts to reformulate the institutional 
power imbalances between teacher and student, leaving education framed as a 
largely paternalistic endeavour. Through the language of empowerment and 
emancipatory authority teachers are imbued with a status which sets them apart 
from students at the same time as making the students reliant on the teacher for the 
students’ own transformation (ibid., 307). This relationship reifies the role of the 
teacher and places her in a permanently powerful paternalistic position vis-à-vis the 
student, therefore acting to predetermine the way teachers and students interact in 
the classroom by fixing a very specific vision of teacher role and student 
transformation. 
Ellsworth takes these three points of critique – abstract nature, universalised 
claims, and lack of teacher context – and examines them in relation to her own 
specific teaching practice as an attempt to develop critical pedagogy further. In early 
1988 the University of Wisconsin-Madison where Ellsworth worked was embroiled 
in a crisis provoked by an increase in the amount and visibility of racist acts both on 
campus and in the wider community. The university’s response was to initiate a 
number of strategies to recruit a greater number of non-white students and staff, to 
ensure a compulsory ethnic studies course, and to implement a number of 
procedures around racial and sexual harassment (Ellsworth 1989, 297-298). 
Ellsworth’s own response was to establish an elective module called “Media and Anti-
Racist Pedagogies”, a course designed to investigate how racist structures and 
practices operated at the university (ibid., 299). Conscious of her own critiques of 
critical pedagogy, Ellsworth sought to address the abstract nature of critical 
pedagogy, the Eurocentric male focus, and the student-teacher relationship through 
her own practice. Rather than attempting to build pedagogical practice on the basis 
of the assumed universal elements of empowerment, student voice and dialogue, 
Ellsworth states that in her situation, 
[a] preferable goal seemed to be to become capable of a sustained 
encounter with currently oppressive formations and power relations that 
refuse to be theorised away or fully transcended in a utopian resolution – 
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and to enter into the encounter in a way that owned up to my own 
implications in those formations and was capable of changing my own 
relation to and investments in those formations. (Ellsworth 1989, 308) 
Ellsworth sought to address the abstract nature of critical pedagogy by rooting her 
response in the specific context of her university and programme and in her context 
as a female academic. This began with the specific naming of the political stance of 
the course as being anti-racist, rather than using the more ambiguous term “critical”. 
In doing so, Ellsworth wanted to ground the course in the lived experiences of the 
students dealing with racism on campus and in the community. In this sense she 
returned to Freire’s original calls for the specific context of the students providing 
the starting point for any critical intervention through education. Furthermore, in 
starting from this specific context Ellsworth was better able to explicitly name the 
modes and practices of oppression the course sought to address, providing a 
concrete focus in place of critical pedagogy’s abstract concepts. Finally, Ellsworth 
worked with the students not only to help them identify the oppressive racist 
practices they were subject to and involved with, but also examined her own role in 
these oppressive practices. Rather than automatically assume her ability to detach 
herself from the privileges of being a white middle class professor engaging a diverse 
student group around the topic of racism and the university, Ellsworth aimed to 
explicitly address her own race, class, gender, and her position as a teacher (1989, 
309). Ellsworth challenged the paternalistic language of teachers transforming 
students by empowering them by including herself and her own transformation as 
part of the critical process. Not only does this challenge the Eurocentric male 
dominance in critical pedagogy, it establishes a different student-teacher 
relationship in which both teacher and student are transformed. 
The critiques of Ellsworth, Weiler and others continued to develop critical 
pedagogy and further expand the big tent to include feminist concerns with 
universality, male dominance, and specific teacher context. What has followed in 
recent decades is critical pedagogy’s engagement with neo-liberalism through a 
critique of neo-liberalism writ large and neo-liberal education more specifically. 
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Critical Pedagogy and Neo-Liberalism 
In the last decade those who were central to the development of critical pedagogy 
have taken stock of the work to date and attempted to regroup. A series of edited 
books were published with the same key figures contributing chapters, all concerned 
with the future of critical pedagogy in the neo-liberal age, best encapsulated in one 
of the earliest titles Critical Pedagogy: Where Are We Now? (McLaren and Kincheloe 
2007). Shirley Steinberg points out that critical pedagogy needs to ‘continually 
attempt to redefine themselves through the context’ (2007, ix). Critiques of neo-
liberalism were introduced as critical pedagogy sought to update its position as an 
educational, social, and political theory and practice in what was being heralded as 
new dark ages (Giroux 2011; Nikolakaki 2012) and uncertain times (Macrine 2009a). 
Key elements in neo-liberal approaches to education which are criticised by critical 
pedagogy are: education as an economic function to serve the market, the role of 
institutions as providers of a service, and the student-teacher relationship. Ultimately 
neo-liberal education is critiqued as a form of oppression which seeks to not only 
maintain but actively reproduce the current form of society which is built on systemic 
inequality and which limits personal freedom and societal transformation to 
economic gain (Porfilio 2011, ix).  
One of the central pillars of neo-liberalism addressed by critical pedagogy is the 
undermining of public institutions in favour of private interests (Giroux 2009; 
Macrine 2009b; Hill, et al. 2015). This sees a reorientation of education from being 
understood as a public good to being approached as an individual and competitive 
endeavour operating under the auspices of the free market. Recent considerations 
of neo-liberalism include the criticism of the increasing marketisation of education 
as a consumer product. Joe Kincheloe discusses this as the ‘corporate private view’ 
(2007, 25) of education, in which schools are a supplier of labour to the economy and 
commodities themselves which are open to free-market dictates. In this 
understanding, schools are not concerned with the development of an individual’s 
sense of responsibility to herself, others, and society, but are absorbed by the 
creation of citizens which are economically productive for the benefit of the 
individual and society writ large (ibid., 25). This critique of neo-liberalism is 
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reminiscent of a blend of Giroux and Aronowitz’s (1989) earlier critiques of liberal 
and conservative approaches to education, bringing together the private endeavour 
and focus on qualifications from conservative approaches and the claimed 
meritocracy and social mobility of liberal approaches. Critical pedagogy scholars 
continue: as neo-liberalism and its accolites pursue the privatisation of public goods, 
education is no longer only about the private choice of the individual, the institutions 
of education must begin to market themselves as offering a superior product to the 
consumer (Hill 2003, 2). Increasing the attractiveness of the educational product can 
be done in a number of way. One of these is the institutions embracing the various 
metrics applied to education, ranging from those which score and rank research, to 
those which offer a comparison of teaching, and those which claim to measure 
student satisfaction (Rolfe 2013). Henry Giorux highlights two further ways 
universities in particular attempt to market themselves and increase their 
attractiveness to potential student-customers: the increased presence of corporate 
franchises on university campuses, and the advertisment of academic subjects on the 
basis of their exchange value to the student upon completion (Giroux 2009, 15-16). 
This reorientation of education as a market for consumer students and the 
institution as a provider of a product results in the third area of critique: a different 
student-teacher relationship. This is a student-teacher relationship in which the 
student is a consumer seeking economic gain and the teacher is a member of the 
institution providing a product. Under neo-liberalism teachers are constantly 
measured and counted and Stephen Ball uses the notion of performativity to argue 
that neo-liberalism is not only operating ‘out there’ (Ball 2012, 18) in institutions and 
wider society , but  is also ‘in here’ (ibid., 18) in the way in which teachers and 
academics orientate themselves and their relationships in education. Ball argues that 
teachers and academics ‘spend increasing amounts of [their] time in making 
[them]selves accountable, reporting on what [they] do rather than doing it’ (ibid., 
19), and as a result the work of the teacher and academic becomes a performance to 
be judged by others. The substance behind the performance is no longer important, 
it is the performance itself which is used to hold the teacher and academic to 
account. One element of this changing role of the academic is captured in the 
dynamics of research output. As suggested by Rolfe (2013) and elaborated on by 
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those working on critical pedagogy, research is now measured by funding in and 
research papers out, or to call on the more colloquial phrase: publish or perish 
(MacKinnon 2009, 516). In such an environment part of the performativity of 
academics is measured by the amount of funds raised from external partners as a 
means of maintaining a vital funding stream for the institution (Giroux 2009, 15). A 
further impact resulting from a neo-liberal approach to the role of academics is the 
introduction of casual worker teaching-only contracts, so the students are being 
taught by cheaper seasonal labour while full-time staff focus on the production of 
externally funded research (Giroux 2009, 16). 
Critical pedagogy offers itself as a solution to this neo-liberal approach to 
education and society, arguing that now more than ever critical pedagogy is needed 
to combat the inequalities of society which are made ever greater through neo-
liberalism. Maintaining the core message of greater democracy, social justice, 
equality and freedom critical pedagogy urges teachers to challenge the neo-liberal 
practices they are embedded in and work towards a form of democracy and 
citizenship which is ‘more humane, less Eurocentric, less paternalistic, less 
homophobic, less exploitative, and less violent’ (Malott 2011, xxiii). While critical 
pedagogy has extended its critique to include neo-liberalism, its response remains 
the same. Students need to be empowered to become active citizens and challenge 
inequality and oppressive practices and become more involved in participatory forms 
of democracy (Freire 1998; Kincheloe 2007; Macedo 2007; Aronowitz 2008; hooks 
2010; Giroux 2011; McLaren 2016). The nuanced theory of critical pedagogy has 
developed and expanded over time to include an ever greater range of oppression 
and critique, but the response throughout this time, critical pedagogy’s suggestions 
for an alternative approach to education and society, have remained strikingly static. 
Higher Education in the UK 
My initial response to critical pedagogy was that I had found an approach to 
education which could help me better understand and respond to both my time 
teaching in Peru, and my new situation as a Graduate Teaching Assistant at an English 
higher education institution. Here was an approach to education which troubled the 
notion that the reduction of education to considerations of economic gain was 
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problematic and devoid of potential for social change. Here was an approach to 
education which took aim at the uncritical processes of, and actors within education 
which served, willingly or not, to preserve the social status quo. Here was an 
approach to education that seemed to give me a language to talk about the tensions 
I felt in Peru as I worked for a charity which orientated itself around raising the 
economic potential of the pupils, or a university which sought to do the same for its 
students. 
Higher education in the UK has changed substantially in the last decade: there has 
been a shift to a younger student body with a greater proportion of full-time 
undergraduates (Universities UK 2015, 2) and university financing has changed with 
the introduction of higher tuition fees for students and the drop in funding grants 
(ibid., 2). In the winter of 2015 the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) began a legislative process to introduce yet more changes to English higher 
education institutions. The first stage in this process was a consultation document 
titled Fulfilling our Potential: Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility and Student Choice 
(BIS 2015). The document laid out plans to link university funding to teaching quality, 
ease the process for institutions to gain degree-awarding powers, and introduce 
greater competition through deregulation. Included in these proposals was the 
Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) which is a tool designed to assess and rank 
teaching quality in universities (ibid.). In May 2016, the government continued the 
legislative process with a second document accounting for the feedback it received 
on the first. The second paper aped the title of the first, Success as a Knowledge 
Economy: Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility and Student Choice (BIS 2016) and 
included a greater level of detail in preparation for another round of consultation 
before being presented to Parliament. The proposals contained in Success as a 
Knowledge Economy have since become law, and the first TEF awards were granted 
in 2017. After the first round of awards there was a consultation process with higher 
education institutions and TEF has undergone some changes, primarily around the 
way the awards are calculated, but the underlying premise and rationale remain. In 
the belief that it will raise standards in higher education the Government seeks to 
create an open market place through the simplification of regulation, the easing of 
entry for other providers, the removal of student number caps, and the assurance of 
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an exit process, all designed to enhance competition in the sector and align higher 
education with neo-liberal free market principles. By examining Success as a 
Knowledge Economy in more detail, we are able to draw out the same three concerns 
highlighted in critical pedagogy’s critiques of neo-liberalism: the marketisation of 
higher education, the role of institutions as a service provider, and a student-teacher 
relationship based on provider-consumer economic logic. Concentrating on Success 
as a Knowledge Economy and the TEF is not because they represent a sea-change in 
the neo-liberal approach to higher education, on the contrary, they are steps along a 
well worn path. However, what they do represent is the explicit intervention of state 
organised forms of accounting, bureaucracy, and ranking into the space of the 
university classroom, the space which is the focus of this thesis. 
Two particularly important elements of the proposals contained in Success as a 
Knowledge Economy are competition and choice. The first, competition, concerns 
higher education as a market and the changes to increase competition. The second, 
choice, aims to increase student choice within the higher education market through 
the use of accounting and ranking procedures, which has a subsequent impact on the 
student-teacher relationship. 
Starting with competition, Success as a Knowledge Economy begins from the 
statement that ‘[c]ompetition between providers in any market incentivises them to 
raise their game, […] Higher education is no exception’ (BIS 2016, 8). From here, the 
paper goes on to explain that introducing greater competition into higher education 
will act to create a greater diversity of providers, more high quality providers, and 
consequently, an increased choice for students (ibid., 10). To introduce the 
competition which the government deems crucial, changes are made to the higher 
education sector to enforce its operation along free market lines. This includes 
simplifying the regulation of higher education institutions and creating a single route 
of market entry for new providers (ibid., 9). The new single route of entry is 
accompanied by a simplification of regulations around granting degree awarding 
powers and achieving university status, smoothing the way for private providers to 
establish themselves as higher education institutions (ibid., 10). Success as a 
Knowledge Economy argues that the ease of entry and degree awarding powers will 
result in increased competition in higher education, and further aims to bolster this 
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competition by lifting the cap on student numbers at higher education institutions, 
allowing each institution to take on as many students as they wish, or have the 
capacity to manage (ibid., 18). The drive to create a free market for higher education 
and to increase the competition between providers raises the prospect of institutions 
having to end some modules, entire courses, or even totally exit the market place if 
they are found to be unprofitable (ibid., 10). When considering this possibility Success 
as a Knowledge Economy states that ‘[t]he possibility of exit is a natural part of a 
healthy, competitive, well-functioning market and the Government will not, as a 
matter of policy, seek to prevent this from happening’ (ibid., 10).  
Success as a Knowledge Economy states that a central element of enhancing 
competition is increasing the choice for students by providing greater information 
about all higher education institutions through a register of providers, paying 
particular attention to the price and quality of each institution (BIS 2016, 10-11). In 
order to gather and provide this information the Government has introduced the 
Teaching Excellence Framework, starting in the academic year 2016/17. The TEF 
attempts to capture what the Government considers to be good teaching, broadly 
defined, and includes information about learning environments, student support, 
course design, career preparation and various soft skills (ibid., 11). The aim of the TEF 
is to provide a robust framework, similar in nature to the Research Excellence 
Framework (ibid., 12) which can be used to provide comparable information about 
institutions in order to assist students in their choices (ibid., 43). Judgements about 
teaching excellence at higher education institutions are to be made by expert panels 
including academic peers, employers, and students (ibid., 19). The TEF functions by 
using metrics as proxi-measures for teaching excellence, which include student 
satisfaction, retention rates, the amount of contact hours, employer sponsorship and 
employment rates following graduation (ibid., 46). Existing tools such as the National 
Student Survey provide measurements for these metrics, and a university’s 
submission to TEF is assessed by a panel consisting of employers, students, widening 
participation representatives, and academics (ibid., 19; 47). 
Higher education institutions that take part in the TEF and are judged to perform 
well and deliver quality teaching, receive both reputational and financial rewards. In 
the first instance, institutions are ranked by TEF level and are able to use this ranking 
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to advertise to prospective students. In the second, institutions are allowed to raise 
tuition fees in line with inflation and above the current £9000 limit (BIS 2016, 49). 
Combined with the market changes for higher education, these reputational and 
financial incentives are designed to further increase competition between 
institutions and provide students with clearer information and more choice. The 
centrality of competition and choice in Success as a Knowledge Economy are 
indicative of the role the British Government sees higher education playing in the 
society. To this end, tacitly contained within Success as a Knowledge Economy is a 
very specific understanding of the types of relationships to be encouraged within 
higher education institutions. What is unmistakable when considering these forms of 
relationships is the primacy of economics as their underlying model. Students are 
cast in the role of consumers making a rational choice about their course and 
institution on the basis of potential economic gain, and teachers are placed as the 
providers of a product and service to be designed to help ensure this economic 
advancement. 
Where students are concerned, there are numerous subtle and obvious ways 
throughout Success as a Knowledge Economy by which students are cast as 
consumers of a product. In many cases this takes the form of the language used to 
talk about students and their choices, with references to the increased competition 
bringing about ‘better outcomes and value for students’ (BIS 2016, 8), or the move 
to link higher education outcomes and tax data in order to provide prospective 
students with information about the ‘rewards that could be available at the end of 
their learning, alongside the costs’ (ibid., 14). While the language used here tacitly 
places students as consumers, there are elements of the paper which are more 
explicit. One of these is the data sources used by the Government, most notably the 
inclusion of research conducted by the consumer group Which?, which in itself 
reinforces the notion of students as consumers in reporting that 3 in 10 students 
think that the ‘academic experience of higher education is poor value’ (ibid., 11). A 
second example can be found in one of the regulatory changes: part of simplifying 
regulation to help ensure competition is the introduction of the Office for Students 
(Office for Students 2018), which is described as being a ‘consumer focussed market 
regulator’ (BIS 2016, 16) which is explicitly pro-competition and pro-choice. A final 
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example can be seen in the partnership between the Office for Students and the 
Competition Markets Authority (CMA), which now governs the legal rights of 
students as consumers of higher education. Since 2015 the CMA has provided advice 
for both institutions as providers and students as consumers regarding the rights and 
obligations involved in higher education (Competition Markets Authority 2015). 
The use of regulation to force higher education institutions to act in a free market 
environment and the casting of students as consumers of that higher education 
product also acts to place teachers in higher education institutions in the role of 
service providers. Talking of the introduction of the TEF, the Government states that 
it will address issues of teaching quality ‘so that students can be served better in the 
future’ (BIS 2016, 13), suggesting not only that the institution is a service provider, 
but teachers too. Furthermore, due to the criteria used in making the TEF 
judgements, teachers are tacitly called upon to supply a product which will be 
accepted by and acceptable to both students and employers who hold career 
development and economic gain paramount (ibid., 46). The classroom is a space in 
which a form of economic exchange takes place. It is a space flooded with the 
economic imperatives of wider society and the institution itself, reinforced by the 
orientation of higher education as a free market and students as consumers. The 
relationships between student and teacher are premised upon the social 
relationships found in the free market and mediated by the state. Teachers are 
placed in the role of providing courses which satisfy the economic imperatives of 
student and employer alike. The external referents to which the classroom is held 
says that students enter the classroom as an individual looking to go through a 
process that increases their economic potential. Teachers as providers are there to 
guide the student through that process in ways that align with Government and 
employer expectations of economic potential and need. It is not that the classroom 
relationship between student and teacher is stripped of all elements of learning, 
teaching and education, but the aim of these is predetermined as economic potential 
and gains.  
While this classroom relationship is not explicitly addressed in Success as a 
Knowledge Economy there are hints at the regulation which ensures such a 
relationship. The quality reviews which form part of the TEF include several elements 
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that look to reinforce a market-based relationship in the classroom. One of these is 
the assessment of curriculum and standards expected of UK qualifications made 
across subjects (BIS 2016, 34). There is a suggestion here of a standardised and 
comparable curriculum for subjects, and wedded to the rationale of the TEF to 
provide comparable information across universities, suggests the standardisation of 
course content. Another element included in the quality reviews concerns the 
contact hours which students have. It states that it is imperative that students are 
not only receiving the ‘right amount’ (ibid., 34) of contact hours, but that they are 
receiving the correct ‘sort of contact time with teaching staff’ (ibid., 34). Even more 
than the assessment of curriculum across courses, the inclusion of the notion of the 
correct sort of contact hours acts to constrain the interactions of students and 
teachers into those forms deemed acceptable by the Government and expert 
judgement panels.  
Casting students in the role of consumers, and teachers as providers, Success as a 
Knowledge Economy sets up a form of classroom relationship based upon economic 
imperatives, and seeks to hold that form of relationship constant through the 
judgement criteria of the TEF. This frames a certain set of expectations about the role 
of the teacher, the role of the student, and the relationship between the two. For the 
university as an institution the teacher is a measurable and therefore (ac)countable 
economic actor whose role is to transfer knowledge to students in such a way as to 
satisfy national and student expectations. For students, the teacher is cast as a 
worker providing a service which will result in a preferential economic outcome for 
the individual student. 
A Critique of Critical Pedagogy: Predetermination 
To understand my critique of critical pedagogy we first need to understand 
anarchism, or more specifically, the development of anarchist thought around the 
notions of subjectivity, action, and relationships. Unlike other strands of political 
theory, Marxism for example, there is no single foundational document or thinker 
one can point to as either the starting point or the central text for understanding 
anarchism. As a result, anarchism has been described as an ideology, a discourse, a 
culture, a philosophy (Heckert 2010, 186); it has been described as fluid, changing 
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with the needs of those who use it and produce it (Armaline 2009, 136); and it has 
been argued that it is best thought of as anarchisms, a collection of theories and 
practices which share some common ground (Mueller 2012, 15). Despite this fluid 
understanding of anarchism there is a key theme in nearly all anarchist work, which 
is an anti-authoritarian streak motivated by a desire to ‘critically interrogate, refuse, 
transform and overthrow all relations of authority, particularly those centralised 
within the sovereign state’ (Newman 2016, 1-2). This anti-authoritarian stance in 
inspired by three central values: liberty, equality, and solidarity (Mueller 2012, 16). 
By examining each of these values in turn it is possible to cast off popular 
misconceptions of anarchism as a force of chaos and destruction (DeLeon and Love 
2009, 160) and instead present anarchism as a positive theory and practice of 
freedom (Graeber 2013, 187). 
Liberty, or freedom – the two are often used interchangeably in anarchist 
literature (Mueller 2012, 17) – in anarchism is conceived of as freedom from coercion 
and the freedom to live how best suits you (Berkman 1980, 9). This freedom is not to 
be mistaken for the freedom of the individual over and above the freedom of others. 
As Bakunin writes: ‘I am free only when all human beings surrounding me – men and 
women alike – are equally free’ (Bakunin 1964c, 267). Freedom in anarchism does 
not mean limiting or negating the freedom of others because the others’ freedom is 
a necessary condition of the freedom of an individual (ibid.). This understanding of 
freedom introduces the second value, equality. Equality is not restricted to economic 
or social status (Mueller 2012, 17), nor is it rooted in a belief that all people are 
identical (Bakunin 1869). Instead, anarchist equality centres on equality of 
opportunity for activity and development. It is an understanding of equality which 
allows for variation and personal tastes and the freedom to pursue one’s interests 
(Berkman 1980, 25). Anarchist equality does not seek uniformity, and is best 
approached as seeing all people as equivalent rather than equal (Bakunin 1869). The 
final value, solidarity, is based on ideas of mutual aid. In an alternative reading of 
Darwin’s work, early anarchist thinker Petr Kropotkin argued that it was cooperative 
mutual aid, not individualistic competition, which led to the survival of a species 
(Kropotkin 1972). This understanding of solidarity as mutual aid is closely associated 
with free association and the belief that people cannot live in isolation and are able 
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to choose their communities without external compulsion or coercion (Berkman 
1980, 13). Solidarity and free association are rooted in the belief that humans are 
capable of managing themselves and their affairs without the need of a top-down 
social structure (DeLeon 2006, 76). 
In anarchism, these three values have been the basis for a critique of the state as 
a form of social organisation imposed on individuals which prevents them from 
freedom, equality, and solidarity (DeLeon and Love 2009, 160). From these three 
values different areas of anarchist thought and practice take subtly different focuses, 
not breaking with anarchism, but illuminating particular elements. One such area of 
anarchist thought is postanarchism. While maintaining the importance of the three 
values of freedom, equality and solidarity, postanarchism highlights anarchism as 
autonomous practice in the present (Newman 2016, 11-12). Although Gustav 
Landauer (2010) and Jamie Heckert (2010; 2012; 2013; Heckert and Cleminson 2011) 
have approached anarchism in a similar way, I focus here on the work of Saul 
Newman as his work establishes the starting point for my critique of critical pedagogy 
and the state, critical pedagogy and the teacher, and my own teaching practices. 
Postanarchism emphasises an anarchism of the here and now, an anarchism 
which starts and ends with freedom as autonomous practice. Postanarchism 
highlights a politics of autonomy understood as a certain relationship to the self 
based on the ever-present possibility of freedom and the invention of alternative 
relationships and self-governance which are not determined externally to the 
individual, be that by the market or the state (Newman 2016, 129). In this 
understanding of freedom as the practice of the subject, there is a shift away from a 
universal understanding of freedom to which everyone strives, and an emphasis 
instead on the freedom of the subject to determine her actions and relationships for 
herself and in the moment. There are a number of thinkers who are frequently 
identified with this focus on the subject, action, and relationships, including Jason 
Adams (2003), Todd May (1994), and Lewis Call (2010). I focus on the work of Saul 
Newman as he provides the most sustained engagement with these ideas developed 
through a number of articles and books, culminating in his most recent piece 
Postanarchism (2016). Those working focussing on the subject, action, and 
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relationships captured by the term postanarchism claim a distinction from anarchism 
which needs to be addressed and questioned here.  
At its core, postanarchist writers claim the difference between anarchism and 
postanarchism lies in the issue of predetermination. Newman’s critique of anarchism 
is that in postulating a universal human subject as free and rational and arguing for 
social revolution to destroy the state and liberate humanity, anarchism provides a 
revolutionary metanarrative which predetermines an end point of a stateless society 
(Newman 2016, 6; 12). With this predetermined end point of a stateless society the 
actions of individuals are aimed at an externally defined end-goal (ibid., 12). This 
establishes an understanding of anarchism and anarchists which can be used as a 
measuring point by which to define identity, progress, success or failure. There are 
as many different anarchist identities as there are understandings of anarchism, 
which leads to claims of anarchist identities competing for a form of ‘anarcho-
perfectionism’ (Heckert 2012, 66) in which individuals are judged by their efforts to 
appear anarchist enough (ibid.). Newman argues that if anarchism aims at the 
destruction of the state and the implementation of a non-hierarchical, non-coercive, 
free society, in short, a predetermined end point, then anarchism can be held to 
externally derived measures of success, or more likely, failure (Newman 2016, 12). 
This has the potential for those identifying as anarchists to constantly fail, introducing 
pathological shame as anarchists constantly fall short of the mark they set 
themselves, leading in turn to a greater sense of needing to be anarchist enough 
(Heckert 2012, 70). 
In place of this predetermined end of a social revolution and a stateless society, 
postanarchism argues for anarchism as an ontology, where thought and action are 
freed from predetermined ends (Newman 2016, 11-12). For Newman postanarchism 
is a form of thinking and acting anarchistically and ‘seeking to transform the 
immediate situation and relationships that one finds oneself in […]’ (ibid., 12). Here, 
postanarchism is freedom as autonomous practice in which specific relations of 
domination are examined, challenged and, if possible, overturned (ibid., 12), and 
therefore postanarchist freedom is always contingent and changing with the context 
of the subject who acts autonomously. The focus on the immediate action of the 
individual brings to the fore questions about the individual as a subject, forms of 
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action, and relationships which are linked to the issue of freedom, its curtailment, 
and its realisation.  
The subject in postanarchism is approached through the lens of poststructuralism 
and the decentring of a universal human subject: anarchism can no longer rely on a 
singular notion of humanity as free and rational but constrained by the state 
(Newman 2016, 6). Postanarchism draws on poststructuralism to argue that there 
can no longer be a recourse to an individual as fundamentally free and rational as the 
human subject is now understood to be formed by external power and discourse 
rather than an underlying universal status (ibid., 8-9). Postanarchism’s view of the 
subject builds from Foucault’s work on governmentality, rejecting the notion of a 
universal human nature and arguing that the subject is formed through various 
governmental practices which constitute her identity (Newman 2016, 19). These 
governmental practices can be understood as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Gordon 
1991, 48), or the attempt to regulate aspects of behaviour in individuals whose 
subjectivity is formed in specific ways according to their context (Foucault 2009, 267). 
The practices forming the subject overlap and form multiple and at times 
contradictory identities including the healthy subject, the consumer, the law-abider, 
the educated subject, and so on, each enforced by practices of various agencies of 
which the state is part (Odysseos, Death, and Malmvig 2016, 153; Newman 2016, 20-
21). What lies behind the notion of forming the subject through practices of 
governance is a drive to make the subject visible and representable by the governing 
agencies, defining a range of action for the subject according to her various and 
overlapping identities. In neo-liberal practices of government freedom is presented 
as the freedom to choose from the range of identities, the forms of subjectivity on 
offer, each of which has been captured and commodified under neo-liberal 
capitalism (Newman 2016, 23). In choosing from the predetermined range of 
available identities, the subject willingly reinforces her own formation as a subject, 
becoming dependent on the externally constituted identities for her existence (ibid., 
23). As a result of this stance, Newman’s postanarchism is critical of identity politics 
which attempt to supply and have recognised ever-increasing divisions and 
categorisations of identity which ultimately hold the subject ever-tighter in the 
dependency on external references in the formation of her subjectivity (ibid., 31).  
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It is this understanding of the formation of the subject and the version of freedom 
involved with it which is the focus of postanarchism’s critique and action. Far from 
being freedom in the postanarchist sense of autonomous practice in the present, 
freedom in neo-liberalism is fixed by predetermined identities and realms of action. 
If postanarchism is to argue for freedom as autonomous practice, it is necessary to 
present an alternative subjectivity which starts from thought and action without 
arché, without the predetermined end of a complex of neo-liberal identities. In this 
formulation postanarchist subjectivities take on different form, one which is 
constructed by the subject herself in the present and defies the predetermination of 
fixed identities and ends (ibid., 32). 
The focus for postanarchism shifts from the destruction of the state, to 
autonomous practice which defies attempts at the external formation of the subject 
or recognition within existing representative structures such as the state (Newman 
2016, 47). Postanarchism points to insurrection as the form such autonomous 
practice takes, arguing that insurrection aims only at the subject’s self-
transformation by asserting her autonomy from those external conditions and 
constraints. This freedom as autonomous practice is an ongoing practice of individual 
autonomy which is prefigurative in its form. Prefiguration carries two elements: first, 
it occurs in the immediate present without a predetermined end and second, it is a 
practice of freedom which constantly works to invent and form our own subjectivities 
and relationships to others without external referents (Newman 2016, 64-65). The 
spontaneous and creative element of autonomous practice means that action is 
always contingent and changing according to the context of the subject, and as a 
result autonomous practice is constantly experimented with and reinvented (ibid., 
65). Importantly, this is not a call for action directly against agencies of governance 
and power which forms subjectivity, but an affirmation of the self despite these 
forces (ibid., 54-55). Postanarchism is cautious of direct opposition to attempts to 
form subjectivities because direct opposition requires an engagement with those 
forces of power, which ultimately sustains them (ibid., 55). Instead, there is a turn to 
action without opposition. In refusing action which is established via a reference to 
forces of power postanarchism removes itself from binaries of position/opposition 
and opens a space apart from such forces, a space in which new forms of subjectivity 
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can be realised (Heckert 2012, 71). Examples of this freedom as autonomous practice 
are found in the Occupy movements, in which people came together in a refusal of 
the attempts of neo-liberal capitalism to form their subjectivity as consumers, 
workers, the unemployed, and the like. Spaces were established where people 
formed their own subjectivities as members of a spontaneous community operating 
in ways and means entirely apart from the subjectifying attempts of neo-liberalism 
(Newman 2016, 28). The Occupy movement, loosely defined, defied external 
attempts to define it and there was an external frustration with Occupy for having 
no concrete demands to put forward (Schrager Lang and Lang/Levitsky 2012, 21-22). 
Ultimately, Occupy and those involved could not neatly be identified, captured, and 
placed into practices of governance, and so attempts to define it and subsequently 
categorise Occupy as a success or failure were, and continue to be, misdirected. 
In the anarchist focus on the subject highlighted in postanarchism the self-
(trans)formation of the subject through autonomous practice is closely linked to the 
relationships the subject has with others. Although written long before the term 
“postanarchism” and the insights of poststructuralism, Gustav Landauer establishes 
the importance of relationships not dependent on the state. Landauer’s approach to 
anarchism and the state is to cast the state not as a physical entity which can be 
destroyed as with smashing a window, but as a set of imposed relationships which 
condition how people interact with each other (Landauer 2010, 214). This was not a 
new critique of the state in anarchism, with many others having made similar points 
(see Bakunin 1964a, 128; Rocker 1972, 2), what stands out is the response which was 
a call for people to ‘constitute themselves as a people apart from the state’ (Landauer 
2010, 214, original emphasis). Landauer establishes the importance and potential of 
relationships as a response to oppression. These early links to relationships are 
highlighted in postanarchism as it becomes clear that freedom as autonomous 
practice can already be observed in many relationships which occur every day 
(Newman 2016, 130). Examples abound, but a consideration of friendship highlights 
the ways in which relationships between friends are premised upon identities which 
are not included as part of the neo-liberal practices of governance (May 2014). 
Entering into a friendship as a relationship which defies neo-liberal practices of 
governance, the subject is undertaking autonomous practice through which she 
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simultaneously engages in the formation of her own subjectivity. In this example of 
friendship two prominent neo-liberal identities are highlighted, the consumer and 
the entrepreneur, both of which shape the subject in different, and at times 
contradictory, ways. The consumer and the entrepreneur interact with others on the 
basis of personal gain and self-interest. However, through friendships it is possible to 
avoid these attempts to form the subject by relating to others on the basis of shared 
passion (ibid.). 
The majority of critiques of postanarchism from other scholars writing from other 
perspectives encompassed in anarchism. The basis of many of these criticisms is that 
postanarchism has been too quick to establish itself as a new tradition of anarchist 
thought (Rousselle 2011, vii), both through the use of the prefix ‘post’ (Cohn and 
Wilbur 2010), and the reduction of anarchism, sometimes referred to as classical 
anarchism, to a canon of white, male, European thinkers (Evren 2011, 11). Critics 
argue that the use of the prefix ‘post’ is intended to position postanarchism as 
something progressive and that anarchism is something from the past and better left 
there (Cohn and Wilbur 2010). Connected to this is the criticism from several scholars 
that postanarchist’s treatment of anarchism, and therefore its characterisation as a 
theory and practice of the past, is based on a selective and reductive reading of a 
small sample of anarchists (Villon 2003; Cohn and Wilbur 2010; Evren 2011; Jeppesen 
2011). These scholars argue that postanarchist readings of anarchism are based 
primarily on Proudhon, Godwin, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, and that alongside 
restricting anarchist thought to these few thinkers, postanarchism also reduces the 
work of these thinkers to a small range of works and quotes (Villon 2003). It is the 
postanarchist reading of the subject in anarchism which has been particularly 
criticised as being selective and reductive. Cohn and Wilbur (2010) and Evren (2011) 
point to numerous moments in anarchist literature in which the human subject is not 
naively assumed as fundamentally good, but is better understood as malleable and 
shaped by social context. It’s not that there is an a priori anarchist subject who is 
good or bad. To continue the language of postanarchism, the formation of the 
subject is largely contingent on the society and context she finds herself in. 
Therefore, Newman’s move to put clear water between anarchism and 
postanarchism regarding the subject appears unnecessary. 
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As a result of these reductive readings Sasha Villon accuses postanarchism, and 
Newman in particular, of setting up anarchism as a ‘straw man’ (Villon 2003). Later 
criticisms are kinder to postanarchism and suggest instead that the postanarchist 
reading of anarchism is not deliberately reductionist, but takes a history of anarchism 
for granted (Evren 2011, 11). Ruth Kinna argues that postanarchism, and once again 
Newman in particular, uses this understanding of anarchism as a theoretical foil to 
help develop postanarchism further (Kinna 2017). One response to these criticisms 
of postanarchism is to position it not as a distinct and separate area of anarchist 
thought and practice, but to consider it as a particular response which is part of the 
wider understanding of anarchism, in the same way that environmental anarchism is 
also an approach to anarchism which happens to emphasise certain areas at the 
expense of others (Franks 2011, 169). In this approach the earlier criticisms of 
postanarchism still stand and need to be addressed, but postanarchism can be 
approached not as a breakaway, but as the ‘particular response of particular 
subjected groups in a limited historical context’ (ibid.). 
Franks’ approach to postanarchism carries echoes of earlier discussions regarding 
anarchism and the multiple facets and approaches which have developed over time. 
In his work ‘Anarchy without Hyphens’ Karl Hess (1980) establishes an argument for 
understanding anarchism not as a series of fractured elements of theory and 
practice, but as straight forward anarchism which does not need further refinement 
or definition: ‘[…] anarchists […] are people and, as such, contain the billion-faceted 
varieties of human reference. Some are anarchists who march, voluntarily, to the 
Cross of Christ. Some are anarchists who flock, voluntarily, to the communities of 
beloved, inspirational father figures’ (Hess, 1980). Hess’s examples continue covering 
a vast array of different facets and characteristics of anarchists before concluding 
that no matter what these characteristics are, they all start from a single point: 
liberty. Hess argues that anarchy – without hyphens – is about being free without 
predetermining what that freedom is, and how different anarchists develop that 
notion of freedom is the result of ‘choice and chance’ (ibid.). This is reminiscent of 
our starting point in the exploration of anarchism and the three central values of 
liberty, equality, and solidarity. 
- 55 - 
Returning to postanarchist attempts to put clear blue water between anarchism 
and postanarchism, and the subsequent critiques of that attempt, we are right to be 
cautious and critical of postanarchist claims but that does not mean that the 
theoretical work developed under the banner of postanarchism cannot be a valuable 
tool in understanding the world around us and the possibilities for subversion. Two 
areas in particular stand out for further consideration: the postanarchist critiques of 
identity politics and the question of direct opposition. These two areas are closely 
linked and will be addressed in parallel. Postanarchism, and Newman specifically, is 
critical of identity politics which provides a set of identities which ultimately constrain 
the subject in ever-increasing and complex practices of government (Newman 2016, 
31). This critique sits alongside the claim that direct opposition, by its very nature, 
maintains the thing it opposes. Newman uses the example of the LGBTQ movements 
as building on identity politics and issues of representation to a point of exhaustion 
(ibid.). Newman argues that in direct opposition to the denial of LGBTQ identity the 
LGBTQ community have succeeded in having their particular identities recognised 
and protected, but in doing so, have also created a means by which they can now be 
counted and accounted for through practices of government (ibid.). 
We are right to be cautious of the consequences of direct opposition but we 
cannot deny some of the tangible benefits which can arise from it. To keep with 
Newman’s LGBTQ example in the UK context in which this thesis is written, the 
coordinated lobbying actions of the LGBTQ community in the UK are reflected in a 
raft of legislation and policy seeking to grant legal protection to individuals and 
communities who identify as LGBTQ. We can point to the nine protected 
characteristics of the 2010 Equality Act as an example of this, which include gender 
reassignment, sex, and sexual orientation (Equality Act 2010), and moves to integrate 
LGBTQ rights into school curriculum. These examples have tangible day-to-day 
benefits for those who identify as LGBTQ as the discrimination faced by many from 
the LGBTQ community is now established as an offense which can be prosecuted, 
signalling that such discrimination is no longer a socially acceptable norm, nor a 
legally defensible act. My intention here is not to detour into a discussion of social 
norms and legality, nor is it a claim that legal protection automatically leads to the 
end of discriminatory practices, but it is a signal through legal mechanisms of desired 
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behaviour in the public at large which no longer tolerates the singling out and 
discrimination of a particular group of people. The legal protection afforded the 
LGBTQ community is an example of the use of identity politics and direct opposition 
to secure benefits for that community. As with our caution about Newman’s claims 
against identity politics and direct opposition, we also need to be aware of the 
tensions apparent in achieving gains through identity politics and direct opposition. 
The point here is that Newman presents too simplistic an understanding of these 
things, a criticism similar to those made about Newman’s claims regarding 
postanarchism’s distinction from anarchism. 
Given the critiques of postanarchism and Newman, it is Hess’ and Frank’s 
understandings of anarchism I carry forward in this thesis. What is important for me 
here is the role postanarchism can play as a framework for my critique of critical 
pedagogy, which itself is my particular response to my particular position.  While the 
discussions around postanarchism’s reductive treatment of other anarchist thinkers 
are important, I am not arguing for postanarchism as a saviour of anarchism but am 
drawing on the insights gleaned from the interaction of anarchism and 
poststructuralism to help guide a critique of critical pedagogy and to act as a 
reference point for my own practice in the context of a neo-liberal higher education 
institution. To this end I continue to use the term “postanarchism” as shorthand 
throughout the thesis to refer to anarchism with a particular focus on the subject, 
action and relationships as developed following anarchism’s interaction with 
poststructuralism. Postanarchism’s understandings of the subject, forms of action, 
and relationships is the framework through which I approach my critique of critical 
pedagogy. It is my contention that critical pedagogy does not offer a response to neo-
liberalism, nor is it itself a theory and practice for radical social change.  
Establishing the methodology and method underpinning this argument is the 
focus of chapter two. I begin by drawing on hermeneutics, and particularly the work 
of Paul Ricoeur who established the possibility of reading action as text. Ricoeur 
introduced the hermeneutic principles of reading and re-reading action as a 
simultaneous process in which we read and re-read ourselves, our assumptions, and 
our traditions (Ricoeur 1971). This hermeneutic process is then given form as a 
method through autoethnography: the study of self in the context of social 
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phenomena (Ellis 2004). Throughout chapter two I establish the self-reflective 
process by which I gather and analyse emprical data regarding my own teaching 
practices in light of my critique of critical pedagogy and in the context of working in 
a neo-liberal higher education institution. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of Foucault’s work on care of the self and the practice of accounting 
for our actions to others. The form this thesis takes means it is not only an academic 
pursuit, all-be-it one heavily entwined with personal interest and experience, it is 
simultaneously a process of self-care. These considerations of method lead me to 
establishing my critique of critical pedagogy in the following two chapters.   
In Chapter Three I introduce the reader to critical pedagogy’s suggestions for the 
redefined state which involves the practice of thick democracy by critical citizens. 
Through the lens of postanarchism I demonstrate that critical pedagogy’s reliance on 
the state, the identity of the critical citizen, and practices of thick democracy enforce 
practices of government aimed at the formation of the subject, the type of actions 
the subject takes, and the relationships the subject has. Through the state, the critical 
citizen and thick democracy we see critical pedagogy limiting the possibilities of social 
change by predetermining the end-goal, the form of social organisation, the subject, 
and action. As a result, I argue that critical pedagogy is not and cannot be a response 
to neo-liberalism, as it operates practices of government which limit the freedom of 
the subject. 
Chapter Four focuses on the teacher in critical pedagogy. I argue that critical 
pedagogy’s ideal of the teacher as a transformative intellectual forms the subject 
through practices of government which define the actions of the teacher, and as a 
result fixes the relationships the teacher has with students. Following 
postanarchism’s calls for autonomous practice, I turn to Michel Foucault’s work on 
care of the self (2005, 2006, 2012) to deepen our understanding of how the teacher 
can work to distance the identity given to them by critical pedagogy and take 
responsibility for her own formation as a subject. Through this process of care of the 
self the teacher opens the space for different relationships to students which are not 
defined by critical pedagogy’s identities of transformative teacher and critical citizen. 
Through postanarchism and care of the self student-teacher relationships are formed 
by the subjects in the moment of interaction itself, rather than following a 
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predetermined form. I argue that the formation of such spontaneous relationships 
requires a certain quality of communication between the subjects involved which is 
found in Foucault’s concept of parrhesia. The practice of self care and the 
relationships which accompany it are an elaboration on the postanarchist call for the 
subject to refuse predetermined identities and take control of her own 
(trans)formation. 
Having established the unsuitability of critical pedagogy as a response to neo-
liberalism and the care of the self as a postanarchist autonomous practice for 
teachers, Chapter Five addresses the possibilities of such autonomous practice in our 
everyday life and the spaces which are created by such action. To do this I draw from 
two areas:  first I use Michel de Certeau’s work on the practice of everyday life and 
the possibility of subversion without opposition (1988), and argue that subversion is 
possible even in highly constrained environments such as higher education 
institutions. Second, I call on the work of Obika Gray (2004) to elaborate a 
conceptualisation of the classroom as an exilic space in which dominant forms of 
social organisation can be distanced and space opened to all participants to enter 
into relationships of self care. Exilic space suggests an arena of the spontaneous 
creation of social organisation realised without necessary connection to the 
dominant social forms (Gray, 2004). I draw on these notions of exilic space and couple 
them with de Certeau’s work to argue for an understanding of the classroom as a 
space which both enables and results from postanarchist autonomous practice. 
These three chapters prepare the ground for an exploration of my own teaching 
practice. Chapter Six of the thesis consists of a series of autoethnographic narratives 
drawn from my time teaching in a higher education institution in the UK. These 
narratives are an examination of my attempts at autonomous practice while working 
in a highly constrained environment in which I am subject to multiple practices of 
governance attempting to form my subject and conduct my behaviour. The 
narratives are a collection of eight moments in which the tensions between 
autonomous practice and practices of governance are explored. 
Closing the thesis is a discussion of where this theoretical framework and 
autonomous practice might lead, highlighting the possibilities which exist in using the 
neo-liberal university’s own processes and procedures against it. I argue that the neo-
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liberal concentration on performance and ranking creates a gap in which 
postanarchist practice can flourish, and that through an always changing series of 
teaching practices it is possible to subvert the classroom as a space, environment, 
and collection of subjects for means entirely alien to the neo-liberal university.  
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2. Talking Methods 
This thesis is a combination of theory, practice, and writing in which I engage with 
the texts of critical pedagogy and anarchism and explore and analyse my teaching 
practice, with each element informing my understanding of the others in a continual 
process. The combination of these elements requires a methodological approach 
which enables me to capture and explore my own development as a teacher without 
privileging theory, practice, or writing above one another and hermeneutics provides 
this methodological framework. I start this chapter with consideration of 
hermeneutics as the broader methodology underpinning this thesis, drawing on the 
work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, and Paul Ricoeur. I then turn my 
attention to a discussion of autoethnography as a specific method by which I gather 
and present my empirical data. 
Hermeneutics has a long history reaching back to antiquity, and was originally 
concerned with the interpretation of text, particularly the exegesis of religious texts 
(Byrne 2001, 968; Prasad 2002, 14). One of the central figures in the development of 
philosophical hermeneutics in the late 20th century is Martin Heidegger and his work 
Being and Time (1973). Being and Time aimed to revive the question of Being while 
also establishing some of the fundamental framework for hermeneutics as the 
process of understanding (ibid., 24). Heidegger claims that our exploration of 
understanding starts from our initial presuppositions about the entity we want to 
study: what we already know or think we already know about this entity conditions 
how we initially interpret it. These presuppositions provide the basic concepts of the 
entity being studied and come to us through tradition (ibid., 30). Tradition in 
Heidegger’s work is not an object passed through time but a process in which what 
has come to us from history is delivered as self-evident. The process of tradition 
which constitutes our presuppositions and the presentation of tradition as self-
evident blocks our attempts to examine the roots of our presuppositions (ibid., 43). 
The initial presupposition of the entity is what enables our initial understandings, but 
this must not be confused with a statement which is taken as a self-evident starting 
point from which other propositions are derived (ibid., 28). The presuppositions are 
used as a temporary and necessary guide for our understanding to enable us to 
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approach the entity, but these initial presuppositions change as we come to a deeper 
understanding of the entity through study. The change in our presuppositions 
introduces the concept of a circular movement between Being, presuppositions and 
understanding. There is, in Heidegger’s words, ‘a rather remarkable relatedness 
backward and forward’ (ibid., 28) in which the process of inquiry itself is an element 
in the mode of Being of the entity. For Heidegger, the interpreter in this process of 
hermeneutic inquiry is the subject and the text is the object. Both are kept at distance 
with the subject interpreting the object in order to gain a deeper understanding of it 
whilst maintaining an objectivity to the understanding gained. 
While Heidegger saw the subject and object in the hermeneutic process as two 
separate entities maintaining an objectivity in understanding, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
explored the role of the subject as an active and subjective element in the process of 
understanding. Gadamer starts his engagement with Heidegger by highlighting the 
difference in their two projects: while Heidegger sought to explain the ‘fore-structure 
of understanding for the purposes of ontology’ (Gadamer 2006, 268), Gadamer was 
concerned with the process of understanding if hermeneutics was no longer bound 
by ideas of objectivity (ibid.). Gadamer rejected Heidegger’s subject-object divide 
and saw the subject as an active part of the process and proposed hermeneutics as 
a dialogue in which ‘the interpreter puts questions to the text, and the text, in turn, 
puts questions to the interpreter’ (Prasad 2002, 19; see also Gadamer 2006, 271). For 
Gadamer the subject and object are not detached from each other but are in a 
mutually interactive relationship because through the understanding of the text the 
interpreter also gains a greater understanding of herself. 
Gadamer explains that in the process of understanding we need to pay attention 
not only to the text but to the interpreter’s presuppositions. He writes that, 
[…] it is necessary to keep one's gaze fixed on the thing throughout all the 
constant distractions that originate in the interpreter himself. A person 
who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges 
in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading 
the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. 
Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of 
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what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what 
is there. (Gadamer 2006, 269) 
Gadamer argues that our presuppositions influence our understanding of the object 
and therefore we cannot approach a text directly holding blindly to our 
presuppostions, but must explicitly examine our presuppostions in the process of 
examining the text (2006, 270). 
Gadamer argues that it is not enough for the interpreter to be aware of her 
presuppositions but that she must also be aware of the tradition in which her 
presuppositions are embedded (Gadamer 2006, 272). Furthermore, the interpreted 
text is also embedded within a broader tradition, whether that is history, genre or 
discipline and the interpreter must be continually aware of the tradition of the text 
as well as her own tradition. Gadamer’s understanding of a hermeneutic 
methodology highlights the interaction between interpreter and text: ‘The 
[hermeneutic] circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor 
objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition 
and the movement of the interpreter’ (ibid., 293). In the interpreter’s constant 
attention to tradition and presupposition as part of the process of understanding a 
text, the interpreter also comes to a deeper understanding of herself. This, in turn, 
leads her to interpret the text and herself differently, which once again changes her 
understanding of both. For Gadamer, this process is not necessarily about achieving 
a superior understanding of either text or interpreter, but to ‘understand in a 
different way’ (ibid., 296. Original emphasis). 
Another important issue that Gadamer introduces into the circular process of 
hermeneutics is the relationship between the universal and the singular. The 
universal  refers to the text and tradition under study, while the singular concerns 
the individual’s interpretation of the text: ‘If the heart of the hermeneutical problem 
is that one and the same tradition must time and again be understood in a different 
way, the problem, logically speaking, concerns the relationship between the 
universal and the particular’ (Gadamer 2006, 310). For Gadamer, the relationship 
between the universal of tradition and the particular of the text as understood by the 
interpreter is best approached as a special case of applying something universal to a 
particular situation (Gadamder 2006, 310): giving the example of legal hermeneutics 
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Gadamer explains that the work of the interpreter is to ‘concretize the law in each 
specific case’ (ibid., 325). 
Hermeneutics through Heidegger and Gadamer has been established as a method 
for the interpretation of texts which is a circular process of understanding between 
the interpreter and the text as she accounts for the presuppositions and traditions of 
both. The interpreter must be aware of her own presuppositions and tradition as she 
first approaches a text, and be ready and willing to reformulate these in the process 
of understanding. Jürgen Habermas’ addition to hermeneutics is the introduction of 
elements of critical theory into the relationship between the interpreter, the text, 
presupposition and tradition.  
Habermas introduced critical theory to hermeneutics through a particular 
emphasis on language as the necessary element which makes hermeneutics as the 
interpretation of text possible.  Habermas argues that Gadamer’s approach to 
hermeneutic understanding can be presented as a continuing process of socialisation 
in which new texts are only understood in relation to texts the interpreter already 
understands. In this way the interpreter continues the process of tradition by 
understanding each new text through the tradition established in the interpretation 
of previous texts (Habermas 1990a, 222). This takes us to the crux of Habermas’ 
critique of Gadamer: Gadamer requires an acknowledgement of tradition in the 
process of understanding but does not treat tradition to critical analysis. 
For Habermas, communication is possible because there are linguistic rules shared 
by the conversation partners, whether they are an author and reader or people 
engaging in face-to-face communication. The role of the interpreter in a conversation 
is to act like a translator who listens to the language of an other and makes it 
intelligible for her own understanding (Habermas 1990a, 215). This notion of 
interpreter as translator does not only function between different speakers sharing 
a particular time period, but also between generations as shared understandings are 
transmitted through time as traditions. Habermas establishes the connection 
between language, interpretation, and tradition which is key in his critical 
intervention in hermeneutics (ibid., 217). Tradition, for Habermas, is the ‘medium in 
which languages propagate themselves’ (ibid., 217) and acts as a bridge between 
generations. The inculcation of language in the individual occurs through a process 
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of socialisation which sees the individual ‘[grow] into his language’ (ibid., 217) and 
the individual is therefore an element in the continuing process of tradition. Pointing 
to Gadamer’s work, Habermas states that tradition comes to mirror the ‘life-long 
socialisation of individuals in their language’ on the social scale (ibid., 218). Tradition 
is a language in which we live (ibid., 238), and like tradition, language needs to be 
questioned. If we conceive of language as a kind of ‘metainstitution on which all 
social institutions are dependent’ (ibid., 239), it opens the way for the consideration 
of language and tradition as mediums of domination and social power which serve 
to legitimise specific forms of social organisation (ibid., 239). It is not enough for the 
interpreter to recognise her presuppositions and traditions and the presuppositions 
and traditions of the text as she approaches her interpretation, she must also be 
critically aware of the ideological underpinning and implications of such 
presuppositions and tradition, and be willing to question them (ibid., 239). Reflecting 
on the ideological implications of her presuppositions and tradition the interpreter is 
able to gain a different understanding of herself and the text. Building from the 
critical awareness of ideology in language, presupposition and tradition, this way of 
interpretation can set in motion a weakening and overturning of the tradition 
(Habermas 1990a, 240). Habermas did not reject Gadamer’s development of 
hermeneutics, but criticised Gadamer’s assumption that language and the tradition 
it conveys are elements the interpreter cannot remove herself from and critique 
(Habermas 1990b, 254). 
For Habermas, hermeneutics includes a self-reflection of a subject recognising her 
‘specific freedom from, and dependence on, language’ (Habermas 1990b, 249). This 
dual aspect of hermeneutics as freedom from and dependence upon language 
influences the interpreter’s processes of understanding of the text and herself as she 
goes beyond the recognition of the presuppositions and traditions, into a critical 
stance towards such presuppositions and traditions. In so doing the interpreter 
comes to a different understanding of both the text and herself and the process of 
understanding continues anew. Habermas opens the possibility for new 
interpretations and understandings, and new practices which can challenge tradition 
and the presuppositions within it. 
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While the work of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas would be sufficient as a 
methodology for my engagement with the written work of critical pedagogy, my 
analysis of my teaching practice requires an addition to hermeneutics which covers 
action and which is found in Ricoeur’s work. Ricoeur opened the possibility of 
hermeneutic methodology to be applied to areas beyond textual analysis and argued 
that action is not text in any literal sense, but that it is like text in ways which allow 
us to read action using the same methodology as we read a text (1971, 529). Ricoeur 
describes four traits of the sentence in linguistics which enable us to apply 
hermeneutics to discourses and events (ibid., 530): first, discourse is always 
temporal; two, discourse refers to a speaker through personal pronouns; three, 
discourse goes beyond itself and ‘refers to a world which it claims to describe, to 
express, or to represent’ (ibid., 531); four, discourse not only has a world it 
represents, but also an other to whom it is addressed (ibid., 531). Each of these traits 
fixes the speech act as something greater than the linguistic unit of the sentence. 
Sentences must be understood as a discourse containing the intention of the speaker 
and the possibility of interpretation by the listener. The possible gap between the 
speaker’s intention and the meaning of her words open the space in which 
hermeneutics operates in the listener’s understanding of meaning and the 
understanding of herself in relation to that meaning (ibid., 531-534). Furthermore, 
the discourse of the speech act can be moved from its temporality as spoken word 
to an inscription of discourse through writing (ibid., 538). 
Ricoeur argues that these four traits of linguistics and discourse are equally 
applicable to action, and in the same movement by which we fix discourse in writing, 
we can treat action as fixed text (1971, 538). Temporality as the first trait of discourse 
is the same as the temporal action. It carries similar issues of fixation as speech and 
discourse: whereas speech and discourse are fixed through writing, actions are fixed 
through their constitution as social phenomena. Similar to speech, action also 
contains a gap between intention and meaning: ‘deeds escape us and have effects 
which we did not intend’ (ibid., 541). Thus, action leaves an inscription on the world 
beyond the action itself, and becomes fixed in a way which enables the interpreter 
to read it. The second trait of text carried over to action is that of self-reference: 
action is always self-referential in that it requires something to complete the action. 
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Action is linked to something through the use of action verbs; something did 
something. The verb to do can be replaced by any other and the tense can change to 
provide distinctions in time, but when it comes to action, the action verb is always 
tied to a noun and provides a point of reference for the action (ibid., 539). The third 
trait of the relevance of discourse beyond itself is likewise applicable to action. 
Ricoeur suggests that the importance of those actions which can be read like text lies 
in the relevance of the action to situations beyond the moment in which the action 
occurred. Such actions exceed and transcend the social context of their production 
and can be re-enacted in other situations (ibid., 543-544). Finally, like discourse, 
human action is addressed to an other. In the case of human action, the range of 
possible interpreters is endless, meaning that human action is always open to new 
interpretation (ibid., 544). 
To bring Ricoeur’s work back to the discussion of hermeneutics, the interpreter is 
able to approach action as an entity of study, remaining critically aware of the 
presuppositions and traditions bound in the action, as well as her own 
presuppositions and traditions. In this approach the interpreter engages in the 
process of understanding by critically reflecting on presuppositions and traditions 
and bringing to light new interpretations and different understandings of herself and 
the action. The work of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas provide a sufficient 
methodological framework for my engagement with the texts of critical pedagogy, 
enabling me to critically explore my own presuppositions and traditions as well as 
those of the established texts of critical pedagogy. However, without Ricoeur I would 
be unable to take the next step in considering my actions in the classroom through 
the same movement of the critical recognition of the presuppositions and traditions 
I bring to that space, and the presuppositions and traditions of the space itself. 
Ultimately, Ricoeur’s addition to hermeneutic methodology enables this thesis to go 
beyond a purely theoretical engagement with critical pedagogy, and allows for a 
more complex interplay of different elements in the process of understanding.  
While hermeneutics establishes a methodological framework for my thesis, I 
require a method to gather and analyse data related to my teaching practice. For this 
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I turn to autoethnography, a method which embraces narrative and action as data 
for analysis. 
From Methodology to Method 
Autoethnography is a qualitative method which links the individual to her 
surroundings and has its roots in anthropology and sociology. The ‘auto’ refers to the 
self, the person conducting the research, while the ‘ethno’ refers to culture and the 
society in which the research is taking place (Ellis 2004, 31). In autoethnographic 
research the individual knowingly takes the double role of researcher and subject 
which differentiates autoethnography from other research derived from personal 
experience. Focussing on the interactions between the researcher’s social and 
personal situation, autoethnography allows the researcher to reflect on her position 
as a social actor as she moves from ‘the inward to the outward, from the personal to 
the other, and vice versa’ (Meerwald 2013, 44). 
Autoethnography 
Although the use of personal narrative in social research can be traced back to the 
Chicago School in the 1920s (Deegan 2007), it was Charles Wright Mills’ work on 
sociological imagination which set the ground for a qualitative research method 
which includes the researcher as an integral part of the exploration of social 
phenomena. In The Sociological Imagination (1973) Wright Mills makes an explicit 
connection between each individual’s life and the history and development of 
society. Wright Mills states that many people do not connect their personal 
experiences to the wider context in which their life takes place and are not aware of 
the role the context plays for their character: 
Seldom aware of the intricate connexion between the patterns of their 
own lives and the course of world history, ordinary men do not usually 
know what this connexion means for the kinds of men they are becoming 
and for the kinds of history-making in which they might take part. (Wright 
Mills 1973, 10) 
Unaware that they are able to transform and be transformed by the society in which 
they live individuals lack what Wright Mills called ‘sociological imagination’ (1973, 
12). The sociological imagination is what enables an individual to understand that ‘by 
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the fact of his living he contributes, however minutely, to the shaping of this society 
and to the course of its history’ (ibid., 12) and the way the wider social context 
impacts upon his life. Given that both the individual and the world are transformed 
by one another Wright Mills argues that any study of social phenomena must come 
back to the problems encountered in an individual’s biography and the intersection 
between the individual and the society (ibid., 12). 
The Sociological Imagination opened the way for the inclusion of the genre of 
biography in explanations of social phenomena. Building on Wright Mills’ effort to 
define a qualitative method for the social sciences, Norman Denzin (1989) introduced 
the idea of “interpretative interactionism” – a method for the study of the interplay 
between personal experience and social phenomena. Denzin summarises his method 
as follows: ‘Interpretive interactionism speaks to [the] interrelationship between 
private lives and public responses to personal troubles’ (ibid., 9). Denzin seeks to 
make the lived experiences of individuals directly and easily accessible to readers by 
capturing the voices, emotions and actions of those experiences which ‘radically alter 
and shape the meanings persons have given to themselves’ (ibid., 9). Denzin’s note 
on those experiences which alter and shape the researcher’s life is important, as it is 
not all parts of the researcher’s life which are to be included. These interactional 
moments can be positive or negative, but in autoethnography the researcher is 
focussed on those which lead, or led, to transformations in the researcher herself in 
relation to the researcher’s social question. 
The connection between the researcher’s own life and the exploration of wider 
society in autoethnography serves a critical function because it can enable a critique 
of the conditions of the society in which the self is located. In this way, 
autoethnography is not merely a simple narrative of an experience but a ‘critical 
looking outward at power relations in a cultural space’ (Banks and Banks 2000, 234). 
Furthermore, the links between the researcher, the social phenomenon in question, 
the researcher’s own role as an actor in that social phenomenon, and the element of 
criticality are vital for preventing an autobiography from becoming a narcissistic 
endeavour in which the researcher ignores the larger social questions. 
Having provided a basic understanding of the principles underpinning 
autoethnography as a method and the role the researcher plays in the critical study 
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of the society in which she is embedded, we now move on to consider the key 
characteristics of the method itself. First and foremost, autoethnography is a form of 
narrative told about the self, in which the researcher and parts of her story form the 
backbone of the study. Duhnpath argues that our lives are narrative in quality and 
that ‘we experience the world and re-present our experience narratively’ (2000, 544-
545). We make meaning of our lives through the narratives we tell to ourselves and 
to others and these narratives allow us to explore our experiences and include others 
in that exploration. We frequently bring a coherence and rationality to experiences 
as we re-tell them, and it is often experiences which do not fit rationally and 
coherently within our existing narrative structures that shake and challenge us to 
transform (Meerwald 2013, 48). The focus on the individual as both researcher and 
subject enables us therefore to reconstruct and interpret those moments and critical 
episodes in our lives which hold subjective significance for us (Duhnpath 2000, 544-
545). 
The element of re-presentation captured in Duhnpath’s work brings us to another 
feature of autoethnographic narratives: not all parts of an individual’s biography are 
important for the investigation of social phenomena. Rather than including the 
entirety of an individual’s biography which would mean including a great number of 
moments that are neither relevant to the study nor particularly pertinent in the 
individual’s life, Denzin suggests focussing on ‘interactional moments’ (1989, 15) in 
the individual’s life. Interactional moments are ‘epiphanies’ – moments which ‘leave 
marks on people’s lives’ (ibid., 15) and ‘radically alter and shape the meanings 
persons give to themselves and their life projects’ (Denzin 1998, 335). Denzin argues 
that by focusing on particular moments that are both related to the wider social 
phenomenon being studied and which have a profound transformational effect on 
the individual, forms of biography such as autoethnography become a more exact 
method for exploring social questions. Each autoethnography is premised on a 
careful selection process which enables us to connect disparate events over time and 
consider their consequences (Riessmann 1993, 19; Elliot 2006, 24). The researcher 
chooses which experiences, or interactional moments, to re-tell, what details to 
include or omit about those experiences, which words to use and where to place the 
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emphasis. In each of these steps, she is creating a particular representation and 
interpretation of the experience (Sikes 2010, 17-18). 
One issue that needs to be addressed is the constructed nature of 
autoethnographies, their interpretations, and the truth claims they contain. In 
writing autoethnographic narratives we enter into an ordering process and in doing 
so we are not making claims to a “historical truth” but a “narrative truth” (Spence, 
1982). An autoethnography provides us with an accessible account of the meaning 
of an interactional moment for the author. Hence, the value of narratives such as 
autobiography lies in their ability to convey personal meaning rather than being 
enmeshed in a dichotomy of truth or falsity (Gusdorf 1980, 43). Whatever selections 
and omissions an author makes in telling her narrative reveals a truth about how she 
experienced the event and how she perceives herself and her actions in that event. 
The autoethnographic narratives in this thesis play this role of meaning-making and 
reflection on my attempts to practice a critical response to critical pedagogy and act 
as a singular example and exploration of a critical pedagogy, itself a response to neo-
liberalism as a social phenomenon. 
Another feature of autoethnography is that it is predominantly written in the first 
person singular (Ellis 2004, 30). Given that autoethnographies are narratives about 
ourselves as both researcher and subject of research this is perhaps not surprising 
although while the most common, it is not the only way to write an autoethnographic 
narrative. There are collaborative autoethnographic narratives which use the third 
person ‘we’ or individuals’ names. The advantage of the collaborative approach is 
that it allows researchers to explore the same experiences from multiple viewpoints 
and combine, compare, and negotiate the interpretation of these experiences as a 
collaborative process (DeMeulenaere and Cann 2013). As well as encouraging each 
individual researcher to critically consider her own interpretation of an experience 
through being presented with another’s interpretation, collaborative work can also 
bring previously unforeseen or unnoticed features of an experience to the attention 
of each researcher, and therefore provide a more detailed account of an event. 
Although less common, autoethnographies can also be written in the second person. 
In his piece The Critical Life (2000) Ronald J. Pelias writes exclusively in the second 
person as he takes the reader through a condensed version of his day and the 
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challenges and questions which arise from constantly looking through a critical lens 
on oneself and others. 
You wonder: What does it mean to live with a critical eye, an eye that’s 
always assessing, always deciding questions of worth, always saying 
what’s good or bad? What does it mean to judge others? What does it 
mean to say someone else does not measure up? By what right do you set 
certain standards? How can you not? What does it mean to judge 
yourself? By what right do you evaluate? What is at stake? To discover the 
heart of such questions, you track your day. (Pelias 2000, 220) 
In this opening paragraph of Pelias’ article the unusual use of the second person ‘you’ 
invites the reader to place themselves directly in the protagonist’s position. While 
we are aware that Pelias is writing about the experience of one of his days, the 
boundaries between the writer and the reader are blurred, encouraging the reader 
to take on the narrative as one of their own and displaying the accessibility integral 
to autoethnography. 
The notion of the reader as the protagonist introduces another important element 
of autoethnographies: autoethnography is a story, not a report. As the 
autoethnographic method allows us to tell narratives about our lives and experiences 
it takes us a step away from strictly academic forms of writing. Autoethnographies 
introduce the possibility of using writing elements and styles drawn from fiction and 
utilising narration, characterisation and plot line (Ellis 2004, 30). Time, place, plot and 
scene combine to add to the experiential quality of autoethnographies by providing 
the reader with a location where ‘action occurs, where characters are formed and 
live out their stories and where cultural and social context play constraining and 
enabling roles’ (Clandinin and Connelly 1998, 155). These elements of fictional 
writing enable autoethnography to bridge the gap between the personal experiences 
of the researcher and experiences of the reader because it provides the context of 
the experiences in a way that is both accessible and recognisable. This is not to say 
that the autoethnographic method is restricted to writing alone. Story telling can 
come in many forms, and the same is true for autoethnography which can include as 
varied media as ‘short stories, poetry, fiction, novels, photographic essays, scripts, 
personal essays, journals, fragmented and layered writing, and social science prose’ 
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(Ellis 2004, 38). The media in which the researcher chooses to tell her story is open, 
but regardless of the form there are common elements which autoethnographies 
bring to the fore. Autoethnographies will include the majority, if not all, of the 
following, ‘concrete action, dialogue, emotion, embodiment, spirituality, and self-
consciousness’ (ibid., 38), and each of these aspects highlight the highly personal 
nature of autoethnographic work. For the researcher, there is the constant 
‘vulnerability of revealing yourself, not being able to take back what you’ve written 
or having control over how readers interpret your story (ibid., xviii). And yet this 
vulnerability is central to autoethnography as the researcher not only opens herself 
to her own criticism, but also the criticism of others which is an integral part of the 
critical social function autoethnography plays. 
The element of interpretation involved in autoethnography, and indeed any 
qualitative research method, is addressed by Denzin who states that interpretations 
are ‘unfinished, provisional, and incomplete’ (Denzin 1989, 64) and that each time a 
researcher returns to look at a social phenomenon the process of interpretation 
starts once again (ibid., 64). Importantly, Denzin argues, this does not mean that 
interpretations are inconclusive. He distinguishes between inconclusive and 
incomplete and argues that autoethnographic narratives can draw conclusions about 
the social phenomenon in question whilst still recognising that the process of 
interpretation itself is never finished. Denzin states that: ‘To think otherwise is to 
foreclose one’s interpretations before one begins’ (ibid., 64), removing the need for 
the work to explore the social phenomenon. The unfinished nature of 
autoethnographic social study could be thought of as a weakness, but to do so would 
mean denying the continual possibility of turning a critical lens upon ourselves and 
our stories, as well as other people and their stories. To suggest that interpretations 
should not be revisited, or perhaps should not be revisited in the name of a definitive 
end to the research, is to suggest that there is a single correct answer, the one true 
interpretation of events. The unfinished nature of the interpretation of 
autoethnographies can also be seen through the lens of hermeneutics: it invites the 
author and reader to enter a critical hermeneutic process of understanding, opening 
up the interpretation of human action to myriad interpreters. 
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Alongside these personal elements, the maintenance of a clear link to the wider 
social context in which the experiences of the researcher occurred is a further key 
feature of autoethnography. The term “context” includes the physical and 
institutional environments of the researcher along with her wider social, cultural, and 
interpersonal environment. The interpersonal environment in this instance refers to 
the significant others of the researcher, such as partners, parents, mentors, 
colleagues and peers (Duhnpath 2000, 546). Broadly speaking, the researcher’s 
context consists of all the elements of her daily life which impact on the researcher 
in ways pertinent to the social phenomenon being studied. Without the inclusion of 
context, a text is not an autoethnography but a memoir. The inclusion of social 
context allows the autoethnographic researcher to function as ‘a universal singular, 
a single instance of more universal social experiences’ (Denzin 2007, 136). 
While the above can be identified as key features of autoethnography, this 
introduction is in danger of presenting a harmonious and unified view of 
autoethnography as a method. To do so would be to overlook the attempt to 
distinguish between two categories of autoethnography, first introduced by Leon 
Anderson in 2006.  Anderson’s opening gambit is that it is possible to draw a 
distinction between “evocative autoethnography” and “analytic autoethnography” 
(Anderson 2006, 373), arguing that the former aims to achieve ‘emotional resonance’ 
(ibid., 377) with the reader  whereas the latter fits more with other traditional forms 
of social research. In Anderson’s categorisation, evocative autoethnography is of the 
type promoted and used by many of the scholars included above such as Carolyn Ellis 
and Ronald Pelias. Walford’s criticism of this evocative autoethnography, drawn on 
by Anderson, is that it is often ‘self-indulgent, and is sometimes more akin to therapy 
than social science research’ (Walford 2004, 412). In establishing his distinction 
Anderson argues analytic autoethnography has five key features: complete member 
research status, analytic reflexivity, narrative visibility of the researcher’s self, 
dialogue with informants beyond the self, and commitment to theoretical analysis 
(2006, 378). Complete member research status and analytic reflexivity refer to the 
position of the autoethnographic researcher as a full and active participant in the 
group being researched, and the need for that researcher to reflect on and analyse 
their experiences of being part of said group (ibid., 380). When discussing the 
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narrative visibility of the researcher Anderson requires the researcher to be a ‘highly 
visible social actor’ (ibid., 384) in the text and to incorporate her own emotions and 
experiences as vital data in the story of the social phenomena. The dialogue with 
others is central in analytic autoethnography and involves the researcher going 
beyond her own experiences to include the experiences of others in informing the 
work, with Anderson calling for an autoethnography which ‘is grounded in self-
experience but reaches beyond it as well’ (ibid., 386). Finally, analytic 
autoethnography enters a process in which ‘generalised theoretical understandings 
of social processes’ (ibid., 385) can be developed and refined. 
Anderson’s division of analytic autoethnography and evocative autoethnography 
has been heavily criticised and only finds limited use in the social sciences (Willis 
2011; Thompson 2015). I argue that Anderson’s division is an artificial one. While 
acknowledging that it is entirely possible that some authors writing 
autoethnographies are ‘self-indulgent’ and using it as a form of ‘therapy’ (Walford 
2004, 412), using this criticism as a basis for a separation between analytic and 
evocative autoethnographies is not convincing. In the exploration of 
autoethnography above both Denzin (2007) and Duhnpath (2000) argue for the 
inclusion of social context in order to tie the experiences of the researcher to the 
social phenomenon she is experiencing and studying: without this connection the 
work loses the social link which transforms a work from memoir to autoethnography. 
Let us approach this systematically through Anderson’s five key features of analytic 
autoethnography. Anderson’s first claim that the researcher must be an active 
member of the group being researched (2006, 378) is not convincing because this is 
a universal feature of autoethnographies. The term “autoethnography” contains two 
main elements, ‘auto’ which refers to the self of the researcher and the ‘ethno’ which 
refers to the culture in which the self is located (Ellis 2004, 31). Any research which 
includes the study of culture without the researcher as an active participant is not 
autoethnography, it is ethnography, a related but distinct form of social research. 
This point goes some way to addressing Anderson’s second and third features; 
analytic reflexivity and narrative visibility of the researcher (2006, 378). By 
connecting the self to the social phenomenon the researcher cannot but address and 
reflect on her experiences in the research and use this as part of the data informing 
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the larger project. Connected to the question of the data used in autoethnographies 
is Anderson’s fourth feature; the requirement for the inclusion of dialogue with other 
participants (2006, 378). Here I follow Kevin Vryan’s argument that it is entirely 
possible to complete a piece of research without engaging in dialogue with others as 
part of data gathering. Vryan maintains that if he was to complete a project on the 
basis of self-produced data, he would still be able ‘to carry out effective analyses and 
develop concepts and models of significant social processes in new ways’ (Vryan 
2006, 406). The absence of data from other participants in the social phenomenon 
does not preclude the possibility of a thorough analysis. Instead, the determining 
factor for the inclusion of a dialogue with participants is a question of its necessity, 
value, and feasibility in light of the research taking place (ibid., 406). The final of the 
five key features of analytic autoethnography, is the ‘commitment to the 
development of theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena’ (Anderson 
2006, 378). Once again, this has already been addressed above in the introduction to 
autoethnography as a method. Denzin’s notion of the ‘universal singular’ (2007, 136) 
illuminates that in the autoethnographic account the researcher acts as a singular 
instance of a regular experience. In writing an autoethnography the researcher may 
not be attempting to provide explanation of a social phenomenon at the macro level 
but this does not deny her theoretical engagement through the autoethnography. 
The extent of the link between theoretical engagement and practice may vary, but 
just as the analytic autoethnography promoted by Anderson does not rule out 
evocative accounts, the autoethnography put forward by Ellis, Bochner, Denzin, 
Vryan and others does not preclude the inclusion of theory. 
 I therefore do not recognise the division between analytic and evocative 
autoethnography, and I find the attempt to delineate the two unnecessary. However, 
I agree with Kathy Charmaz (2006) that Anderson’s five features are a useful set of 
guidelines for carrying out and evaluating autoethnographic work, with the caveat 
that we must be cautious not to apply these criteria as a set of normative statements 
about what autoethnography should be (ibid., 398). To do so not only attempts to 
create a divide where there is none, but also runs the risk of limiting the creative and 
flexible potential of autoethnography as a method. 
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One further issue is to be considered when working with autoethnographic 
narratives that is closely connected to the danger of an autoethnography becoming 
a self-indulgent and narcissistic endeavour. Gustav Fischman warns of a similar 
danger around the notion of a ‘narrative of redemption’ (2009 207). Narratives of 
redemption erase any background of the subject and any process which may have 
taken place during the series of events. Instead, they portray moments of personal 
heroics in which ‘pure acts of will […] are implemented instantly, and […] achieve 
virtually instantaneous results’ (ibid., 208). At their core, narratives of redemption 
are over-simplified accounts of personal glory in the face of oppression, which, while 
emotionally resonant, do away with the complexities of our lives and interactions. 
Just as the autoethnographic researcher must avoid writing something devoid of 
social connection, she must also be wary of producing a narrative of redemption. 
Autoethnography, Education and Politics 
Now that we have an understanding of the background and features of 
autoethnography, we can highlight some of the ways in which it has been used as a 
method in the study of education and politics. Broadly speaking autoethnographic 
pieces in either education or politics can be placed in one of two categories: the first 
is those works exploring autoethnography as a method, and the second is those 
works using the autoethnographic method when researching education and politics. 
An example of the autoethnographic method for educational research is Ronald J. 
Pelias’ work The Critical Life. Pelias invites the reader to explore the critical social 
function of an academic through the lens of his personal experience as a lecturer by 
taking the reader through his typical day as an academic, exploring the highly 
evaluative role that comes with such a position (Pelias 2000, 220). Pelias offers 
insights into his interactions with family, students, staff, and administration, weaving 
together emotional responses and considerations with contextual information and 
critical commentary on his own behaviour throughout the day (ibid., 220). This 
educational autoethnography brings to the fore the tensions and contradictions an 
academic faces in her dealings with the different elements of her life. In one 
particular instance Pelias describes the complications of marking student essays 
when he begins to consider the weight of authority which comes with his position as 
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a lecturer (ibid., 221). In another, Pelias highlights the difficulty of dealing with 
specific colleagues and internal departmental divisions, the politics at play over a 
possible appointment to the department and the vested interests in everyone’s 
stance (ibid., 225). Although the details of Pelias’s experiences are specific to his 
context, the nature of the experiences he describes - deliberating over student 
grades while wrestling with the considerations of institutional power that one holds, 
or dealing with departmental tensions and politics - are shared by others in academic 
positions. To echo Denzin, Pelias presents a ‘universal singular’ (2007, 136), the 
telling of a singular event which carries universal features, and the strength of 
educational autoethnographies is to bring these experiences to light and to 
encourage the reader to reflect on similar situations in her own life. 
One example of exploring autoethnography as a method in educational research 
is Stephan P. Banks and Anna Banks’ piece Reading “The Critical Life”: 
Autoethnography as Pedagogy (Banks and Banks 2000) in which they explore several 
ways in which autoethnographies such as Pelias’ enrich educational research.  Banks 
and Banks argue that educational autoethnographies play an important role in 
teaching the reader to challenge everyday assumptions about her role and position 
as a social actor. By bringing everyday action into focus educational 
autoethnographies highlight those actions which the reader may take for granted. 
An example comes through Pelias’s The Critical life (2000) in which he deliberates 
over his role as an academic grading papers and the power dynamics at play in 
departmental appointments. These might be taken for granted by other academics, 
and yet through the Pelias’ autoethnography they are confronted with a 
consideration of their own practice in relation to these two areas. This, Banks and 
Banks argue, is an educational moment for the reader (ibid., 235). Closely tied to the 
challenging of the reader’s assumptions, Banks and Banks argue that 
autoethnographies dealing with educational experiences teach the reader to model 
‘a critical attitude’ (Banks and Banks 2000, 236) in her relationships with family, 
colleagues, students, or institutional administrators. By highlighting issues of power 
in everyday life autoethnographies invite the reader to reflect on her own role in 
power relationships and consider how her actions reinforce or challenge oppressive 
uses of power (ibid., 236). A further consideration of autoethnography as a method 
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in educational research is that it teaches the reader that there are different 
possibilities for writing and presenting educational studies. The autoethnographic 
method both demonstrates and brings to the fore the personal engagement with our 
own research which occurs when writing (ibid., 235). Often research in the social 
sciences, education and politics included, is encouraged as a distanced and 
dispassionate process, artificially separating the researcher from the writing; 
autoethnography bridges that gap and models different possibilities of writing for 
others. 
While Banks and Banks concentrate on the educational possibilities within the 
autoethnographic method, Rubby Duhnpath makes the case for the greater inclusion 
of autoethnographies in educational studies. Duhnpath states that there is no 
dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative research arguing that each can be 
supportive of the other and provide a different and complementary look at the same 
subject (2000 543-544). From this starting point Duhnpath argues that far from being 
a threat to more quantitative educational research, autoethnography provides a 
valuable insight into the experiences and approaches of teachers, teacher educators 
and pupils alike in response to educational challenges. Duhnpath is careful to point 
out that the subjective narratives of teachers, teacher educators and pupils should 
not trump the quantitative work undertaken by academics and administrators but do 
play a vital role in providing the rich descriptive elements missing from quantitative 
educational research (ibid., 550). According to Duhnpath, a blend of 
autoethnographic and quantitative educational research offers insight into both the 
experiential and interactional moments of individuals, and the wider social and 
institutional contexts in which those interactions take place. Importantly, Duhnpath 
argues that by encouraging more autoethnographic work in educational research we 
can give space to currently marginalised and excluded voices in academic research 
(ibid., 550). 
Straddling the gap between work which explores autoethnography as a method 
and work which utilises autoethnography in educational research, DeMeulenaere 
and Cann have written a collaborative autoethnography about activist research in 
education, sociology and anthropology (DeMeulenaere and Cann 2013). 
DeMeulenaere and Cann argue that activist research should be focussed on enabling 
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social change and should specifically address issues of oppression, be that race, 
gender, class, sexuality, age, etc., and challenges to those oppressive practices in the 
lives of the research participants (ibid., 557). To this end, they argue that by 
encouraging a collective reflection collaborative autoethnography is an excellent way 
to bring activist research and social change together. DeMeulenaere and Cann 
suggest that the reflection of activist scholars as part of their research helps to 
highlight the power relationships and dynamics involved in research for social 
change, and can therefore help to break the ‘hierarchical divisions’ (ibid., 561) and 
make activist research more socially just by addressing issues of oppression in the 
population involved in the research. Researchers working collaboratively with 
educators bring the normally distant realms of academic research and practical 
experience together in a process of reflection which is beneficial for all involved. 
While there exists a range of literature on autoethnographies in educational 
research, there is far less inclusion of autoethnography in the study of politics, be 
that pieces exploring autoethnography as a method or pieces which use 
autoethnography. The lack of autoethnographic methods in political research is 
discussed by DeLysa Burnier (2006) who stresses that the ‘overarching commitment 
to become a science has excluded the personal, and specifically the self, from 
scholarly research and writing’ (ibid., 411) in political science. The only space in which 
personal writing appears in the social sciences are prefaces of books, personal 
addresses, or essays in honour of a particularly important individuals, along with 
biographies and autobiographies (ibid., 411). Burnier argues that this is an oversight 
as the personal is central to the development of the social scientific, and personal 
writing allows us to capture the subjective elements of research: 
Personal writing is hybrid in character, in that it blends and combines 
an individual’s personal story with his or her scholarly story. It is writing 
that is not strictly scholarly because it contains the personal, and yet it 
is not strictly personal because it contains the scholarly. Indeed, 
personal writing in this way seeks to erase the false dichotomy 
between the scholarly and the personal. (Burnier 2006, 412) 
By way of response to this lack of autoethnography in political science Burnier 
includes elements of personal writing as part of her courses, encouraging students 
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to write reflective pieces about their own lives in light of what has been covered in 
the course (ibid., 413). 
One of the few examples of autoethnography in political research is the work of 
Abraham DeLeon. DeLeon explores autoethnography as a methodology, arguing that 
‘testimony opens new ways of looking at knowledge construction by allowing 
participation in a subversive form of scholarship’ (2010, 399), connecting this to his 
experiences of systemic racism (ibid., 398). Adding more detail, DeLeon argues that 
autoethnographies have the potential to be anti-hierarchical and subversive by 
challenging traditional notions of scholarship based on objectivity (ibid., 407-409). 
Autoethnographies can act as a form of counter-narrative which explore the 
everyday actions of activists and scholars alike and can therefore be a form of direct 
action as encouraged by forms of anarchist theory (ibid., 409). 
These examples of the autoethnographic method in educational and political 
research share three important commonalities: the personal, other voices, and 
accessibility. In the first instance, in both education and politics, autoethnography 
introduces the personal while maintaining the link to the wider social context. 
Autoethnography allows us to consider social phenomena not from a falsely claimed 
objectivity, but from the acknowledgement and embracing of the effects society has 
on an individual and vice versa. Finally, autoethnography offers an accessibility for 
reader through forms of writing which are recognisable and understandable for 
wider audiences. Therefore, autoethnography in education and politics helps fulfil an 
important social function as a record of direct action and as a form of writing and 
research which can be explored and discussed by those outside the academy. 
Hermeneutics, Autoethnography, and Me 
This thesis is an interaction of my reading and critique of critical pedagogy, alongside 
my practices of teaching, informed by and reflective of both the presuppositions I 
bring to the process of understanding and the traditions in which I am embedded. 
Importantly, hermeneutics as developed by Ricoeur via Gadamer and Habermas, 
provides a methodological framework which embraces the interplay of all these 
elements at once, removing the prioritisation of one over another. The 
understanding and critique of critical pedagogy in this thesis has been a process of 
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constant development as a result of my reading, writing, and practice occurring 
simultaneously. As I have deepened my engagement with the literature around 
critical pedagogy and sought to develop my teaching practices, I have been 
confronted with my own presuppositions and the assumptions of critical pedagogy. 
Through these confrontations of presupposition and tradition I have been challenged 
to expand my reading further as I seek to better understand my own presuppositions 
and treat those of critical pedagogy critically. 
In combination, Charles Wright Mills’ work on sociological imagination and 
Norman Denzin’s interactional moments set the ground for a qualitative research 
method which includes people and the details of their lives as an integral part of the 
exploration and explanation of social phenomena. The discussions around analytic 
and/or evocative autoethnography and the warning regarding redemptive narratives 
are important considerations in this thesis. As stated at the beginning of the chapter, 
my thesis is located at the intersection of politics, education and personal experience 
and entwines theory and practice while addressing the short-comings of critical 
pedagogy. Autoethnography provides me with a method by which I can combine 
these theoretical explorations with personal accounts of practice. Building from my 
initial research questions regarding the social change called for in critical pedagogy 
and how I enact an approach to education which creates space for me and the 
students which distances external pressures and in which we can decide how to act 
for ourselves, my thesis includes the features of autoethnography outlined above. 
Recalling Anderson’s five criteria as a guide, I explicitly connect my experiences of 
teaching to the wider context of neo-liberal higher education and I am an active 
member in that context. Furthermore, I am visible in the research itself and my 
analysis is a reflection on my practice, and my autoethnography is connected to a 
wider attempt to theorise the shortcomings of critical pedagogy in my context of neo-
liberal higher education. 
Operating in parallel with autoethnography in this thesis is Foucault’s work on 
care of the self (2005, 2006, 2012). Autoethnography is the study of self in the 
context of society and is a method through which the experiences of the individual 
can be used to illuminate and analyse wider social phenomena. In this process of 
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presenting one’s experiences and actions as objects of research the researcher opens 
herself to criticism. Ellis captures this process of opening and critique as follows: ‘[…] 
there’s the vulnerability of revealing yourself, not being able to take back what 
you’ve written or having control over how readers interpret your story. It’s hard to 
feel that critics are judging your life as well as your work’ (2004, xviii). In revealing 
herself through autoethnography the researcher is inviting others to critique her and 
her actions and it is in the movement of revealing and critique that there is a parallel 
to Foucault’s care of the self (2005, 2006, 2012). Care of the self is an on-going 
process of subject (trans)formation in which an individual attends to her own actions 
and the actions of those around her in order to take responsibility for those actions 
rather than deferring that responsibility to the expectations of others (Foucault 
2005). Practices of self-care have transformed over time from antiquity to the 1st and 
2nd centuries A.D. and beyond into early Christianity but throughout this 
transformation they maintained a central tenet: the re-telling of thought and action 
to an other. In antiquity this other took the form of a singular master to whom the 
individual would divulge all thoughts, words, and actions from the day, offering these 
up as objects of self-reflection and critique. While this could take the form of oral 
conversation Foucault’s specific example draws upon the letters of Serenus to 
Seneca, in which Serenus accounts for his day in great detail and waits to receive the 
input of his master (2006). By the 1st and 2nd centuries the master figure had changed 
from a singular individual to a potential network of others, including teachers, family 
and friends, to whom the individual could re-tell her day. 
In both time periods accounting for oneself to oneself and others as part of taking 
responsibility for one’s actions and (trans)formation as a subject meant opening 
oneself to critique and criticism, much like the autoethnography. In light of this, this 
thesis is not only an autoethnographic exploration of my critique of critical pedagogy 
in the context of neo-liberal higher education, it is also a process of self-care. Through 
my autoethnographic account I am taking responsibility for myself and my actions 
and invite others into a consideration and critique of those actions. I am inviting the 
reader to play the role of a master. This thesis and the methodology which underpins 
it is not only an academic endeavour, it forms part of an active and on-going attempt 
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at my practices of self care which run parallel to the critique of critical pedagogy and 
the practice of subversive teaching. 
 To anchor the discussion of autoethnography and self care in this thesis let us 
consider the material that constitutes the foundation of my autoethnography. I kept 
class notes after each seminar over the period of two years, covering twelve different 
groups on a first-year undergraduate module in British politics. This allowed me to 
immediately record my impressions of the class and highlight any specific 
occurrences and interactions which were particularly interesting. Alongside specific 
instances the class notes provided me with a format in which to capture more general 
information about the sessions, including details about the rooms, the ambiance, the 
group dynamics and personal thoughts and emotions. In addition to these written 
notes I used a voice recorder to capture the entirety of each of the sessions. These 
recordings were supplementary to the class notes and allowed me to return to 
specific sessions to confirm events and conversations as they happened. 
Autoethnography comes with its own ethical challenges and considerations. In 
connecting the personal and the other, and critically examining the interplay 
between me as a researcher and my context, autoethnography deals directly with 
issues of ethics. In telling my own story I necessarily include the students, and as with 
the selection of the narrative to be told, I select how to represent those students. 
Both, Carolyn Ellis and Norman Denzin come to the same conclusion when 
considering the ethical component of autoethnography, proposing that the 
researcher writes from an ‘ethic of care and concern’ (Ellis 2004, 46). Denzin 
elaborates this initial position stating that ethnographers, autoethnographers 
included, should always write from an ethic of care, solidarity, community, mutuality, 
and civic transformation (Denzin 1997, 274-275). Such a stance places my on-going 
relationships and interactions as a central consideration in the writing and 
presentation of my autoethnographic work. I must be continually aware of the 
possible impacts of my work on both me through opening my life to criticism, and on 
those around me who play an integral role in my interactional experiences. The 
ethical approval for this thesis started from this position of care and concern and 
drew on the British Education Research Association (BERA) ethics guidelines (British 
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Education Research Association 20112) as a practical guide. Although this thesis is a 
study of my own teaching practice, it necessarily involves the students I work with, 
and therefore they are participants in the study, if not specific entities of study. To 
this end, it was important that I went through the ethical considerations and 
proceedures as would usually guide primary research, including voluntary informed 
consent, full disclosure about the project, right to withdraw, and issues of privacy. 
Along with the position of care and concern argued for by Denzin and Ellis, these four 
elements of the BERA guidelines inform my responsibility to the students as 
participants (ibid., 5). 
In the first class with each new group of students I would begin with a brief 
introduction to the research, explaining that while I was conducting research into my 
own actions, this could not be isolated from my interactions with the students. 
Distributing participant information forms and participant consent forms gave the 
students time to read through an outline of the project and what was being asked of 
them, and I encouraged them to ask any questions they may have. Being already 
aware of the relationships of power and authority in play in the classroom, with me 
in the position of seminar leader and them as students, I recognise that the students 
may not have had the confidence to ask for clarity and may well have agreed to the 
research on the basis that someone with a position within the institution was asking 
them to. However, this was an important step both in terms of compliance with 
ethical guidelines and for establishing an environment of questioning and challenge. 
In the majority of the classes at least one student asked a question about the research 
and their role and my responses clarified points and issues. I made it clear, verbally 
and in writing, that any consent given at that moment could be withdrawn at any 
point until the end of the data gathering phase of the research. This process of 
information sharing, question and answer, and consent forms satisfy the BERA 
criteria of informed consent to participate in research (ibid., 5), openness in the 
securing of that consent (ibid., 6), and the right of participants to withdraw (ibid., 6). 
                                                 
2 These have recently been updated: https://www.bera.ac.uk/researchers-
resources/publications/ethical-guidelines-for-educational-research-2018  
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One question which was asked in several  groups was whether I was going to be 
using the students to experiment on with my different teaching practices. The issue 
of detrimental impact arising from participation in research is covered in BERA’s 
guidelines (BERA 2011, 7), and it was important for me to reassure the students that 
I was not going to be doing anything untoward. I explained that the project started 
from the premise that all teaching is a political act, and that how we teach and how 
we engage with each other in the classroom is political. From my position, whether 
voiced or not, all staff they interacted with in the course of their degree would have 
a noteable teaching practice and would approach them on the basis of this particular 
understanding of what education is and should be, and how the classroom should 
function. I explained that what I was aiming to do in this research project was to make 
my position and approach explicit and to explore the politics involved with this 
position. I assured them that regardless of the research I was conducting, I had a 
responsiblilty as a staff member of the institution to guide them through the module 
and help them achieve their personal goals. Sometimes there may be a personal 
tension for me between these different elements of student aspirations and 
expectations, institutional responsibilities, and personal convictions regarding 
education and my role, but these tensions are in part what I am exploring in the 
research. 
To deal with issues of privacy and confidentiality (BERA 2011, 7) the class 
recordings and class notes were both kept in password-protected files with back-ups 
stored on a password-protected USB drive used only for this project. In the write-up 
of the gathered data names of participants have been changed to ensure anonymity. 
Upon completion of this thesis the gathered data will be destroyed. 
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3. Critical Pedagogy and the State 
The social change critical pedagogy is working towards is a more democratic state in 
which citizens play a greater role in the decision making processes which impact 
them (Giroux 1989; Freire 1998; Darder 2002; Gandin and Apple 2002; 2005; 
McLaren 2007; Carr 2011; Wheeler-Bell 2014; Liou and Rojas 2016). In 
predetermining from the start the outcome of social change and the form of social 
organisation this change is to take, critical pedagogy removes the freedom of people 
to determine their own forms of organisation through spontaneous autonomous 
practice. Critical pedagogy’s calls for social change may strive for greater equality, 
democracy and freedom, but this is bound by a framework of the state which 
ultimately maintains hierarchical relationships and practices of government which 
give form to subjectivities. There is a parallel to be drawn with neo-liberalism, not in 
the objectives of the social change pursued, but in the role of certain practices of 
governmentality which predetermine the subjects’ actions. In both critical pedagogy 
and neo-liberalism education is an arena ridden with external pressures and 
expectations for all participants. In neo-liberalism the expectation of students is to 
become productive economic units and consumers, and for teachers to provide an 
easily replicable and sanctioned set of knowledge. In critical pedagogy the 
expectation for students is to become critical citizens who take active roles in 
democracy, and for teachers to be transformative intellectuals who guide students 
to this end. Whatever the form of these pressures, critical pedagogical or neo-liberal, 
the student and the teacher are constrained in their actions. Bringing this back to the 
state, critical pedagogy establishes these constraints through a call for social change 
which explicitly maintains state structures and practices of government. Therefore, 
critical pedagogy cannot be a response to neo-liberalism, as although the end-goal 
might be different, the processes which limit the freedom of the subject, student or 
teacher, are the same. To better understand this claim, this chapter first establishes 
critical pedagogy’s understanding of democracy and the state through two concepts 
of democracy. The first is thin democracy, which reduces democracy to voting, and 
citizenship to consumerism. According to critical pedagogy it is this form of 
democracy found in the neo-liberal state. The second is thick democracy, the type 
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sought by critical pedagogy and which promotes citizen participation in all walks of 
public life. With thick democracy comes a redefinition of the state as a form of social 
organisation. Connected to critical pedagogy’s thick democracy and the state is a 
specific form of citizenship which establishes the identity and actions of citizens who 
participate in thick democracy. Critical pedagogy positions itself as a response to neo-
liberalism through its calls for thick democracy, a redefined state, and critical citizens, 
and I close the chapter by drawing on postanarchism to argue that critical pedagogy 
cannot be a response to neo-liberalism because through thick democracy, the state, 
and the critical citizen it predetermines the subject, action, and relationships through 
practices which mirror neo-liberalism. 
Democracy and citizenship are two core themes in critical pedagogy’s response to 
neo-liberalism. Although these terms are used repeatedly throughout critical 
pedagogy there is little attempt to provide a precise definition of either. Indeed, 
Henry Giroux cautions directly against trying to provide cut-in-stone definitions of 
either, stating: 
Once we acknowledge the concept of citizenship as a socially constructed 
practice, it becomes all the more imperative to recognise that categories 
like citizenship and democracy need to be problematized and 
reconstructed for each generation. (Giroux 1989, 5-6) 
Giroux argues that the concepts of democracy and citizenship should not be reified 
as this would remove the possibility for each generation to critique them from their 
own context. In order to maintain its critical impetus and belief in the social 
construction of knowledge, critical pedagogy needs to maintain the possibility of 
questioning terms which are so central to its calls for social change. However, despite 
the reluctance to provide a definition of democracy or citizenship critical pedagogy 
has a clear vision of what each of these concepts entail. 
Democracy in Critical Pedagogy 
Paul Carr (2011a; 2011b) and Quentin Wheeler-Bell (2014), demonstrate that the 
notion of thick democracy in critical pedagogy provides a foundation and approach 
that can ‘create the conditions for a more nuanced, resilient and hopeful form of 
democracy’ (Carr 2011b, 187) which counters neo-liberalism. Building on previous 
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work which addresses democracy in critical pedagogy (Darder 2002; Gandin and 
Apple 2002, 2005; McLaren 2007) Carr and Wheeler-Bell develop democractic 
practice which challenges oppression and aims to create a ‘more humane political, 
cultural and socioeconomic space for all’ (Carr 2011b, 188). 
Thin democracy is the form of democracy operating in the neo-liberal state which 
reduces democratic participation to the act of voting, and restricts the teaching of 
democracy to this understanding (Carr 2011b, 198). The organisation of the neo-
liberal state is an important part of maintaining a thin democracy. Critical pedagogy 
argues that the neo-liberal state is one which is economically flexible and efficient, 
meaning a small a state as possible allowing maximum freedom for capital flow and 
accumulation (Carnoy 1998, 10). This means a reduction in the number of state-run 
public services such as healthcare and education, and an increase in private-run 
organisations supplying those services on a for-profit basis. The space for capital 
created through the non-intervention of the state is not to be confused with a lack 
of state support of capital. In the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis neo-liberal states 
around the world stepped in to provide bailouts to protect large banks and 
corporations from failure and collapse (Aronowitz 2009, xi). By reducing the size and 
interventions of the state neo-liberalism provides a space for capital to flourish at the 
expense of greater equality between people. The organisation of the neo-liberal 
small state is accompanied by an array of practices which seek to determine the 
political role of citizens and the form of education pursued. 
Regarding the political role of the citizen in thin forms of democracy, issues are 
centred on party-political positions with the agenda established through public 
statements and media coverage, taking no account of citizens’ interest or needs. 
Simultaneously, these discussions focus on reassuring citizens of decisions which 
have already been made, and reinforce the division between decision-making elites 
and the public as passive recipients of policy. Rather than playing an active role in the 
state, the citizen in the neo-liberal state is reduced to a consumer, limiting choice to 
a choice of which products to buy, which services to pay for, and how to spend 
personal accumulations of wealth (Giroux 2011, 8). This shifts the understanding of 
a citizen to such an extent that being a citizen is conflated with loyalty to and 
participation in the existing social and economic system (Aronowitz 2009, x). Those 
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who cannot participate in the process of consuming are already economically 
marginalised, and as a result of the conflation of citizenship with consumer are 
marginalised even further (Macrine 2009, 1) and defined as both undesirable and 
disposable (Giroux 2011, 8). With these capital focussed practices of the neo-liberal 
state come large inequalities between citizens, not only on the basis of economics 
but also social status. Any attempts to address these inequalities are limited to mild 
reforms characterised as ‘reformism’ (Freire 1998, 74). Reformism seeks to introduce 
gradual changes in the practices and conditions of society in favour of preventing 
deeper transformations. There may be adjustments to limited welfare and support 
programmes on an ad hoc and piecemeal basis, but the underlying systems which are 
the root of many inequalities are left untouched. Here reforms are used as a tool to 
satisfy those who argue for greater equality while avoiding the risk of larger changes 
which would threaten the privilege of capital and those who hold it (ibid., 74). 
When regarding education, critical pedagogy argues that the thin democracy of 
neo-liberalism operates in myriad ways to restrict the time and space for democratic 
practice and critical discussion. It does this through limiting the study of democracy 
to specific subjects (Politics, Social Studies, Citizenships, etc.), limiting curriculum 
opportunites for the exploration of democracy beyond voting, and uncritical 
approaches to the study of power, change and social relationships. Alongside this, 
the curriculum is highly prescriptive and assessment is based on the reproduction of 
the answer already given during the delivery of the education, further curtailing 
opportunities for critical thinking and questioning. Addressing the school as an 
institution, the thin democracy of neo-liberalism tends to isolate schools from their 
immediate community context through the use of standardised curricula and 
teaching practices, divorcing institutional education from local issues (Carr 2011b, 
198). The aim of thin democracy is to educate uncritical and compliant citizenry who 
cannot and do not participate in the world around them beyond the act of voting 
every few years (Aronowitz 2009); thin democracy is small and centralised, and 
dependent on formal institutional and state structures (Carr 2011b, 198-199). 
Ultimately, critical pedagogy understands the neo-liberal state as acting to preserve 
inequality and oppression through the prioritization of capital over people. Critical 
pedagogy characterises this as the neo-liberal state being against the solidarity of the 
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people (Freire 1998, 88). In light of this, critical pedagogy explicitly positions itself as 
a response to neo-liberalism, arguing that the goals and practices of critical pedagogy 
are desperately needed to push back against the neo-liberal state and the form of 
citizenship it has established (Aronowitz 2009, xi; Steinberg 2007, x). 
Critical pedagogy’s response starts from thick democracy, a form of democracy 
which aims at the increased participation of citizens in the decisions which affect 
them. Wheeler-Bell writes that thick democracy, 
[…] expands the arenas in which individuals are able to collectively 
organise and deliberate over the processes that affect lives. Thus, systems 
that expand social power for the most part, are better than systems that 
limit social power, because they allow individuals greater access to arenas 
in which they can collectively control social processes. (Wheeler-Bell 
2014, 465) 
Thick democracy is a form of democracy which encourages and embraces the active 
participation of citizens. As with thin democracy, thick democracy is associated with 
a particular form of state organisation. Critical pedagogy too posits a state which is 
flexible and efficient, but has a completely different understanding of flexibility and 
efficiency. Critical pedagogy argues for a redefinition of the state as neither an 
almighty entity overseeing and commanding the population, nor as a tool of the rich 
for the continuing exploitation of others, as is the case in neo-liberalism (Freire 1998, 
35, 89). Rather, the state can be used as a tool for the redistribution of capital, the 
ending of oppressive practices, and the promotion and protection of oppressed 
groups. In place of a small state which works to protect and promote capital flow and 
accumulation, the state in critical pedagogy is used to alter the economy to suit the 
needs of the people. Economic development is an important element here, but it is 
turned into a means to support people rather than an end in itself. To this end, the 
state in critical pedagogy must be redefined by progressive political parties, who, 
once elected, can begin to use the state differently. These parties must make use of 
the state to fight in favour of economic development and to limit the size and power 
of the centralised state through a process of decentralisation (ibid., 35, 78). The 
decentralisation of the state enables it to be flexible and efficient through greater 
citizen involvement in more participartory forms of democracy. Thick democracy 
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sees voting and elections as a component of democracy, but not synonymous with 
democracy. The thick democracy of critical pedagogy still makes use of forms of 
representative democracy and party and state stuctures, but it does not limit itself 
to these (Aronowitz 1993; Carr 2011a; 2011b; Wheeler-Bell 2014; Liou and Rojas 
2016). Thick democracy also includes politics which reaches beyond party-political 
lines and into all aspects of life, addressing a wide range of issues and settings 
including concerns of power, diversity, inclusion, oppression and social change (Carr 
2011b, 198-199). The aim of thick democracy is to continually include citizens in 
decisions which impact them ranging from the economy to schooling, to health care 
and beyond. In contrast to neo-liberal understanding of the citizen as a sporadic voter 
in elections, in a thick democracy the citizen plays an active role as a check and 
balance on the decisions of the leading group (Torres 1994, 190). 
When addressing education in a thick democracy, critical pedagogy approaches 
democracy as something not only to be taught in schools but which must be learned 
through the practice of democracy itself (Freire 1998, 91). In this understanding thick 
democracy introduces principles of critique, participation and discussion into all 
areas of education, with staff and students alike taking part in the decision making 
processes of the school. Here, democracy is not confined to the study of specific 
subjects as in neo-liberal understandings of education, but is integrated into the very 
operation of the school. Furthermore, rather than isolating the school from the 
community and learning through centralised curricula and textbooks, the school is 
embedded within its community, drawing from this context to question and 
challenge non-democratic and oppressive practices. In this approach, assessment is 
no longer the focus of education, instead the concentration is placed on the social 
and collaborative construction of knowledge and the role this plays in the 
empowerment of students (Carr 2011b, 199). It is important to note that while Carr 
(2011a, 2011b), McLaren (2007), Wheeler-Bell (2014) and others emphasise the 
possibilities of thick democracy in schooling, opportunities for greater participation 
are not limited to schools: democratic involvement includes participation in a range 
of civic organisations, trade unions and established political parties (Aronowitz 2008, 
78; Gandin and Apple 2005). Critical pedagogy’s thick democracy and redefined state 
is one in which there is the integration of citizens in democratic processes and the 
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support of an economy and market which represents the interests of oppressed 
groups not just the needs of capital (Carnoy 1998, 13; Freire 1998, 60). The state  
protects human rights, provides welfare and health support to its citizens, and 
provides institutions for the design of, and support for, rationally-based and 
universally applied laws (Torres 1994, 190-191), and is therefore a solidarity state 
(Freire 1998, 60). 
The thick form of democracy sought by critical pedagogy is based on the values of 
social justice, equality, and individual freedom, all grounded in tolerance and the 
rights of others (Freire 1998, 52). Tolerance is not a value which is mechanically 
transferred through rote-learning and text books but it is developed through 
practicing being open to others and living with difference rather than isolating 
oneself. This understanding of tolerance corresponds to critical pedagogy’s 
understanding of democracy as something which needs to be lived rather than 
taught. Tolerance is rooted in the ability to listen to and interact with those who have 
a different opinion and to engage in a process of dialogue and understanding with 
them (ibid., 51). The rights of others operate in tandem with tolerance and require a 
recognition of the rights of all people regardless of statuses and characteristics which 
are currently discriminated against. Here, we see the influence of earlier 
developments in critical pedagogy to extend understandings of oppression beyond 
class and economic status to include race, gender, and the like. It is these values 
which are translated into a practice of democracy in which citizens listen and are 
listened to by one another as they participate in decision making processes which 
impact them. Furthermore, in encouraging greater participation it is necessary to 
cultivate values of tolerance towards others and their positions and to maintain 
respectful and rational dialogue in order to reach agreement. In order to increase 
democracy, equality, justice and freedom all citizens are encouraged to participate 
in decision making procedures, involving themselves in a wide range of established 
organisations, particularly at the local community level. This understanding of 
democracy found in critical pedagogy as both a set of values and a practice relies 
upon a closely related concept, citizenship (Macedo 2009, 814). 
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The Critical Citizen as Agent of Change 
Critical pedagogy’s thick democracy is based on challenging and changing oppressive 
conditions faced by citizens through projects which aim at increasing citizen 
capability and involvement in decision making processes, most often occurring 
through or connected to state institutions. The citizen is therefore vital in the 
practices of democracy sought in critical pedagogy. Like democracy, ‘citizen’, 
‘citizenship’, and other associated terms are not defined in critical pedagogy, but 
there are several reoccurring terms like “critical citizen” and “engaged citizen” 
(Giroux 1992; 2009; Macedo 2009; Macrine 2009; Saltman 2009; Sandlin and 
McLaren 2010; McDonald and Underhill 2014; Liou and Rojas, 2016). Elaborating on 
what a critical citizen is, Giroux writes that: 
[d]emocracy cannot work if citizens are not autonomous, self-judging, 
and independent – qualities that are indispensable for students if they 
are going to make vital judgments and choices about participating in and 
shaping decisions that affect everyday life, institutional reform and 
governmental policy. (Giroux 2009, 20-21) 
The inclusion of the notion of autonomy here is interesting as it implies something 
akin to the anarchist understanding of the term, Giroux even calls on the connection 
between knowledge and the power of self-definition for students and teacher alike 
as part of the expansion of democratic freedoms (2009, 20). The call is for students 
to develop a critical agency which enhances their responsibility to others, public life, 
and democracy (ibid., 21). However, this potential similarity between the critical 
citizen in critical pedagogy and the subject in anarchism comes to an abrupt end only 
a sentence later, as the importance of the critical citizen is re-stated as students 
learning how to govern, and how to be governed (ibid.). The autonomy claimed by 
Giroux is ultimately limiting, as it restricts the action of critical citizens to being critical 
citizens, whatever particular actions they choose to take in fulfilling that role. 
Fernández-Balboa picks up some of the characteristics of the citizen in critical 
pedagogy in his exploration of self-reflection and praxis: writing of critical pedagogy 
as a way of life, he writes that ‘[critical pedagogy] has personal, ethico-moral, and 
political implications that require knowing oneself; reclaiming one’s own voice, 
identity, and rights; and acknowledging one’s social and political responsibilities’ 
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(1998, 47). Both Giroux and Fernández-Balboa bring several important points to the 
fore regarding the citizen in critical pedagogy. One we are already familiar with, and 
focuses on the need for the citizen to be aware and reflective of her position in 
society and her ability to make change. We are reminded of Freire’s earliest work in 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed where the attention is placed on the context of the 
students and the process of bringing those students to a realisation of their abilities 
to act on and shape the world around them (Freire 2005, 25). The second highlights 
the active role the citizen plays; it is not enough to recognise her position in the 
world, the critical citizen in critical pedagogy must also act from that position. 
The citizen is vital in the practices of democracy sought in critical pedagogy, and 
several scholars warn that increasingly students as citizens do not take responsibility 
for the maintainance of democracy (Giroux 1989; De Lissovoy 2011; Ross 2017). 
hooks writes of her concern that in contrast to her upbringing in which there was an 
awareness that all citizens ‘assume responsibility for protecting and maintaining 
democracy’ (2010, 13), there is little discourse about democracy now. As a result, 
citizens assume that ‘living in a democracy is their birthright; they do not believe they 
must work to maintain a democracy’ (ibid., 14). hooks argues that this understanding 
of democracy is the result of an education system which limits exposure to ideas of 
democracy and oversimplifies the threats to democracy as coming from an external 
enemy, not from the internal dismantelling of democratic processes or the apathy of 
citizens. hooks' critique closely mirrors the critique of thin democracy which leaves 
no place in education or public discourse for larger questions and discussion on the 
nature of democracy. In place of citizens assuming the continuation of a democracy, 
hooks argues that democracy must be addressed as something to be struggled for, 
fought for, and actively sought in the ongoing education of citizens (ibid., 14). To this 
end it is not enough to teach about democracy in the abstract, but education itself 
must become a forum in which citizens can become involved in the active process of 
citizenship and democracy. The education of critical citizens must therefore involve 
the development of critical capacity through which citizens will ‘learn how to hold 
power and authority accountable’ (Giroux 2011, 7). It is education which offers the 
first opportunities for citizen involvement in thicker versions of democracy which 
build schools as democratic public spheres (Giroux 2005, 66). 
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In addition to scholars who focussed on the importance of the critical citizen in 
critical pedagogy, Johnson and Morris (2010) and Ross (2017) have provided a more 
systematic appraisal of the skills and aptitudes critical citizens have. These categories 
are not offered as a final answer to what the critical citizen in critical pedagogy looks 
like, but are an attempt to bring certain characteristics and roles of the critical citizen 
into focus. Following an examination of the overlaps between critical thinking, critical 
pedagogy, and citizenship education Johnson and Morris (2010) distill some of the 
key elements of an ideal critical citizen, including ‘politics’, ‘social’, ‘self’,  ‘praxis’,  
‘knowledge’, ‘skills’, ‘values’, and ‘dispositions’ (ibid., 90). A critical citizens’ 
knowledge is understood as the knowledge of society and systems of government, 
knowledge of the connections between culture and power and citizens’ positions 
within these, and knowledge of how to enact change. Major skills of the critical 
citizen include critical analysis, dialogue, cooperation, reflection, and collective 
action, while values of the citizen address a commitment against injustice, the valuing 
of identities, a consideration of self-worth and ethical actions and reflection. 
Dispositions refer to active questioning of social and public affairs, a social awareness 
towards self and others, a critical perspective and a motivation to change society 
(ibid.).  
Another example of an exploration of an ideal critical citizen is Ross’ discussion of 
the need for ‘dangerous citizenship’ (2017). Ross builds from the work of Paulo Freire 
to argue that citizenship ‘embodies three fundamental, conjoined and crucial 
generalities: political participation, critical awareness, and intentional action’ (2017, 
50, original emphasis). Together these three characteristics and roles of the critical 
citizen in critical pedagogy connect to the thick democracy of greater participation in 
decision making processes, as outlined above. The first of these, political 
participation, does not only mean the act of voting but an engagement with 
organisations of democracy which prioritise principles of justice, freedom, and 
equality. Critical awareness refers to Freire’s work on conscientizacao and involves 
citizens reaching an understanding of how things are and how they might be 
different, enabling them to be guided by a vision of the world and an understanding 
of the possibilities of their actions (ibid., 50). Finally, intentional action concerns 
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behaviours ‘designed to instigate human connection, true engagement with 
everyday life, meaningful experience, communication, and change’ (ibid., 50). 
While the critical citizen is the aim in critical pedagogy, there is a recognition that 
the specific circumstances of many may prevent them from becoming more involved 
in thick democratic practices. Stanley Aronowitz points to those groups which are 
formally disenfranchised, such as immigrant populations, and those who are 
effectively disenfranchised through various obstacles and are unable to fulfil the role 
of critical citizen which critical pedagogy requires of them (Aronowitz 2008, 77-78). 
When discussing participation in trade unions for example, Aronowitz argues that 
critical citizens are vital both to the life of the union and its efficacy. He argues, 
however, that while it is desirable for citizens to participate in forms of democractic 
decision making, the reality of many citizens is that long working hours, multiple jobs, 
and double shifts all ‘conspire to exclude them from even the most informal 
institutions of democratic life’ (ibid., 78-79). 
Democracy, the Citizen, and the State 
We now consider two practical examples which illustrate critical pedagogy’s 
attempts at thick democracy and the critical citizen, starting with Paulo Freire’s 
involvement in the administration of the Workers’ Party in São Paulo, Brazil. When 
the Workers’ Party won municipal elections in the late 1980s, Freire was appointed 
as the Secretary of Education and viewed the victory as ‘a fantastic possibility for at 
least changing a little bit of our reality’ (Williams 1990, cited in Aronowitz 1993, 19). 
The election of the coalition which formed the Workers’ Party brought with it an 
attempt to redefine the state along democratic socialist lines. In a rejection of the 
structural adjustment policies used elsewhere in Latin America, the administration in 
São Paulo sought to forge its own path through reforms to educational policy in 
partnership with other elements of Brazilian civil society (Torres 1994, 182-183). 
Freire described the process of transition from a party of elites to a democratic party 
of the left as a pedagogical endeavour which required a commitment to the rights of 
others and tolerance (Freire 1998, 52). The Workers’ Party represented a radical left 
administration which sought state reforms in health, transport, and education for the 
people of São Paulo, and Freire saw his role as starting a process of change 
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(Aronowitz 1993, 19). Despite the new possibilities Freire saw, he was aware of the 
economic and political challenges facing the new administration and their impact on 
schooling: 60-70 percent of students dropped out, most had only four years of 
schooling, and many teachers lacked training (ibid., 19). Freire began to reform the 
municipal schools of São Paulo and characterised them as ‘popular democratic 
schools’ (ibid., 19) which measured quality through the establishment of class 
solidarity, and aimed at democratising schools to ensure that the local community 
elected the school director in order to ensure direct accountability. Furthermore, the 
democratisation of schools in São Paulo included opening decisions about the school 
and the curriculum to community involvement: school councils were established 
which played key decision-making roles regarding education in São Paulo (Freire 
1998, 62). Writing about this period in São Paulo, Aronowitz states that Freire’s 
popular-democratic philosophy took on a distinctly practical edge as Freire tried to 
‘transfer power to the oppressed through education, now framed in the context of 
state-financed and controlled schooling’ (Aronowitz 1993, 20). Reflecting on the 
period, Freire writes that the process of democratisation of the administration was 
vital to shift the Worker’s Party from its position as a centrally organised avant-garde 
to one which was a more decentralised party of the masses (Freire 1998, 78). 
A more recent example of critical pedagogy’s engagement with the state and 
democracy in action is found in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Gandin and Apple 2002; 2003). 
Brazilian education is highly centralised, with decisions about curriculum and funding 
being made by appointed secretaries of state. The Popular Adminstration sought to 
change this through the introduction of greater autonomy and citizen participation 
and control in form of participatory budgeting and the Citizen School. Participatory 
budgeting involves the active participation of the communties of Porto Alegre in 
directing the financial resources of the city on the basis of need, pushing back against 
the prevalence of elite decision making and financing of traditional and authoritarian 
public policies (ibid., 262). In introducing participatory budgeting the Popular 
Adminstration committed themselves to ‘enabling even the poorest of its citzens to 
participate in deliberations over where and how money should be spent’ (Gandin and 
Apple 2002, 260). Gandin and Apple praise the inclusion of participatory budgeting 
as a demonstration of the thick democracy and the importance of local context and 
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empowerment of marginalised and oppressed groups called for in critical pedagogy. 
In the process of participatory budgeting the people of Porto Alegre were involved in 
an education process based on their empowerment, and the governmental 
administration has been re-educated around the possibilities for democratic 
participation: 
Popular participation “teaches” the state to better serve the population. 
This is a crucial point that is often forgotten in our discussion of the role 
of democracy in state policy formation and in bureaucratic institutions. 
(Gandin and Apple 2002, 262) 
While citizen participation in budgeting carries an educational function for all 
involved, the Popular Administration in Porto Alegre also established a more 
specifically educational project through the Citizen School. The Citizen School was 
designed to change the relationship between the state and communities through 
education (Gandin and Apple 2002, 260-261). The aim of the Citizen School, which 
worked through the municipal school system, was to develop the possibility for 
citizens of Porto Alegre to see themselves as active agents in their community. These 
municipal schools were often set up in the poorest communities and played a vital 
role in introducing the thick democratic practices called for in critical pedagogy: the 
sectretariate for municipal education sought the ‘active participation of teachers, 
school administrators and staff, students, and parents in institutionalised forums of 
democractic decision making’ (ibid., 263). This participation was seen as central in 
the creation of citizens who are autonomous, critical, tolerant and respectful of the 
rights of others (ibid., 263-264). 
The examples of Freire’s role in São Paulo, and participatory budgeting and the 
Citizen School in Porto Alegre are held up as models for critical pedagogy’s thick 
democracy and citizen participation. They demonstrate how democracy and 
citizenship are linked explicitly to state institutions and structures, and in the case of 
Citizen School, it is promoted as an active attempt to adjust the relationship between 
communities and the state through education. In the redefinition of the state 
through the actions of progressive political parties, critical pedagogy highlights the 
importance of such reform acts for their potential to transform the state as an 
operator for equality and freedom (Freire 1998). Both São Paulo and Porto Alegre are 
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examples of critical pedagogy’s reliance on the state as part of the social change it 
seeks, a reliance reinforced through thick democracy and the critical citizen. The 
state, although in a more democratic form, is constantly assumed in the discussion 
of critical pedagogy’s suggestions for action and vision for the world. This places strict 
limits on the social change possible in critical pedagogy as it denies the possibility of 
other forms of social organisation and fails to address the state as a form of 
oppression itself. Critical pedagogy seeks social change within the structure of the 
state which makes society more equal and more democratic, but in not challenging 
the state itself critical pedagogy fails to address the hierarchical forms of organisation 
which are a constituent part of the oppression it claims to challenge. With the 
continuation of the state critical pedagogy also enables the continuation of social 
relationships based on hierarchy and coercion which limit personal freedom. To 
understanding this argument we need to address anarchism’s critique of the state 
and anarchist conceptions of freedom.  
Never Mind the State: Anarchy in Thought and Practice 
One of the scholars to address critical pedagogy’s limitations regarding the state is 
Judith Suissa (2010). Suissa argues that educational philosophers such as Henry 
Giroux acknowledge the political dimensions of their work and take a critical stance 
towards their understanding of and approach to education but still ‘take the present 
basic social framework and institutional setup as given’ (ibid., 3). While such 
academics frame their critiques and calls for social change using terms such as “more 
democratic” and “more participatory”, the structural relations of the society we live 
in and the education we should have are left unexamined. Suissa argues that it is 
precisely this tendency not to challenge larger social structures which makes critical 
pedagogy so appealing: there is the comfortable offer of social change for those who 
pursue principles of democracy without going as far as ‘demanding an entire 
revolution in the way our society is organised’ (ibid., 3). Furthermore, academics 
tackling issues of democracy in education tend to do so by equating education to 
schooling, and thus placing any debates about education as part of social change 
within the existing framework of a state (ibid., 4). Suissa does not analyse these 
arguments any further, but uses them to provide a distinction between progressive 
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approaches to education like critical pedagogy and anarchist philosophies of 
education. 
Following Suissa’s argument my contention in the remainder of this chapter is to 
show how critical pedagogy cannot be considered as a response to neo-liberalism – 
a role it casts itself in – precisely because of its reliance on the state through the twin 
concepts of democracy and citizenship. I draw on the framework of postanarchism 
following Franks’ argument that postanarchism is not a distinct form of anarchism or 
an attempt to surpass anarchism as a theory and practice of freedom, but is an 
anarchism with a particular emphasis (2011, 169). In this understanding, 
postanarchism as part of anarchism argues for freedom as autonomous practice in 
which the subject attempts to form her identity and subjectivity without reference 
to those identities established by external agencies of government. In establishing 
freedom as autonomous practice, postanarchism lays out three interrelated 
elements, the subject, action, and relationships and I use these three elements to 
provide a framework for my critique of critical pedagogy and its reliance on the state. 
The lessons of poststructuralism introduced by postanarchism argue that the 
subject is no longer understood as a single, unified and universal being, but is 
continually formed by overlapping practices of government which seek to direct 
behaviour (Newman 2016, 19). In the neo-liberal state these various identities can 
include the employed, the healthy, the criminal, the educated, etc. Freedom in neo-
liberalism is the freedom to choose from predetermined identities which form 
subjectivity, it is this understanding of freedom critiqued by Newman in relation to 
identity politics, as explored above (2016, 31). While the various practices of 
governance which form subjectivities are not all found in the institutions of the neo-
liberal state, the state is part of this ensemble of power (ibid., 20-23). Rather than 
providing a response to the neo-liberal state (Aronowitz 2009, xi; Steinberg 2007, x) 
critical pedagogy proposes a form of state which reinforces practices of governance 
along the same lines as the state it critiques. Critical pedagogy rejects attempts to 
cast citizens as consumers, defined by participation in capitalism (Giroux 2011, 8) but 
instead attempts to cast citizens as critical, defined by their participation in practices 
of thick democracy and the state. This acts to predetermine the form of the subject 
in critical pedagogy. Although there is a claim to autonomy, this autonomy is still 
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bound by the prescription of a form of subjectivity based on the notion of the critical 
citizen: the subject is free to involve herself in an areas of life and thick democracy 
she chooses, but she must involve herself. This is similar to the conception of neo-
liberal freedom as critiqued in postanarchism: the subject is free to choose which 
identity(ies) she wishes to conform to, but choose she must. In both cases the 
prescription of the form of subjectivity limit the possibilities for the subject to form 
herself apart from these externally defined roles. The critical citizen in critical 
pedagogy is a form of subjectivity, an identity like any other, which comes with 
specific modes of behaviour. The critical citizen is a subject who involves themselves 
in the running of her local school for example, or who participates in a trade union, 
or in the case of Porto Alegre, is active in local budgetary decisions. As with the 
subject in neo-liberalism, there is a freedom of choice, but that freedom is reduced 
to a decision about which facet of the identity of a critical citizen the subject decides 
to follow in participating in democracy and the state. 
Anarchism, and the role of the subject, action and relationships highlighted by 
authors like Newman, brings to light a second issue regarding the subject in critical 
pedagogy, critical pedagogy’s calls for tolerance and the rights of others as key values 
in its vision of democracy and the state (Freire 1998, 51-52). These values build from, 
and find their expression in, the areas of critical pedagogy which sought to develop 
more nuanced understandings of oppression and move past Freire’s original 
oppressor/oppressed dichotomy to include a wider range of peoples on the basis of 
race, gender, sexuality and other marginalised identities. In critical pedagogy’s vision 
of democracy these oppressed people are recognised, protected and celebrated. 
Viewed through postanarchism, the inclusion of ever-greater identities is not 
connected to the freedom of subjects, but quite the opposite because it gives the 
state and governing agencies yet more predetermined identity options for the 
subject to choose from. Furthermore, the acceptance and protection of these 
identities brings an even greater dependency of the subject on the state as the power 
which recognises this specific identity (Newman 2016, 31). The same move occurs in 
critical pedagogy in its calls for tolerance and the rights of others. Oppressed 
identities are given protection under the democratic state of critical pedagogy 
introducing a dependency for the subject who choses one of those identities as part 
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of her formation. We have explored the limits of this postanarchist critique of 
identities in more detail previously but it is expedient to remind ourselves that while 
this critique enables us to identify an area of concern in critical pedagogy, it is not 
without issues.  
Action is the second area of postanarchism which frames a critique of critical 
pedagogy through its reliance on the state. Newman critiques revolutionary politics 
of the likes of critical pedagogy which rely on the state, dismissing any attempts to 
organise a disciplined revolution which seizes control of power to implement change 
from above, ‘as though [the state] were a benign instrument to be commanded by a 
revolutionary will’ (Newman 2016, xi). It is precisely this form of metanarrative and 
use of the state we see in critical pedagogy. The metanarrative of critical pedagogy 
can be summarised as social change through education for greater democracy, 
equality, justice, and freedom. Through the concepts of state, thick democracy and 
critical citizenship we see the actions of subjects, the critical citizens discussed above, 
predetermined by an externally defined end-goal. There is no space in critical 
pedagogy for the critical citizen to decide her own action. Social change as greater 
democracy, equality, justice and freedom form the already decided on end-point and 
the role of the critical citizen is to help society get there. Furthermore, in critical 
pedagogy’s concept of thick democracy and a redesigned state a crucial role is to be 
played by the reinvented political party. Critical pedagogy may not seek a highly 
centralised and strong state, but it is the role of the political party to decentralise 
both itself and state apparatus as part of the process of bringing about social change. 
Critical citizens are given responsibility as part of this process, but it cannot happen 
without the support of the party and changing state apparatus. 
There is also a temporal element to this critique of action. Anarchism argues for 
an immediate concern with the present, the here-and-now (Newman 2016, 12), 
following the same line of argument as found in Gustav Landauer’s work from a 
century earlier: if people constitute themselves as a people apart from the state, the 
state will, at the same time, cease to exist (Landauer 2010). Newman in particular is 
highly critical of revolutionary politics which place the end goal in some 
indeterminate distance from the present (Newman 2016, 11-12), a temporal 
dimension found in critical pedagogy’s action of education for social change. Critical 
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pedagogy argues for the education of critical citizens and the redefinition of the state 
at the hands of a progressive political party as the start of a process of social change. 
Only once a progressive political party is elected can the process of changing the state 
apparatus and opening citizen participation in thick democracy begin. 
Simultaneously, only once people have been educated as critical citizens can they 
begin to take part in thick democratic practices which are necessary to bring about 
social change. There are two anarchist objections to this. One, critical pedagogy’s 
understanding of critical citizenship as something to be learnt fixes an end point for 
the action. We have already seen anarchism’s distancing of such fixed end-goals in 
the discussion above. Two, the critical citizen and the changing of state institutions 
and practices is the social change to come, they are the promise of social change at 
a future point in time once other conditions have been met. By placing social change 
as something to be obtained in the future, critical pedagogy cannot account for the 
possibilities of change in the everyday present. As with the formation of the subject, 
critical pedagogy’s aim for action to bring about a democratic state in which there is 
greater democracy, equality, justice and freedom predetermines the social change 
sought. In so doing critical pedagogy removes the freedom of the subject to act 
beyond the boundaries of participation and critical citizenship towards its set vision 
of the state and social change. 
Given anarchism’s rejection of end-goals, there is no suggestion for what should 
replace the state. The concentration is instead on freedom as autonomous practice 
in the present through which the subject refuses attempts to categorise her and 
define her actions and relationships, and acts for herself in the creation of her 
subjectivity and social organisation. This is a rejection of critical pedagogy’s state, 
democracy and critical citizen as a response to neo-liberalism. To take this anarchist 
critique of critical pedagogy further and bring it into contact with education, the 
focus of this thesis, in the next chapter I turn my attention to the teacher in critical 
pedagogy. 
  
- 104 - 
4. Critical Pedagogy and The Teacher 
The previous chapter ended with the argument that critical pedagogy’s 
predetermined thick democratic state as the aim of social change limits its ability to 
respond to the challenges of neo-liberalism and neo-liberal education. This chapter 
examines the teacher in critical pedagogy and argues that, as with the state, critical 
pedagogy predetermines the role and relationships of the teacher in a way which 
limits possibilities for social change. By painting a very specific picture of who a 
teacher should be and what at a teacher should be doing, critical pedagogy denies 
teachers the opportunity to decide autonomously what kind of teacher they would 
like to be and how they would like to enact their vision of social change in the 
classroom. In critical pedagogy, the teacher should be a transformative intellectual 
who constantly works towards critical engagement with the world and strives to 
become a critical citizen working for a thick democracy. Consequently, the teacher in 
critical pedagogy is meant to have a specific relationship with students in which she 
actively encourages students to develop into critical citizens. To explore how this 
predetermined role and relationships of the teacher limit both personal and social 
change I turn to Foucault’s notion of care of the self. In contrast to the predetermined 
relation between the student and the teacher found in critical pedagogy, care of the 
self promotes an open-ended and flexible understanding of the individual and her 
relationships. I argue that care of the self is a vital part of enacting anarchist 
(trans)formations of the self and relationships which can subvert the personal and 
inter-personal relationships of the state.  
The Teacher as an Intellectual 
From critical pedagogy’s point of view, the neo-liberal approach to teachers is 
characterised by deskilling (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987; Kincheloe, Steinberg and 
Villaverde 1999; Giroux 2006; Steinberg and Kincheloe 2006; Apple 2007; Kincheloe 
2007; 2008; 2011; Hill et al. 2015; Saltman 2015). Deskilling is a process in which a 
teacher is transformed into a technocrat who delivers an educational product and is 
created as part of a workforce which is easily replicable and replaceable. The 
deskilling process occurs at different points through the teacher’s development and 
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practice. In the first instance deskilling occurs at the level of preservice teacher 
education in which future teachers are introduced to a particular discourse 
surrounding their subject (Gallagher 1999; Kincheloe 2008). By developing teacher 
education which broaches no discussion of the subject area writ large, preservice 
teachers are expected to immerse themselves uncritically in the dominant tradition 
of the subject (Gallagher 1999, 73). In doing this preservice teachers are inculcated 
into the accepted and acceptable understandings of a subject, understandings which 
are further reinforced through standardised content and delivery practices, 
constraining the teacher’s autonomy and creativity in exploring the subject. In 
addition to the discourse of their subject areas, preservice teachers are also taught 
specific pedagogies of content delivery, a practice that reduces the process of 
education to a series of rules and a common format which can be followed regardless 
of the individual teacher, the students, and their context (Kincheloe 2011, 58). The 
standardisation of subject content and curriculum materials which not only set the 
outcomes for particular sessions but are ‘teacher-proof materials’ (Kincheloe 2008, 
126) which provide instructions to be followed by the teachers, further removes 
teachers’ professional autonomy (Apple 1985; Aronowitz 2008; Saltman 2015). With 
highly predetermined curricula and the heavy emphasis on final examinations, the 
space in which the teacher can use her creativity and judgement becomes ever 
smaller (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987, 28). In this approach teacher autonomy and the 
practice of professional skills and creativity are discouraged by educational 
institutions for fear of the potential negative impact on the measurable outcomes 
associated with the ranking of individual students and institutions alike (Aronowitz 
and Giroux 1987, 28-29; Aronowitz 2008, xiii). The process of deskilling removes the 
teacher as an individual from the process of education. The individual teacher is no 
longer relevant as she can be swapped out at whim with another deskilled individual 
capable of delivering the same content in the same way. Teaching as a profession is 
reduced to a technical process of content delivery rather than an active engagement 
with content and students. The deskilling of teachers goes hand in hand with neo-
liberal educational approaches which reduce education to an economic exchange, 
with the student being the consumer and the teacher being the provider. There is an 
attempt to remove any variation, creativity, or autonomy from the educational 
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process to ensure a uniform product which is replicable within institutions and 
comparable between them. However, these are attempts and there are no 
guarantees that they will succeed but as I argue later, there always exists the 
possibility of autonomous practice. 
Teachers within critical pedagogy are seen as part of a broader category termed 
'cultural workers' (Giroux 1992). Giroux writes that traditionally the concept of the 
cultural worker has been taken to refer to ‘artists, writers, and media producers’ 
(ibid., 5), those professionals that are directly connected to what is ordinarily 
considered culture in the narrow sense of the term. He expands the concept to 
include those working in as diverse areas as ‘law, social work, architecture, medicine, 
theology, education and literature’ (ibid.). Each of these professions play a role in the 
creation, analysis, and comprehension of culture, and in the political intent to create 
and mobilise knowledge in the pursuit of social change (ibid). In critical pedagogy, 
teachers play a key role in this broader collection of cultural workers as it is through 
education that cultures can be created, reproduced, examined and critiqued and it is 
through this process that oppressed groups are empowered to become critical 
citizens. 
The broad concept of cultural workers is closely connected to the concept of the 
intellectual. The notion of an intellectual is constructed of two parts; the first 
concerns the way in which an individual approaches knowledge and the second 
considers how that individual uses their knowledge. Exploring the notion of an 
intellectual’s approach to knowledge, Aronowitz and Giroux contrast an intellectual 
individual with an intelligent individual. They define an intelligent individual as 
someone who has a depth of knowledge within a specific field and can make use of 
that knowledge in a strict, technical application, but who lacks the ability to connect 
that knowledge to other areas or their own wider social context (Aronowitz and 
Giroux 1987, 33). Freire is highly critical of these individuals: 
Intellectuals who memorise everything, read for hours on end, slaves to 
the text, fearful of taking a risk, speaking as if they were reciting from 
memory, fail to make any concrete connections between what they have 
read and what is happening in the world, the country, or the local 
community. (Freire 2001, 34) 
- 107 - 
Freire criticises the technical approach to knowledge which reduces it to nothing 
more than memorisation and repetition and argues that when knowledge is 
approached in this way it is impossible to connect the memorised facts with the social 
world as the facts without context are empty words (Freire 2001, 34). The critique is 
an extension of Freire’s earlier work regarding banking education and the emptiness 
of student rote learning, where students learning to repeat the facts is more 
important than the significance of the information (Freire 2000, 71). In contrast, an 
intellectual is someone who ‘has a breadth of knowledge about the world, who views 
ideas in more than instrumental terms, and who harbours a spirit of inquiry that is 
critical and oppositional, one that is true to its own impulses and judgements’ 
(Aronowitz and Giroux 1987, 33-34). In order to be an intellectual, it is not enough to 
simply have a breadth of knowledge, the individual must also fulfil a social function 
by connecting that knowledge to social concerns that ‘deeply affect how people live, 
work, and survive’ (Giroux 1992, 82). To truly be considered as intellectuals, cultural 
workers such as teachers must act with moral compassion and practical politics in an 
attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and in doing so take on an 
inherently public position and role in shaping society (Giroux 2011, 65). In critical 
pedagogy the ideal teacher is an intellectual who is able to connect her knowledge 
to the world, be that her students’ immediate contexts, issues of the local 
community, or issues which reach further afield. 
With the concept of teachers as cultural workers and intellectuals, Aronowitz and 
Giroux further split teachers into four categories: the teacher as a hegemonic 
intellectual, as an accommodating intellectual, as a critical intellectual, and as a 
transformative intellectual (Aronowitz and Giroux 1987, 36-40). It is important to 
note that these four categories are considered ideal-types and that Giroux and 
Aronowitz state that educators can, and indeed do, move across and between these 
groups (ibid., 36). 'Hegemonic Intellectuals' are identified as those who define 
themselves by ‘the forms of moral and intellectual leadership they provide for the 
dominant groups and classes (ibid., 39). They see their role as actively providing a 
homogeneity of culture, politics, and ethics in line with expectations and wishes of 
the dominant class. 'Accommodating Intellectuals' are those who tacitly support the 
dominant classes and prevailing social reality, but are not aware of their position in 
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this process. In contrast to 'Hegemonic Intellectuals' they ‘do not define themselves 
as self-conscious agents of the status quo’ (ibid., 39), but unquestionably conform to 
the expectations they are subject to from the dominant classes. Those characterised 
as 'Critical Intellectuals' are ‘ideologically alternative to existing institutions and 
modes of thought’ (ibid., 37), but do not connect this stance to their wider social 
position and function. The result of their approach is that critical intellectuals 
distance themselves from the political nature of their work, leading them to a point 
at which their critique can become rhetoric. 
The final and most important category of the teacher in critical pedagogy is the 
'Transformative Intellectual'. Transformative intellectuals not only adopt a position 
of criticism, as critical intellectuals do, but take active steps to ensure that this 
criticism is translated into action for change: 
Educators need to encourage students by example to find ways to get 
involved, to make a difference, to think in global terms, and to act from 
specific contexts. The notion of teachers as transformative intellectuals is 
marked by a moral courage and criticism that does not require them to 
step back from society but only to distance themselves from being 
implicated in those power relations that subjugate, corrupt, exploit, or 
infantilise. (Giroux 1992, 106) 
Through public engagement and action, transformative intellectuals aid in the 
creation and maintenance of a ‘democratic public culture’ (Giroux 1992, 105), in 
which neo-liberalism can be questioned and challenged, and change can be fostered. 
Through this engagement a teacher as a transformative intellectual can challenge 
oppressive practices in her immediate context and in doing so model this challenge 
for her students. This public role of the teacher is not restricted to the classroom. 
Teachers in critical pedagogy ‘must reach beyond the boundaries of the classroom, 
into communities, workplaces, and public arenas where people congregate, reflect, 
and negotiate’ (Darder 2009, 158). Teaching in critical pedagogy is understood as a 
form of social criticism that provides the basis for social change (Giroux, 1992, 105). 
In reaching beyond the classroom and engaging in their relations to the wider world, 
teachers as intellectuals perform a public service. Integrating herself into her 
community the transformative intellectual simultaneously lives and enhances the 
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democratic values of greater participation. Giroux summarises critical pedagogy’s 
challenge to teachers as transformative intellectuals: 
This is a call to transform the hegemonic cultural forms of the wider 
society and the academy into a social movement of intellectuals intent on 
reclaiming and reconstructing democratic values and public life rather 
than contributing to their demise. (Giroux 1992, 106) 
The transformative intellectual outlined here is radically different to the deskilled 
teachers in neo-liberal institutions criticised by critical pedagogy. In neo-liberal 
education intelligent deskilled teachers have their creativity stripped from them and 
are left with an approach to education which is bound by strict rules and specific 
methodological processes, which are accepted without challenge. This is akin to 
Freire’s critique of the banking method and Aronowitz and Giroux’s portrait of the 
accommodating intellectual. By contrast, the transformative intellectual actively 
engages with and challenges the context in which they teach, both within and beyond 
the classroom. Fischman argues that most teachers have the potential to be 
transformative intellectuals, they only need a starting point to realise this possibility: 
Potentially, a great number of teachers could be committed intellectuals, 
based on the functions that they could perform and not on any essential 
value or characteristic. For these teachers the starting point will very likely 
be an attempt to understand how the multiple forms of exploitation are 
affecting his/her students, their families and communities, and him or 
herself, and the institution within which s/he works. (Fischman 2009, 213) 
Here Fischman emphasises the importance of the action for the teacher and suggests 
students and their community as the starting point for teacher engagement. 
Simultaneously, the role of the transformative intellectual is presented as something 
attainable and easily within the grasp and ability of many teachers, removing the 
sense that teachers need to undergo a great change to fulfil the ideal. 
Relations in Education 
A fog of forgetfulness is looming over education. Forgotten in the fog is 
that education is about human beings. And as schools are places where 
human beings get together, we have also forgotten that education is 
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primarily about human beings who are in relation to one another. 
(Noddings et al. 2010) 
This quote captures the expansion of interest in the role of relations in education and 
critical pedagogy (Sidorkin 2002; 2003; Stengel 2003; Thayer-Bacon 2003; Bingham 
and Sidorkin 2010; Margonis, 2011; Biesta 2012; Chinnery 2012; Noddings, 2013; 
Mayo 2015) which not only expands critical pedagogy’s big tent but also adds a 
greater depth to the understanding of the role of the teacher as a transformative 
intellectual. The teacher in critical pedagogy acts as a model and guide in challenging 
oppressive social practices and assisting students to become critical citizens. The 
ability of the teacher to fulfil this role is closely connected to the relationships the 
teacher has to others and knowledge. 
To understand the recent turn to relations in critical pedagogy, it is first necessary 
to outline what is meant by the rather ambiguous term “relation”. Barbara Thayer-
Bacon offers a good starting point by highlighting that “relation”, its plural 
“relations”, and its variants “relationship/s” and “relational” are used in a wide 
variety of ways (2010, 165). The common theme that binds the different uses of the 
term relation is connection; we use them to refer to a functional interaction, a logical 
relationship between terms, a personal relationship between individuals, the social 
relationships of citizens to their country. Likewise, we use the term to signify and to 
demonstrate empathy with others and as a way to compare experiences (ibid.).  
Writing about student-teacher relations Nel Noddings draws a distinction 
between teachers and instructors: whereas a good teacher always recognises the 
importance of her relationship with the students, the instructor does not consider 
fostering a relationship to her students as part of her role and instead focuses on 
correct answers and ‘obtains an impressive number of correct responses from 
students on test’ (Noddings 2010, vii). Indeed, the student-teacher relationship in 
critical pedagogy is of paramount importance for the enhancement of the learning 
experience for both teacher and student because ‘the reactions of students invited 
into a caring relation often include increased interest in the subject matter (if she is 
interested, it must be worth exploring); enhanced self-esteem (if she sees something 
in me, I must be worth something); and concern for others (if she cares about them, 
perhaps I should too)’ (ibid.). In order to achieve a good relationship between teacher 
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and student, the teacher must show respect to students and allow them the space 
to bring their personal and cultural identities into the classroom (Margonis 2011, 
434). Margonis argues that the teacher must work to bring formal education in line 
with the array of other educational events happening in students’ lives (Margonis 
1999, 2011). In doing so, it is possible to create spaces in which students relate to 
one another and work collectively to address social issues which are borne of their 
own contexts and relationships both in and outside the classroom. This requires the 
teacher to prioritise relations over the competing institutional and national pressures 
of assessment, and to prioritise relations over a dogmatic adherence to a political 
position (Margonis 2011, 438). 
While some scholars highlight the importance of relations in the classroom, be 
that between teacher and student or student and student, others make the case for 
the importance of relationships to strangers we do not know personally. Hutchinson 
argues that an important part of education examines the relations we have with 
people in the wider world. Through technology and global commerce we now have 
immediate access to people all over the world. Connected via webs of production 
and consumption, it is no longer enough to only consider our relations with those 
who we have face-to-face contact with (Hutchinson 2010, 76) but we now also need 
to consider strangers and education  plays a vital role in helping to conceptualise 
these relations. As a starting point for exploration of our relation to strangers 
Hutchinson suggests the three Cs: care, concern, and connection (ibid., 84-84). 
Hutchinson explains: 
“Why should we care? How can we demonstrate our concern? What is our 
connection? Take these questions and apply them to issues of sweatshop 
labour and instead of ignoring the topic, one asks: Why should I care that 
a child ten years of age works twelve-hour shifts in intolerable factory 
conditions? How can I, as a student, demonstrate that I am concerned 
about these labour practices (perhaps boycott, demonstrate, write letters 
to the corporation)? And what is the connection between my going to see 
a multimillionaire ballplayer and the company whose product he endorses 
paying unliveable wages to its overseas workers? (Hutchinson 2010, 84-
85) 
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Hutchinson's questions regarding our relationship to strangers are an important 
addition to other scholars’ work as they can help teachers to address social concerns 
which go beyond the students’ immediate context. One example of the attempt to 
include the consideration of strangers is found in a critical exploration of the fast-
food industry illustrated by Love (2011). Students may like fast-food, attracted by a 
combination of taste, price, and advertising, but be ignorant of the production of the 
final product which involves a vast array of strangers ranging from those who work 
in fast-food restaurants for a minimum wage to those who grow the vegetables and 
produce the meat (Love 2011, 440-441). Starting from the immediate context of the 
students who like fast-food, the teacher in critical pedagogy can follow the three Cs 
to help students to critically examine how their choices of food impact strangers: 
should the students care that restaurant and farm workers alike are paid so poorly 
for their labour? How can students demonstrate their concern about the exploitative 
practices that result in the low end price of the product? And what connections are 
there between the students enjoying fast-food and the lives of others? The critical 
examination of the issue cannot stop here. The care, concern and connection to 
strangers must also extend to other fast-food customers who do not eat fast-food 
for the taste or convenience but because it is the only cheap source of food available 
to them (ibid.). These far-reaching discussions which go beyond a reductive position 
of outright opposition to fast-food open the way to consider more complex and 
nuanced understandings of how students and teachers alike can practice opposition. 
We are reminded of Giroux’s discussions of resistance and rebellion in which he 
explores students who act out against school rules: his argument follows that by 
rebelling against school dress codes students are simultaneously reproducing wider 
societal practices of fast fashion and the sexualisation of young women (Giroux, 
1983). Opposition to oppressive practices as encouraged by the teacher as a 
transformative intellectual must be aware of and engage with these nuanced 
considerations of care, concern and connection in collaboration with students. In this 
instance, it is the role of the teacher in critical pedagogy to encourage students to 
think about all of these relationships and in fulfilling her role as a transformative 
intellectual, to work with the students to address and change the issues raised while 
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being cautious not to reinforce another set of oppressive practices operating in a 
different environment beyond the classroom. 
Giroux argues that both ethics and politics are present in the relationship between 
the student and teacher, and that ethics is the sense of our own personal and social 
responsibilities for the other in the struggle against inequality. The role of the teacher 
in this relationship is to actively enter the struggle through education and other 
means and to challenge inequality, social injustice and lack of freedom and to expand 
democratic and human rights in her own classroom practice and in her wider 
community (Giroux 1992, 74). Drawing on her own experiences of education bell 
hooks recalls that it was the teachers with this ethical commitment who had the most 
impact on her. She writes that ‘[t]hey were the teachers who were concerned with 
the integration of thinking and learning information. They were the committed 
teachers who wanted to see students grow and self-actualise’ (hooks 2010, 34). 
Alongside this relation to others and its ethical component, scholars on relations 
in education also highlight the importance of a particular relation to knowledge. 
Writing as part of the big-tent of critical pedagogy, these scholars understand 
knowledge as socially constructed and reject a notion of knowledge that is 
conditioned by strict relationships of hierarchy, discipline, and authoritarianism 
(Stengel 2010, 141). Barbara Thayer-Bacon describes this understanding as 
'relational (e)pistemology' (2003), emphasizing that knowledge is ‘something that is 
socially constructed by embedded and embodied people who are in relations with 
each other and their greater environment’ (Thayer-Bacon 2010, 165). By viewing 
knowledge as something that arises from and within our relations, we are invited to 
consider a different role of the teacher. Rather than being a transferor of pre-
arranged and unquestionable information, the teacher, along with her students, is 
an active participant in the creation of knowledge. As mentioned previously, critical 
pedagogy rejects the notion of knowledge as something that is transferred and 
accumulated (Giroux 1992, 98) and claims that educators in traditional approaches 
to education are ‘transformed from an intellectual to a technician’ (Aronowitz 2008, 
xiii). In contrast, critical pedagogy calls for a relation to knowledge that views it as 
constructed as part of our relations with others and sees the teacher as having a 
particular relationship to knowledge that creates space for others to enter into the 
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production of knowledge as part of an ongoing process. As Freire states in a chapter 
entitled 'Teaching Is Not Just Transferring Knowledge': ‘to know how to teach is to 
create possibilities for the construction and production of knowledge […]. In speaking 
of the construction of knowledge, I ought to be involved practically, incarnationally, 
in such constructions and be involving the students also’ (Freire 2001, 49-50). 
Although critical pedagogy's approach to the relations of the teacher have been 
presented here in three parts, they are not stand-alone relationships, but interwoven 
with one another. A teacher’s relationship to knowledge cannot exist without her 
relationship to the other. Without acknowledging the other and her position within 
the classroom and the wider community, the teacher cannot carry a notion of 
knowledge that is based on the belief in its production as the result of interactions 
with others. Likewise, the recognition of the teacher’s own position in regard to 
broader society and social change cannot occur without the relation to others that 
allows for their voices and experiences to be heard. 
Postanarchism and Subjectivity 
Having outlined the understanding of the teacher in critical pedagogy, I can now 
establish my critique through the lens of anarchism and the emphasis on the subject, 
action, and relationships. Once again, I use the shorthand of ‘postanarchism’ here 
not in distinction from anarchism, but as a way to quickly refer to the illumination of 
the subject, action and relationships. As with the anarchist critique of critical 
pedagogy and the state, I proceed by addressing these three key elements. 
Postanarchist understandings of the formation of subjectivity are embedded in 
Foucault’s work on governance and the formation of the subject according to 
multiple and overlapping identities, each of which come with expected modes of 
behaviour (Newman 2016, 19). These practices of government are sometimes forms 
of power of the state and its agencies, for example schools and security services, and 
are sometimes non-state agencies such as corporations. No matter who or what the 
governing agencies are, their aim is to conduct the behaviour of subjects in 
identifiable ways which can be categorised, understood and controlled for (Foucault 
2009, 267). I have previously critiqued critical pedagogy on the basis of the 
prescriptive formation of subjectivity, arguing that rather than offering a response to 
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neo-liberalism, critical pedagogy utilises similar practices by offering the subject 
choice within a defined realm of action. In this section of the chapter I apply this 
critique to education and demonstrate that in its treatment of teachers, critical 
pedagogy establishes a defined identity which is an element in the formation of the 
subject. The identity of the teacher in critical pedagogy is established as a 
transformative intellectual, and subjects are expected to conform to this formation 
of their subjectivity in the pursuit of critical pedagogy’s vision of social change. The 
identity of the transformative intellectual is comprehensively established through 
contrasts with other teaching identities like the hegemonic intellectual and the 
critical intellectual. The formation of subjectivity is not only confined to the teacher 
when she is in the education institution, but is to form an important part of her 
identity through her entire life. Here, critical pedagogy abandons the choice 
contained in neo-liberal identities in which the subject is presented with a range of 
identities to pick from. Critical pedagogy presents no such range, firmly pinning its 
colours to the mast: if you want to be considered a teacher in critical pedagogy, you 
must act as a transformative intellectual, no other identity is permitted. This attempt 
to form the subject of the teacher through the identity of the transformative 
intellectual leaves the subject in critical pedagogy with no space in which to form her 
own subjectivity. Like the critical citizen, the subject as a transformative intellectual 
has a wide range of actions available to her to as ways to critically engage with the 
world around her, but this engagement is still bound by the broader notion of 
subjectivity established for her. Her subjectivity is already predetermined by critical 
pedagogy as a transformative intellectual. 
The realm of action defined for the teacher in critical pedagogy is connected to 
this very specific and limiting form of subjectivity. Action in critical pedagogy can be 
approached through action in the classroom, and action in the community. In the 
classroom the teacher is to deliberately introduce the context of the students and 
use this as the starting point of education. In starting from the students’ context, the 
teacher helps to create a critical distance between the students and their immediate 
community, helping them to realise the role they can play as critical citizens. 
Ultimately, this approach aims to achieve critical pedagogy’s goal of a society with 
greater democracy, equality, justice and freedom. We know from the previous 
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chapter that this end-goal predetermines the action of the critical citizen as subject, 
an outcome equally applicable to the role of the teacher. The teacher in critical 
pedagogy takes on a dual aspect. Not only is the teacher an identity on which 
practices of government operate giving form to the subject, the teacher is also part 
of a governing agency which enacts practices of government for the formation of 
others. Working in education the teacher is part of educational practices which 
explicitly seek to create students as critical citizens through the introduction and 
reinforcement of specific behaviours. The classroom is not the only domain of action 
for the teacher in critical pedagogy because she is also expected to strive for social 
change in her wider community. In this element of her role the teacher takes on some 
of the identity of a critical citizen, actively participating in democratic processes and 
teaching the students what critical citizenship is by example. In and outside of the 
classroom, the action of the teacher is decided not by the teacher herself but by 
critical pedagogy. To be a teacher is to be a transformative intellectual and to act for 
social change is to bring about greater democracy, equality, justice and freedom. 
Through the formation of the subject as a transformative intellectual and the 
realm of action defined for her, the teacher in critical pedagogy has clearly 
established relationships with others. The teacher as a transformative intellectual 
carries the responsibility to help shape the student as a critical citizen. As a result, 
the teacher will always be in a position of power regarding the student and this 
power will always determine their relationship. In contrast, anarchism argues for the 
spontaneous relationships which are not dependent on externally imposed 
formations of subjectivity, but are born out of the free autonomous practice of the 
subject in the present moment (Newman 2016, 129). 
The anarchist critique of critical pedagogy and the state through the subject, 
action and relationships only critiques but offers no response or solution. This 
critique is important as it establishes the limit of critical pedagogy as a response to 
neo-liberalism, a role critical pedagogy has cast itself. The anarchist critique of the 
teacher in critical pedagogy however, offers a response through autonomous 
practice. Anarchism offers a space for freedom as autonomous practice in which the 
subject refuses the formation of her subject by external expectation and creates 
space to form her own subjectivity. Taken to its extreme this position may conclude 
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that any form of institutionalised education will cast the teacher in a particular role 
with particular expected behaviours, therefore to pursue anarchist autonomous 
practice institutionalised education should be removed. This would culminate in a 
position akin to Ivan Illich’s position in Deschooling Society (1995) in which 
institutionalised schooling is removed in favour of informal networks of learning. 
However, it is important to remember that anarchism is a practice for now, and 
following Franks (2011) is approached here as a particular response of a particular 
subject in a specific context. While a conclusion of anarchism may suggest 
deschooling, such a position does not assist me in my critique of critical pedagogy, 
nor in understanding and following my own practices in the context of neo-liberal 
higher education. The question of deschooling brings us back to the earlier discussion 
of the role of direct opposition in anarchism more broadly, and in Newman’s work 
specifically. If we were to follow Newman’s construction of postanarchism without 
question, action entirely alien to the dominant system, in this case removing 
ourselves from educational institutions to practice education elsewhere and 
differently, would be entirely appropriate. However, following this path would 
contravene one of the central tenets of anarchism, freedom as the freedom of all. As 
Bakunin wrote, ‘I am free only when all human beings surrounding me – men and 
women alike – are equally free’ (Bakunin 1964c, 267). In this instance opposition 
from within existing educational institutions has an important role to play in 
autonomous practice which operates as part of the freedom of self and others. Such 
an approach to opposition within existing educational institutions does not require 
the direct opposition Newman is critical of, but neither does it preclude opposition 
and subversive action from within. 
The postanarchist position is that freedom is the starting point for the subject and 
an ever-present possibility in the subject’s present context, not something to be 
learnt or achieved as part of social change. Anarchism is a politics of autonomy in 
which freedom is understood as a relationship one cultivates in the present (Newman 
2016, 129). This anarchist freedom is not only a refusal of practices of government 
which form the subject, it is an active pursuit of self-government and relationships 
which are no longer solely determined by external factors (Landauer 2010, 214). In 
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the context of this thesis, it is the pursuit of self-government and relationships which 
are not determined by critical pedagogy through the identity of the transformative 
intellectual. To give greater depth to the postanarchist notion of self-governance and 
relationships to others, I turn to Foucault’s work on care of the self. 
Care of the Self 
Michel Foucault’s lectures from the early 1980s lay the ground for an understanding 
of the teacher’s relationship to herself and the connection to others. To take our 
understanding of this relationship to others further, I draw on Foucault’s work on 
parrhesia, the practice of speaking truth to others, and connect it to teaching practice 
in the classroom as the practical expression of care of the self and others. 
In his late lectures at the Collége de France Foucault turned his attention to 
exploring the notion of care of the self, an idea often dismissed as being simply 
egotistic in more recent times (Foucault 2005, 12-13). Foucault argues that in 
antiquity and through to the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D the notion of care of the self 
was closely linked to the now more famous delphic precept of ‘know thyself’ (ibid., 
4) but while know thyself went on to form the backbone of much of Western political 
thought, care for the self fell into obscurity (ibid., 4-5). Given the importance of care 
of self, Foucault explores care of the self and its development over time to better 
understand its impact today. 
First, care of the self ‘is an attitude towards the self, others, and the world’ 
(Foucault 2005, 10) and concerns our relations with others and our behaviour in the 
world. Care of the self is a principle which is profoundly connected to how we live 
our lives, and not a method to be deployed in specific situations. Second, care of the 
self also ‘implies a certain way of attending to what we think and what takes place in 
our thought’ (ibid., 10). Third, care of the self is not an aimless process in which we 
pay attention to our thoughts and actions, but is aimed at our transformation: 
[…] the notion of epimeleia [care] does not merely designate this general 
attitude or this form of attention turned on the self. The epimeleia also 
always designates a number of actions exercised on the self by the self, 
actions by which one takes responsibility for oneself and by which one 
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changes, purifies, transforms, and transfigures oneself. (Foucault 2005, 
10-11) 
Care of the self can be approached as a prefigurative spiral in which by considering 
ourselves and our actions, and others and their actions, we are able to reflect and act 
again in the constant pursuit of relationships which enable care of the self and the 
transformation of subjectivity. Care of the self presents us with an understanding of 
the relationship to self and transformation which is established without end, a 
process of transformation which has the open-ended formation of the self as its aim 
rather than the particular and predetermined self of the transformative intellectual. 
The distinction between the two may appear subtle, but it is an important one. The 
transformative intellectual is a form of subjectivity decided in advance and externally 
of the subject herself. Critical pedagogy provides a clear understanding of how the 
transformative intellectual is to act and the relationships she is to have. The teacher’s 
role is reduced to the choice of the specific actions she takes whilst being formed as 
a transformative intellectual. In contrast, care of the self promotes the formation of 
the subject not along predetermined lines and to external expectations, but as a 
process of (trans)formation undertaken by the subject and for the subject. Care of 
the self opens the space for the subject not to pick from a range of practices and 
behaviours already established by critical pedagogy under the banner of the 
transformative intellectual, but to take responsibility for her own formation apart 
from this externally defined identity. 
Care of the self in antiquity was presented as a principle which applied to and was 
pursued by the young. The aim of care of the self was to prepare the young for their 
advancement into maturity and was particularly targeted at correcting failings in 
Athenian education (Foucault 2005, 75). Care of the self concerned both the 
education and transformation of the subject and consisted of pedagogical and 
psychological elements. The pedagogical element concerned ‘the transmission of a 
truth whose function is to endow any subject whatever with aptitudes, capabilities, 
knowledge, and so on, that he did not possess before’ (ibid., 408). The use of the 
pronoun ‘he’ is telling here, as care of the self was a gendered pursuit, reserved for 
specific boys in Athenian society. This pedagogical element was complemented by a 
psychological one which aimed not at the endowing of abilities, but at the 
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transformation of the young men as subjects (ibid., 408). Those who practiced care 
of the self in antiquity were young men and members of the Athenian aristocracy 
who would go on to govern the city state. In spite of the importance of their future 
occupation, the education they received did not prepare them to fulfil their future 
role. It was considered to be the duty of young Athenian aristocrats to care for 
themselves in order to care effectively for others through good governance but the 
Athenian education did not teach the young men how to govern themselves and 
consequently could not help them to govern the city as adults (ibid., 37, 72, 175).  
Care of the self in antiquity was concerned with a particular form of reflexivity of 
the subject, a particular form of the subject’s reflection on thought itself. In antiquity 
this reflexivity came in the form of memory exercises which strove to access the truth 
of actions and thought through a process of recognition (Foucault 2005, 460). Such 
reflection was crucial in being able to consider one’s thoughts and actions 
throughout the past day, review the choices made, and consider what could be done 
differently in future scenarios. This was an endeavour in which the individual gave an 
account of his day through the use of an active period of reflection at the end of the 
day before going to sleep, or through the use of a diary to record the day’s events. 
The final element of care of the self in antiquity ties several of these characteristics 
together. In order for the young man to go through the corrective function in 
preparation for governance, and in order for him to be able to truly account for his 
day, he needed a master. The master was a philosopher who would play the 
pedagogical and psychological role needed to teach the young Athenian care of the 
self (Foucault 2005, 58). The mastership took on three different models. First, there 
was the mastership by example: a master was required to model the appropriate 
behaviours for the individual. Second, mastership by competence, ‘that is to say, 
quite simply, of the person who passes on knowledge, principles, abilities, know-
how, and so on, to the younger person’ (ibid., 128). And third, was the mastership of 
dilemma and discovery, which was Socratic in character and operated through on-
going dialogues in which the student would be questioned about problems they face 
or might face and led to realise and consider his response (ibid., 128). The 
relationship between individual and master maintained a strict hierarchy, with the 
master being responsible for the development of self care in the individual, without 
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being transformed in this process himself. Despite the non-prescriptive concepts 
underpinning care of the self as a process of self-formation, the practice throughout 
antiquity was aimed at the formation of suitable city-state governors as an end point. 
The notion of care of the self underwent important changes by the time of the 1st 
and 2nd centuries A.D. The first of these changes was that, at least in theory, the 
notion of care of the self was no longer exclusively reserved for young aristocrats, 
but became a more general maxim for all people: ‘it appears as a rule applicable to 
everyone, which can be practiced by everyone, without prior condition of status and 
without any technical, professional, or social aim’ (Foucault 2005, 126). However, 
while the principle of care of the self was generalised, in practice, it was still only 
accessible to a select group of individuals as it was practiced and taught only within 
specific institutions which could only be attended by those who had the time to do 
so (ibid., 113). The generalisation of the principle of care of the self also saw an 
important shift in the age of people who practiced care of the self. The focus was no 
longer on the young Athenians and their preparation for governing, but on a process 
of formation of subjectivity which aimed for the individual’s status as subject in old 
age (Foucault 2005, 109). The shift in age brought with it a change in the time scale 
for the individual. Rather than care of the self being constrained to the moment 
between adolescence and adulthood, it became an obligation to last a lifetime (ibid., 
87). By opening the age range of those who practiced care of the self, it changes from 
a practice with a time-limit and end point into an endless pursuit, driven by a 
constant attention to the way individuals lived their lives. The end-goal of a subject 
capable of governing the city state is removed in favour of a process of constant 
attention the aim of which is the subject’s formation of herself for herself rather than 
for an externally defined goal. 
Opening the principle of care of the self to encompass the entirety of an 
individual’s life was also accompanied by a change in the character of the master 
figure. As care of the self was no longer confined to a corrective motion which aimed 
at tackling a young man’s ignorance, it was no longer necessary for the master in the 
relationship to be a “professional” and a philosopher. Instead, the role of the master 
by the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D was to act as ‘an effective agency (opérateur) for 
producing efforts within the individual’s reform and in his formation as a subject. He 
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is the mediator in the individual’s relationship to his constitution as a subject’ 
(Foucault 2005, 129-130). By the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D the term master became 
misleading, as the master could now be a friend, a family member, a teacher, or other 
acquaintance. The shift in the character of the master broadened the practice of care 
of the self and lifted it out of particular and exclusive settings, tying it to individual 
relationships (ibid., 206). Together, the generalisation of the notion of care of the self 
and the change in the character of the master reflected a change in reasons for 
practicing care of the self. Care of the self was no longer meant to enable oneself to 
govern well, but was instead ‘for oneself and with oneself as its end’ (ibid., 83). The 
result of this change was a different relationship to the other: rather than being 
premised upon the need to govern well, the relation to the other was based on the 
individual’s own process of personal transformation. Unlike the stricter separation of 
the individual and master in antiquity, by the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D this 
relationship was no longer constituted by a hierarchy between those involved. This 
reconfigured relationship with a master established a reciprocity between the two 
individuals involved. In accounting for herself and her actions to an other, both 
parties enter into a relationship of care in which they can account for themselves. 
Alongside the change in the characteristics of the master, the care of the self in 
the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D necessitated a particular relationship to others which 
was beneficial to both the individual striving for transformation, and those around 
them. An example of one such relationship is friendship: 
Friendship is just one of the forms given to care of the self. Everyman who 
really cares for himself must provide himself with friends. From time to 
time these friends will enter the network of social exchanges and utility. 
This usefulness, which is an occasion for friendship must not be removed. 
It must be maintained to the end. But what gives this utility its function 
within happiness is the trust we place in our friends who are, for us, 
capable of reciprocity. And it is reciprocity of behaviour that makes 
friendship figure as one of the elements of wisdom and happiness. 
(Foucault 2005, 195) 
This introduces two important elements into care of the self which were not present 
in antiquity. First, the duty of individuals to provide themselves with friends as a 
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necessary part of care of the self and second, there is a reciprocity in friendship which 
acts as a social bond. Caring for myself by having friends is simultaneously caring for 
others by being a friend myself. Whilst this example is focussing on friendship, the 
reciprocal quality of the relationship can also be found between lovers, or family 
members. In the context of this thesis I am interested in the possibilities of the 
relationship of self care between people in a classroom. Overall, the 1st and 2nd 
centuries A.D saw care of the self become a critical social function that concerned 
not only the individual’s life, but her wider world, and the lives led by others (Foucault 
2005, 93). 
We can draw direct conceptual links here back to the work of Colin Ward (1973) 
and Todd May (2014), and their arguments that anarchic relationships are possible 
in everyday life. The new relationship between the individual and the other is 
characterised by reciprocal care, a relationship which does not establish a hierarchy 
in which one of individual is accounting to a more senior formal master. There are 
similar relationships at work in anarchist calls for free association and reciprocity. 
While Ward proposed that anarchist relationships of non-domination, free 
association and reciprocity were waiting like ‘a seed beneath the snow’ (Ward, 1973, 
14), operating at a level beneath the state and bureaucracy, May argued that 
anarchic relationships are already in existence, not operating under the state, but in 
spite of it. May points to the presence of friendships, which are not based on 
hierarchical relations determined by what one individual can gain from another, but 
are based on shared interest, mutual reciprocity of feeling and the role of the 
friendship in the past (May, 2014). 
As with antiquity, care of the self in the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D is accompanied 
by a particular form of reflection, a particular form of the subject’s thought about 
thought. In antiquity this was characterised by practices of memory and 
remembrance in which the individual accounts for herself to herself and a single 
master operating in a hierarchical relationship. In the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D this 
reflexivity found its form in an ongoing and active consideration and meditation on 
the individual’s life and her actions towards herself and others in relationships which 
are not strictly hierarchical (Foucault, 2005, 460). This form of reflexivity introduces 
a particular way of living and particular practices of self-government into the 
- 124 - 
principle of care of the self and becomes an aesthetic form which concerns the 
individual’s constant attention and action regarding the ways in which she, and her 
friends, live their lives. Reflexivity is no longer confined to specific moments of 
reflection at the end of a day but is practiced through giving an ongoing account of 
one’s days and actions not only to oneself, but to one’s friends. This ties into the 
newly introduced notion of care of the self as an ongoing practice and process of 
personal (trans)formation through an individual’s life which requires a certain 
attention and way of living (ibid., 460). Embedded within the notion of care of the 
self and the reciprocal relationships it entails is a particular form of interaction 
between speaker and listener which enables such relationships. 
Parrhesia 
As noted above, the relationships between ourselves and others necessary for the 
practice of care of the self require a certain quality to the interactions. This form of 
interaction is parrhesia, the act of speech which occurs between the individual and 
an other. 
Parrhesia in the first instance means simply ‘the need for the two partners to 
conceal nothing of what they think from each other and to speak to each other 
frankly’ (Foucault, 2005, 187). Parrhesia forms an ethical verbal relationship between 
speaker and listener, one in which there is both a moral attitude (ethos) and a 
technical procedure (tekhne), that are both indispensable for ‘conveying true 
discourse to the person who needs it to constitute himself as a subject’ (ibid, 372). 
This notion of parrhesia is at the centre of the relationship between individuals, 
formal masters or otherwise, and is fundamental to the principle of care of the self. 
In order to understand parrhesia in more depth, we need a deeper explanation of 
the term itself, as well as its use as an element in relationships formed through the 
practice of care of the self. 
Parrhesia has both positive and negative forms. In the negative, parrhesia is taken 
to mean saying everything, saying anything which comes to mind, anything which 
serves the cause one is defending, anything which serves the passion or interest 
driving the person who is speaking (Foucault 2012, 10). However, it is the positive 
sense of the term which we are interested in here, and that carries more qualifying 
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characteristics than simply to say everything: ‘the word parrhesia […] refers to a type 
of relationship between the speaker [parrhesiastes] and what he says’ (Foucault 
2006, 2). Parrhesia, contains five key characteristics, frankness, truth, criticism, risk, 
and duty (Peters 2003), and by examining each in turn we are able to gain a greater 
understanding of the term. 
Turning first to frankness, Foucault states that the positive sense of parrhesia has 
a certain measure of straight-talking, in which the speaker conveys her own message 
in a clear and concise way: ‘the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that 
what [she] says is [her] own opinion. And [she] does this by avoiding any kind of 
rhetorical form which would veil what [she] thinks’ (Foucault 2006, 2). Foucault 
makes an important distinction between parrhesia and rhetoric, drawing a direct and 
clear connection between what is thought by the speaker and what is said. Not 
allowing room for miscommunication or confusion the speaker ‘personally sign[s]’ 
(Foucault 2012, 11) her discourse. The speaker of parrhesia is not necessarily a great 
orator or public speaker, nor does she speak with flourish or fancy. Instead she 
conveys her own message with clarity and thought, communicating directly with her 
interlocutors. 
This personal connection between thoughts, words, and actions leads to the 
second characteristic of parrhesia, truth. The parrhesiastes speaks her opinion, but 
the connection goes deeper than this. In speaking her opinion and personally signing 
herself to it, she creates a bond between herself and the truth she has spoken 
(Foucault 2012, 11). The consequence of this bond is that the parrhesiastes never 
speaks in the name of another, or with the words and thoughts of another, but 
always with her own ideas, notions, and truth. In this positive sense of parrhesia we 
are given a picture in which it is not simply the role of the speaker to say anything 
and everything, but to consider what she says, how she says it, and her relationship 
to it. 
The third and fourth characteristics of parrhesia are closely linked, and best 
considered together: risk and criticism. In speaking the truth, the parrhesiastes 
invariably plays a function of criticism of either herself or her interlocutor, and this 
criticism carries with it risk. ‘For there to be parrhesia, in speaking the truth one must 
open up, establish, and confront the risk of offending the other person, of irritating 
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him, of making him angry and provoking him to conduct which may even be 
extremely violent’ (Foucault 2012, 11).  When the term parrhesia was used in ancient 
Greek and Greco-Roman cultures, it always brought with it an element of risk for the 
speaker, often in form of violence and death. This possibility of extreme violence is 
linked to the references of parrhesia in which the speaker addresses a tyrant or king, 
who, upon hearing something he does not approve, could react with great anger 
(Foucault 2006, 4). However, this risk need not always be so extreme. There can also 
be a risk to friendship, or a political risk involved in parrhesia. For example, if a friend 
does something which you think is wrong, and you play the role of parrhesiastes and 
challenge them about their actions, you risk angering and hurting them, and as such, 
risk your relationship with your friend. These relationships, particularly the political, 
do not only exist between the speaker and a single interlocutor, but can also be found 
between the speaker and the agora (Foucault 2006, 7). When considering 
interactions with the wider world, the speaker of parrhesia is at risk if her opinion or 
approach is contrary to the dominant opinion, or if in speaking the parrhesiastes risks 
bringing about scandal (Foucault 2006, 4). 
The final of the five characteristics of parrhesia is duty. As it suggests, parrhesia is 
tied to the duty of the speaker to speak in that she is compelled or obliged to speak 
the truth and unable to stay silent (Foucault 2006, 6). This duty gives parrhesia a 
sense in which speaking out is not wholly the speaker’s choice but that they cannot 
do differently but to speak the truth despite the risk that doing so brings. To help 
bring these five characteristics together Foucault offers a concise summary: 
parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific 
relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life 
through danger, a certain type of relationship to himself or other people 
through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific 
relation to moral law through freedom and duty. (Foucault 2006, 6) 
While these five characteristics help us to better understand what is included when 
we use the term parrhesia, there is another element to the term which is connected 
to the process of truth-telling. Foucault highlights that parrhesia is not simply a skill 
or a set of techniques, but it is ‘a stance, a way of being which is akin to a virtue, a 
mode of action’ (Foucault 2012, 14). This means that parrhesia cannot be reduced to 
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a tactic to be deployed at whim as it carries an ethical function in addressing 
relationships between people. Parrhesia is an ethical undertaking at its core and 
engages in telling ‘the truth of what is in the singular form of individuals and 
situations’ (Foucault 2012, 25). This focus on singular forms of truth regarding the 
subject and her behaviour in a particular situation is a rejection of any attempt to 
rely on truth with a capital “T”, as this would imply a universal truth about universal 
subjects, and, as has already been discussed, postanarchism rejects such a notion. 
Instead, truth here concerns the specific actions of a specific subject in a specific 
situation, and is concerned not with universal statements or claims, but with the 
extent to which the subject, in that moment and that action, took responsibility for 
her actions as hers, rather than automatically as the actions expected of her by 
external forces. In engaging in parrhesia the subject and her interlocutor are able to 
consider the actions of the subject from this position of the subject herself and her 
attempts at the formation of her own subjectivity. 
Care of the Self, Parrhesia, and the Teacher 
This exploration of care of the self and parrhesia has enabled me to bring a greater 
depth to anarchist calls for autonomous practice in which the subject refuses the 
formation of her subjectivity by external sources and attempts to decide for herself 
how she is to be. Care of the self is the continual process of attention paid by the 
subject to her subjectivity through the critical accounting of her actions and the 
actions of those around her. This continual process is one through which the subject 
is able to incrementally take responsibility for the formation of her subject in the 
different contexts in which she operates, and with each attempt at autonomous 
practice is able to show the subjectivities of neo-liberalism and critical pedagogy as 
contingent, malleable and subject to change. Moreover, in the process of self care 
the subject engages with others in reciprocal relationships which are not defined 
externally but are prefigurative and arise in the relationship itself. Care of the self 
requires us to form and maintain reciprocal forms of social relationships in order to 
continually attend to our own formation as subjects. Such relationships are not, and 
cannot be, conducted on the basis of predetermined social roles, as to do so is to 
place limits on the relationship and the transformation possible (Anderson and Wong 
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2013, 424). The student-teacher relationship in critical pedagogy is one where the 
teacher’s role is to enable the student to examine ideas and connect these to context 
in the pursuit of social change. This establishes a rigid structure to the relationship 
which is directed toward a particular fixed end determined by critical pedagogy with 
the teacher acting as its agent. This relationship has a fixed form which does not 
develop on the basis of the interactions of those involved, but remains centred on 
the creation of critical citizens working toward social change. 
In contrast, anarchist student-teacher relationships are formed in the moment of 
the interaction between the subjects. This relationship cannot be formed in advance, 
it cannot be planned or directed. It is a spontaneous result of autonomous practices 
of the teacher and student as they take control of their own formations as subjects. 
This of course occurs within an institutional context in which there are external 
expectations already shaping the relationship between teacher and student from the 
moment the teacher enters the class. All the teacher can do in this scenario is to 
attempt to disrupt these roles and expectations and invite students in to 
relationships to self care and care for others. In taking account for themselves the 
teacher and student practice care of the self, or self-governance. I argue here that a 
teacher who commits to anarchism, commits to forms of self care as outlined above. 
Through practices of care of the self and the continual attention to how she lives her 
life the teacher can consider her subjectivity and her relations to others in an ongoing 
and transformative way. Care of the self does not posit an externally defined and 
particular self to be reached, as in critical pedagogy’s transformative intellectual, but 
instead invites the teacher to live in a way which enables her continual 
(trans)formation along with the (trans)formation of others and society. There is no 
end point to this process, as there is no end point in anarchism, the focus is on the 
practice itself and the changes such practice brings in the world. Here, teaching 
becomes part of the teacher’s practices of self care. Education offers the teacher an 
arena in which to invite others, the students, into relationships of care of the self and 
care for others. Education presents the teacher the chance to account for herself 
with regards to the topics she teaches and how she teaches, while simultaneously 
presenting the opportunity to engage with the students through critical questioning 
of themselves and their actions. In inviting the students into this self care and care 
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for others the teacher requires a form of communication which is frank, truthful, 
critical, and at times, risky: it requires parrhesia. By approaching education as part of 
her self care the teacher attempts to establish a space in which the externally defined 
subjectivities and relationships of critical pedagogy are distanced and anarchic 
spontaneous relationships arise. 
Before concluding this chapter on care of the self, it is important to address the 
potential of care of the self becoming a practice of government under neo-liberalism. 
It could be argued that care of the self finds a contemporary manifestation in the 
notion of well-being which now pervades educational institutions: this is yet another 
identity added to the neo-liberal ensemble, the mentally healthy individual. The 
discourse of health and well-being creates an expected mode of conduct for staff and 
students in higher education, one in which individuals are expected to attend to their 
own mental health and well-being via institutionally sanctioned means. Staff should 
take part in lunch-time sports clubs, yoga sessions, and alike in the pursuit of this 
mental health and well-being. The well-being discourse could be approached as a 
neo-liberal manifestation of care of the self, however, Foucault’s work on care of the 
self already provides us with a cautionary note. Foucault wrote of the change of care 
of the self into a form of egotistical pursuit in contemporary society, one which 
targets the singular and individual pursuit of self over and above (or perhaps apart 
from) the relational element (Foucault 2005, 12-13) which makes care of the self such 
a powerful concept when wedded to anarchist thought and practice. There is a 
danger of the co-opting of care of the self into the neo-liberal practices of 
government, but I argue here that such a move would take a fundamental move away 
from self care as established in this thesis.  
Throughout this exploration of care of the self I have made the connections to my 
critique of critical pedagogy and the predetermined role and transformation of the 
teacher. In parallel with my earlier critique of critical pedagogy relying on the 
continuation of the state as the form of social organisation, my critiques find their 
practical expression in the following chapter where I build on previous critiques of 
critical pedagogy and the lack of consideration of the context in which teachers work. 
In the following chapter I put forward a theorisation of the classroom as a space in 
which results from postanarchist autonomous practice.  
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5. Anarchy in the Classroom 
In the previous two chapters I have made the case that critical pedagogy limits the 
possibilities for social change by predetermining the subject, action, and 
relationships. These critiques have been made through the framework of anarchism, 
and a particular focus on the subject, action, and relationships, and the theory and 
practice of freedom as autonomous practice in the present. In this chapter, I propose 
a theorisation of the classroom as a space for everyday action which arises through 
anarchist autonomous practice. I begin with Michel de Certeau’s work on the practice 
of everyday life and the possibilities of subversion without opposition (1988). 
Drawing on de Certeau’s ideas, I argue that subversion is possible even in highly 
constrained environments such as English higher education institutions. From here, I 
call on the work of Obika Gray and others to elaborate a conceptualisation of the 
classroom as an exilic space in which dominant forms of social organisation can be 
distanced and subjects self-govern through care of the self and the formation of 
spontaneous relations with others (Gray, 2004; Grubačić and O’Hearn 2016). The aim 
here is to provide a theory of action which can account for the context of the teacher, 
while not trapping myself in my own critiques of predetermination: this is a fine line 
to tread between offering one possibility, and denying others. 
The Practice of Everyday Life 
To elaborate on a theory of autonomous practice found in anarchism, I begin here 
with Michel de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life (1988). De Certeau offers an 
approach to everyday life which highlights the gaps between something’s intended 
purpose and its use, arguing that in these gaps exists the chance to subvert the 
dominant forms of social organisation and the formation of the subject via practices 
of governance. 
De Certeau’s starting point is the claim that within dominant forms of social 
organisation there are always particular ways in which institutions are designed to 
be used, and yet there are always ways to subvert these institutions. The term 
“subvert” is key as de Certeau does not argue for a direct rejection of the institutions 
or attempts to alter those institutions for other means, but argues that subversion 
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entails using the institutions for ‘ends and references foreign to the system’ (de 
Certeau 1988, xiii). In using institutions for means and ends entirely alien to the 
dominant form of social organisation people are able to escape them without leaving 
them (ibid., xiii). This is similar to the discussion of direct opposition in anarchism and 
Newman’s work and the possibility of subversion from within. This notion of using 
the institutions of dominant forms of social organisation in ways and for ends entirely 
alien to those forms are at the heart of de Certeau’s work. de Certeau maintains that 
there is a difference between the initial production of something and the way it is 
consumed by its users, but, importantly, he does not use the terms production and 
consumption in their economic contexts. As an example, there is the production of 
television images and what the consumer makes of the images or what else she does 
with her time while watching television: a television show may be made to provide 
light entertainment, and yet the viewer might use it as background noise while 
completing another task (ibid., xii). To elucidate the ways in which the gap between 
production and consumption can be used de Certeau introduces the notion of la 
perruque, or ‘the wig’. La perruque is a French term for ‘the worker’s own work 
disguised as work for his employer’ (de Certeau 1988, 25). Crucially, this is different 
from both stealing, as nothing of material value is taken, and absenteeism, as the 
worker is still present at her job. Two examples offered of la perruque are the 
furniture maker and the secretary. A furniture maker uses the lathe at work, scraps 
of wood, and parts of her work time to build a sideboard for her home. This is a 
creative act on the part of the furniture maker which is driven not by economic 
considerations of selling the sideboard and making a profit, but by a desire to make 
the item for her own pleasure. A secretary uses a pen, paper, and work time to write 
a love letter. Again, the love letter is written for the pleasure of the secretary, it is 
not directed towards economic gains and carries no financial motive. In both cases 
people make use of the dominant frameworks in which they find themselves to 
produce something entirely unaccountable for by those frameworks and neither 
action is motivated by an economic concern or directed toward profit (ibid., 25). De 
Certeau points out that this subversive behaviour is not always tolerated, and that 
turning a blind eye to its occurrence has become less common as the attempts to 
control the gap between production and consumption have increased. But, there are 
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still ‘sleights of hand’ (ibid., 28) available to us as we divert time which is owed to 
institutions in order to produce other objects, play games of free exchange, and 
exchange gifts, all actions that subvert by bypassing the predetermined aim of the 
dominant political and social frameworks of society (ibid., 28). 
de Certeau argues that la perruque is one among many practices that ‘introduce 
artistic tricks and competitions of accomplices into a system. […] Sly as a fox and twice 
as quick: there are countless ways of “making do”’ (de Certeau 1988, 29, original 
emphasis). In outlining his understanding of other practices that can play in the gap 
between production and consumption de Certeau outlines two pairs of concepts: the 
first strategies and places, and the second tactics and spaces. Strategies and tactics 
are often cited as de Certeau’s most well-known concepts, but as noted by Ian 
Buchanan, there is a thinness to their formulation that has left them open to 
interpretation and use in many different ways (Buchanan 2000, 86). De Certeau 
himself noted that his work on strategies and tactics formed an ‘initial schema’ (de 
Certeau 1988, 35) rather than a fully formed set of concepts. Starting with de 
Certeau’s own words, the distinction between strategies and tactics: 
I call a strategy the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships 
that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a 
business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It 
postulates a place that can be determined as its own and serve as the base 
from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats 
(customers or competitors, enemies, the country surrounding the city, 
objectives, objects of research, etc.) can be managed. (de Certeau 1988, 
35-36, original emphasis) 
Strategy establishes a specific set of relationships both within the place in question 
and in relation to other exterior places. Strategies seek to create places of conformity 
through the calculation and manipulation of these power relationships in areas that 
have both physical locations and abstract forms. Further to this, strategy also seeks 
to establish a certain autonomy and independence with regard to possible variations 
in situations by being able to ‘capitalise acquired advantages’ and ‘prepare for future 
expansions’ (de Certeau 1988, 36). Another way strategy seeks to operate is to 
control places through the division of space. By parcelling out space strategy creates 
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a ‘panoptic practice’ (ibid., 36) by which elements exterior to the place are 
transformed into objects that can be ‘observed and measured’ (ibid., 36) and thus 
planned for and controlled for to a certain extent. When talking of strategies de 
Certeau explicitly links them to places, defining them as a configuration of proper 
positions in which each element is to be found in its correct and distinct location and 
in the correct and distinct relation to all other elements in the place. This 
configuration excludes the possibility of two things being in the same location at the 
same time, and therefore implies a certain stability (de Certeau 1988, 117). This 
spatial element corresponds to the controlled and planned for elements of 
strategies, and builds on de Certeau’s use of the term ‘panoptic practice’ (ibid., 36) 
in which elements are parcelled and categorised. 
In order to explain the difference between strategies and tactics, we turn to the 
example of the furniture maker. The furniture maker works for a company which 
posits itself as a subject, uses strategies to control for relations internally and 
externally, and operates within a defined place of its own. The strategy of the 
furniture company refers to how it manages internal relations through the 
establishment of hierarchy between workers and managerial staff, and external 
relations as it deals with suppliers of material and buyers of furniture. Through 
strategy things are maintained in their correct places, a worker is a worker and 
operates on the workshop floor, a manager is a manager and operates in an office: 
the worker cannot work in the office nor can the manager work on the workshop 
floor. The furniture company maintains an isolated place, the shop, which is itself 
carefully ordered to manage the company’s relationships to those exterior to it. 
Buyers enter a showroom at the front of the building in which they purchase their 
furniture, they are not allowed to enter the workshop floor, nor are they allowed to 
enter the rear of the building where materials are unloaded. Similarly, delivery 
drivers bringing materials to the company must use the rear entrance and are not 
allowed to unload their deliveries in the showroom. The company maintains a 
controlled place in which each element – worker, manager, buyers, supplier – are 
given their correct position and orientation in relation to one another. 
de Certeau’s notion of tactics sit in contrast to strategy (Buchanan 2000, 86). A 
tactic is ‘a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No 
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delimitation of an exteriority provides it with the conditions necessary for autonomy. 
The space of a tactic is the space of the other’ (de Certeau 1988, 36-37). de Certeau 
goes on to say that tactics always play on and with the ‘terrain imposed on it’ (ibid., 
37) and as such operate in continuously isolated instances. This transient nature of 
tactics means that it can never consolidate a position and can never plan particular 
practices, but instead must seize moments as they arise and be forever on the 
lookout for any possible gaps between production and expected consumption (ibid., 
37). Furthermore, de Certeau claims that tactics are ‘the art of the weak’ and are 
determined by the ‘absence of power, just as strategy is organised by the postulation 
of power’ (ibid., 37, original emphasis).  So, if strategy seeks to create protected 
places in which all possibilities are controlled and accounted for in favour of the 
predominant forms of social relationships, tactics seek to create spaces that subvert 
these dominant forms of relationships. Buchanan summarises tactics as ‘being 
constantly in the swim of things and are as much in danger of being swept away or 
submerged by the flow of events as they are capable of bursting through the dykes’ 
(2000, 89). Spaces exist when ‘one takes into consideration vectors of direction, 
velocities, and time variables’ (de Certeau 1988, 117). This rather vague initial 
introduction to space is later given more substance by de Certeau as he explains that 
spaces occur because of certain practices that ‘orient it, situate it, [and] temporalize 
it’ (ibid., 117) lending space a greater fluidity than place. These practices, or tactics, 
that orient, situate, and temporalize mean that spaces are constantly in formation 
and dissolution creating a state of instability and unpredictability in contrast to 
controlled places. This also means that space is a ‘practiced place’ (ibid., 117, original 
emphasis), a location which is brought into being by the very actions that both 
require and constitute it. 
Once again, we can return to the example of the furniture maker. While she works 
at the furniture company and is subject to its strategies and works in its place, she is 
not wholly constituted by the company. There are gaps she can exploit through 
tactics and spaces. For the furniture maker tactics and spaces come in moments 
throughout the working week when she is able to collect the offcuts of wood and 
begin building her sideboard. During breaks and lunches she plans what she wants to 
build. During lulls in production she starts to collect materials. By completing pieces 
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early, she creates time to work on her own project. However, none of these occasions 
are regular or planned for, each is the result of a spontaneous action and each occurs 
in a moment which cannot necessarily be replicated. In these tactical moments of 
subversion her workstation in the workshop becomes a different space: it is still 
embedded in the place of the company, but it is like a bubble in a liquid, separate 
while within. Through her tactics the furniture maker fleetingly creates a space of 
escape from the company’s strategy and place, escaping it without actually leaving. 
To help further illustrate the gap between the production of a place and its use as 
a space de Certeau offers the example of a city and uses the contrasting narratives 
of maps and tours to draw out both physical and relational differences of place and 
space. A map of a city is based on a predetermined, fixed, and predictable layout of 
the city which allows us to make assumptions about locations of certain elements, 
suggests how we travel from one element to another, and gives us a set of language 
to use (de Certeau 1988, 119). We are able to navigate a city using a map which is 
drawn, oral, or otherwise, through telling the story of the relationship of elements 
within the city to one another. Tours on the other hand use a different type of 
narrative, a narrative of space. This is distinct from a narrative of place in that it is 
formed by the practices which constitute and are constituted by the space itself. A 
tour of a city does not merely describe one element in spatial relation to another, 
although it may do this too, but it predominantly tells the story of how these 
elements within this place have been used in different ways (de Certeau 1988, 119). 
In telling the story of the different ways that the space has been used, we are 
simultaneously using that space differently: previously it was the space in which the 
story we are telling occurred, now it is being used as the space in which that story is 
being told. It is the idea of elements of places being used differently, or differently to 
how they were intended to be used, which is particularly important. Returning to 
some of de Certeau’s other notions, in the gap between production and 
consumption, in this example of the city, there is possibility for tactics and the 
creation and dissolution of space. The city is designed in a particular way with an 
original intention behind its use. However, in navigating the city it is possible to find, 
use, and make short cuts, perhaps a pedestrian using an underground car park to get 
from one street to another, rather than using the connecting pavements. Pedestrians 
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in a city can use/consume the city in a very different way than intended, and in so 
doing spaces continuously form and dissolve: an alley way becomes a short cut, a 
park bench becomes a bed, a street becomes a race track. Such is the unpredictability 
and instability of space. 
de Certeau’s ideas on strategy and places, and tactic and spaces have given us a 
way to approach the practice of everyday life and the possibilities which exist using 
the gaps between the production of something and its consumption. La perruque is 
explored in direct connection to education by Ruth Heilbronn as she examines the 
role of teacher educators in preparing pre-service teachers for their new job. 
Heilbronn has taken de Certeau’s ideas and used them to explore the tensions which 
arise between many teachers’ vocational aims of student learning and growth, and 
the institutional aims of target-driven ends and assessment (Heilbronn 2013, 31-32). 
Setting out the tension as she sees it, Heilbronn argues that the aims of education 
are ‘predominantly subsumed to economic ends, related to gaining skills, 
qualifications and employment in a global economy’ (ibid., 31). In the English state 
school context which Heilbronn is addressing these economic ends come in the form 
of a highly assessed and prescriptive learning process which is at odds with the 
national curriculum stance that teachers should aim to personalise their teaching for 
each student. Alongside this tension between two parts of the English national 
curriculum, there is also a tension between many teachers’ vocational aims which 
are often couched in the language of caring and social justice and the establishment 
of relationships with the student and the wider institutional aims of training, skills, 
and qualifications that serve the economy (ibid., 32-33). 
Heilbronn argues that teachers rarely seem to question the institutional paradigm 
which they are working in, and adds that this is entirely reasonable: ‘to ask 
fundamental questions of one’s daily work could lead to a loss of faith in that work, 
in the sense of removing the ladder one is standing on’ (Heilbronn 2013, 35). A key 
responsibility for teacher educators is to assist teachers in being able to question 
their positions and situations without jeopardising their ability to act. The ethical 
imperative for teacher educators is to help teachers to cope with living with 
contradictions (ibid., 36-37). The primary means for dealing with these tensions 
comes through teachers developing a ‘strategic competence’ (ibid., 35) about the 
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institution they work in, and then the ability to engage in la perruque, translated by 
Heilbronn as ‘wiggery’ (ibid., 36). Highlighting, as de Certeau does, that wiggery is not 
unethical behaviour, Heilbronn suggests that it is instead playful, creative, and witty, 
and that it is this playfulness that is vital for teachers to navigate the tensions in their 
daily lives and resist the overwhelming pressures of the institution: ‘Playfulness 
enables and announces that alternative viewpoints exist, even if these alternative 
viewpoints are not fully rationalised’ (ibid., 36). La perruque enables teachers to hold, 
and at times pursue, different aims to the institution without confronting the 
authority of the institution head-on (ibid., 36). La perruque for teachers can be a 
subversive and tension-releasing act without necessarily drawing the attention of the 
institution and negatively impacting on their own position. 
The practice of everyday life and la perruque offers us the gap between production 
and consumption in which possibilities of subversion exist. Coupled with de Certeau’s 
sketches of strategies and places, and tactics and spaces we can approach anarchist 
relationships of care of the self and others which bring with it a transformation of 
forms of social organisation. The notion of wiggery as put forward by Heilbronn offers 
teachers a way to deal with the tensions of their position and goes some way toward 
addressing the criticisms others have made of critical pedagogy. Importantly, 
through de Certeau and Heilbronn, the practice of everyday life and wiggery in the 
classroom gives us a grounding for a theory of action which takes into account 
teachers’ context and does not attempt to fix the action or the outcome in advance. 
Wiggery gives teachers a way to find the spaces in their day-to-day institutional 
context in which they can enact anarchist relationships in the present, including care 
of the self and others. What is lacking in de Certeau’s work, as discussed above, is a 
greater understanding of the notion of space. By de Certeau’s own admission his 
work on spaces and places was limited, and with an understanding of the possibilities 
found in everyday life, it is therefore now necessary to elaborate on a theory of space 
which builds on de Certeau’s work and aligns with anarchist understandings of the 
formation of the self and relationships. 
- 138 - 
Exilic Space 
To give us a starting point in theorising space I turn to the work of Obika Gray and his 
study of the Jamaican urban poor in the 1960s and his work on the notion of exilic 
space in particular. Gray’s study into the use of state power in Jamaica and the forms 
of opposition to it introduces the notion of exilic space to capture and analyse the 
urban poor’s marginalisation and unequal position in Jamaica, and the creation of 
spaces that resisted formal state power. Introducing the notion Gray writes: 
The black poor lived much of their existence under conditions of social 
dishonour and economic marginality in post-war Jamaica. This was the 
condition to which Jamaica’s historically unequal social relations had 
assigned the black majority. However, the black poor did not surrender to 
this deprivation but developed a repertoire of defensive responses. (Gray 
2004, 92-93) 
These responses included working with power as well as defying it, and importantly 
for this thesis, the ‘pursuit of a relatively autonomous existence within the social 
space they occupied’ (Gray 2004, 92-93). Gray named this social space exilic space. 
Gray argues that faced with the dominance of the Jamaican middle and upper 
classes and the imposition of their standards and norms of living and their 
relationship structures through the state, the urban poor sought to create their own 
spaces of social dissidence where they developed ‘their own structures of defiance 
and modes of existence’ (2004, 93-94). The urban poor in Jamaica were denied full 
membership of Jamaican society through their use of language and customs and a 
strong commitment to an identity based on African descent and civilisation. Denied 
a place in the dominant organisation of Jamaican society, the urban poor created 
exilic spaces in which they practiced a form of cultural labour in making and 
recovering themselves and what they saw as their right to an equal identity. While 
these other modes of existences may have been the semi-autonomous products of 
the urban poor, be they political gangs, street and community religious leaders, or 
criminal subcultures, they were far from unproblematic (ibid., 93-94). 
While the exilic space of the urban poor was an area of cultural production, it was 
also a physically located space which maintained certain features. First, although the 
exilic space was subject to ‘surveillance and penetration’ (Gray 2004, 95) by the state 
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and its actors, as well as other areas of Jamaican society drawn to the possibilities of 
new cultural forms that were taking shape there, it remained a relatively isolated 
area. While political parties and state security forces both periodically entered poor 
urban environments, these interventions were normally restricted to sporadic 
instances and very specific locations (ibid., 95). Second, exilic space was ridden with 
contradictions arising from the various new identities being formed and the cultural 
residues left behind from the dominant political and social frameworks (ibid., 103). 
These features of the exilic space combined to create an area with a ‘dual identity’ 
(ibid., 102) where the urban poor faced economic and social oppression within wider 
Jamaican society, but in that they created areas of relative autonomy in which they 
could subvert the repressive practices of dominant Jamaican political and social 
frameworks and pursue their own cultural forms and identities. These other 
identities of the urban poor were not dependent on the expectations of wider 
society, but neither were they fully free from any ‘cultural residues’ (ibid., 97). There 
still existed a preference for traditional church weddings over other forms of intimate 
relationships, for example, and a preference for lighter over dark skin tones (ibid., 
97). However, what is of importance in these exilic spaces is the underdetermined 
nature of the spaces, the gap between societal expectation and action which opened 
the space for possibilities, possibilities that in this case were manifested as other 
identities and relationships created by the urban poor themselves. Gray is quick to 
warn that this autonomy should not be overstated, as various political groups and 
parties worked to find ways to use the new political and social forms for their own 
partisan agendas (ibid., 112). Similarly, Gray argues, it should be remembered that 
this determined creation of exilic space was largely informed by a ‘covert desire for 
inclusion in the cultural mainstream’ (ibid., 113) and that while the creation and use 
of exilic space played an important role in the cultural recovery of the urban poor, 
the space was also shot through with conventional understandings of morality and 
shared values found in Jamaican society at large. 
Gray’s notion of exilic space is complex and full of tensions which the occupiers of 
the space had to negotiate and cope with, either individually or in groups. With this, 
exilic space is both a physical location and a space of cultural renewal and growth in 
which people explore possibilities for relationships which are not bound to wider 
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societal expectations and yet still recognised their location, both physically and 
culturally, within wider society. 
The concept of exilic space has been used to address a range of groups who sought 
to escape dominant forms of social organisation. With examples that range from the 
Cossacks, to Zapatistas, to prisoners exilic space has been used to highlight the spatial 
and structural exit from ‘acceptable society’ (Grubačić and O’Hearn 2016, 16) even 
though these groups remain embedded within wider society and often take part in 
its institutions and economy (ibid., 16). In this understanding, exilic space is both an 
escape from the state and an attempt to leave the hierarchical relationships of wider 
society of which the state is only one part (ibid., 17). The example of the Zapatistas 
highlights the attempts in Chiapas to create forms of social organisation and 
institutions which evolve from the needs and actions of the community, rather than 
ones imposed or imported from elsewhere (ibid., 111). The Zapatistas did not seek 
to battle capitalism, nor did they seek to act as a guide for others’ action, or to leave 
Mexico. They stood as a ‘lesson in dignity’ and ‘[…] [did] not want to monopolise the 
vanguard or say that we are the light, the only alternative, or stingily claim the 
qualification of revolutionary for one or another current. We say, look at what 
happened. That is what we had to do’ (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, quoted 
in Khasnabish 2012, 221). This approach was not framed as a direct opposition or 
attack on the state, but as a creative process through which other spaces could be 
created while still operating within the state. The Zapatistas sought to escape 
without leaving. 
Other uses of exilic space have been found in analyses of Occupy and the 
attempts, conscious or not, of people to create spaces for living and dialogue when 
in wider society spaces to live, and spaces to talk are so often divided off and require 
money to access (Mann 2012, 108-111). Occupy offered spaces in which groups were 
able to escape from state institutions and capitalism while still being embedded 
within them (Vodovnik and Grubačić 2015). In her study of Occupy encampments 
Mann argues that ‘caregetting/giving, learning, reading, talking, getting/giving food, 
communicating’ (ibid., 108) are all subject to increasing levels of privatisation which 
acts to increase our dependence on infrastructure which we have very little control 
over and struggle to afford. In contrast, Occupy camps became different spaces of 
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social and economic life which were premised upon practices of mutual aid and 
collaborative community building (Vodovnik and Grubačić 2015, 539-541). In Occupy 
camps people created exilic spaces by bypassing the financial logic of wider society 
and working collaboratively to supply food and drink through the encampment 
kitchens or healthcare provision through medical professionals donating their time 
and resources (Mann 2012, 109). In these analyses of Occupy the camps are not only 
understood as exilic spaces which stand apart but within the state, they are also 
explicitly understood as spaces in which anarchist forms of social relationships come 
to the fore. They are examples of anarchist principles of liberty, equality and 
solidarity, and can be understood through postanarchism’s emphasis on subject, 
action and relationships as attempts to not only relate to others differently, but to 
relate to ourselves as subjects in ways which are not predetermined by the state and 
its institutions. Furthermore, these exilic spaces can be understood as expressions of 
de Certeau’s tactics and spaces: moments seized and spaces created on an ad hoc 
and temporary basis which make use of the gap between production and 
consumption. Many Occupy movements used public parks and open spaces which 
were not originally intended to house temporary populations. 
A further important point to note about exilic space as an expression of de 
Certeau’s tactics and spaces is that it can be subversive without being oppositional. 
de Certeau reminds us that in playing in the gap between production and 
consumption we are able to subvert dominant forms of social organisation not 
through direct confrontation but through using these gaps for means entirely alien 
to the state and its institutions. Occupy is an example of this in the creation of a space 
which was based on free association and mutual aid underpinned by anarchist values 
of liberty, equality and solidarity, and the desire to constitute ourselves as subjects 
without the interference of the state. The link between exilic space, de Certeau and 
anarchism is made even stronger through a consideration of this notion of subversion 
without opposition. This can be approached in two complementary ways. 
In a chapter entitled ‘Anarchism Without Opposition’ Jamie Heckert (2012) 
captures this notion of subversion with a quote from the novelist Ursula K. Le Guin: 
‘To oppose something is to maintain it’ (Le Guin2012, Ch.11, Para.19). In the first 
instance, to define exilic space as anti-capitalist, anti-hierarchy, anti-consumerist, or 
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any other “anti” we might think of, is to bind exilic space to existing forms of social 
organisation, the state. This is not to say that being ‘anti’ or saying ‘no’ is not a 
desirable or powerful position to take, but it cannot be all. Paul Kingsnorth’s work 
One No, Many Yeses (2003) highlights the complexities of many social movements 
and groups which may share a similar ‘no’, anti-capitalism for example, but contain 
a plethora of ‘yeses’, each of which comes from the specificities and contexts of the 
group. To define and group these various movements as anti-capitalist is to curtail 
the diversity of positive positions, approaches, and responses to capitalism contained 
within them. Exilic space offers us the possibility to include ‘no’ whilst not being 
defined by it and enables the possibility of many ‘yeses’ without straightjacketing 
what those possible ‘yeses’ might be. What is paramount here is not to detach the 
‘no’ from the ‘yeses’, for ‘[j]ust as a no without a yes denies the possibility of life, a 
yes without a no denies the possibility of choice’ (Heckert 2010, 188). And so while 
the ‘anti’ contained in a lot of the ideas of exilic space are important and should not 
be forgotten, exilic space should not and cannot be reduced to them and defined by 
them. Once again we can see an example of this in practice in the various Occupy 
movements. Occupy had no overarching claims, each Occupy encampment and 
movement grew out of a myriad of local, national and international concerns, and 
while most did criticise capitalism and the state, to stop our understanding of Occupy 
there would be to lose the diverse range of positively framed responses from groups 
around the world, none of which necessarily shared a vision of what Occupy was or 
what it was specifically fighting for. We are reminded of Subcomandante Marcos’ 
statement ‘This is what we had to do’ (Subcomandante Insrgente Marcos, quoted in 
Khasnabish 2012, 221), and in Occupy’s case “this” was different for each 
encampment. 
Once again we return to the complex interplay and tension between direct 
opposition and indirect subversion first addressed in this thesis through Newman’s 
critiques of identity politics. I argued above that while we are right to be cautious of 
direct opposition because of the possibility of contributing to ever greater practices 
of government, we would be remiss to deny the gains from direct opposition. The 
example of Occupy and the Zapatistas, and Kingsnorth’s work in One No, Many Yeses 
add to this complexity. While groups often posit a position directly against neo-liberal 
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capitalism, one “no”, doing so does not necessarily guarantee the continuation of 
neo-liberal capitalism. Indeed, the varied and creative responses of different groups, 
the many “yeses”, highlight the possibility of maintaining a direct opposition to neo-
liberal capitalism whilst simultaneously practicing forms of indirect subversion in 
ways and means entirely alien to it. Groups and individuals navigate the tension 
between the dangers of direct opposition as warned by Newman, Heckert, and Le 
Guin, and the need for creative subversive responses captured in the work of de 
Certeau and Gray. Direct opposition and indirect and alien subversion are not 
mutually exclusive, nor are they strategies in de Certeau’s use of the term. They are 
instead better approached as tactics, the use of which is influenced by the fleeting 
and ad hoc nature of the situation one finds oneself in. This links back to Franks’ 
understanding of anarchism and the different emphasis placed on different 
elements, whether that is the environment, subjectivity, or myriad other concerns. 
Anarchist theory and practice can be understood as the ‘particular response of 
particular subjected groups in a limited historical context’ (Franks 2011, 169). Those 
particular responses might engender direct opposition or indirect subversive action, 
but to predetermine the action in advance through the denial of either would be to 
deny the complexity of theory and practice established throughout this thesis. This 
necessary complexity and nuance of subversion without opposition is captured in the 
second exploration of position/opposition explored below. 
In the second instance, attempts to define exilic space in dichotomous terms of 
position/opposition acts to solidify thoughts and possibilities within mental 
boundaries and borders. Calling on Heckert once more we can follow his question, 
‘[w]hat new possibilities arise when we learn to cross, to blur, to undermine, or 
overflow the hierarchical and binary oppositions we have been taught to believe in?’ 
(Heckert 2012, 64). If exilic space is to be an area of creative possibilities in our 
relationships it is imperative that we think beyond the existing political and social 
frameworks to which we are normally beholden. This is connected to the term “exile” 
itself. Exile is always “exile from” and not “exile to” and this small linguistic change 
brings something vital to the concept of exilic space. To utter the term “exile to” 
requires the speaker to name a destination, an end point of their motion of exile, and 
yet to do so would be to curtail the very possibility that we are looking for in the 
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notion of exilic space. “Exile to” would establish the dichotomy we are keen to avoid. 
In contrast, “exile from” only asks the speaker to name their starting point, what they 
are trying to distance themselves from, leaving the process of exile free not only from 
a singular destination, but from any requirement of predictions about what is to 
come. As such, the notion of exilic space allows us to name a multitude of elements 
of existing forms of social organisation which we want to distance ourselves from 
while leaving our destination open. Once again we can turn to Occupy as an example. 
Occupy both as the loosely defined movement and the collection of individuals which 
comprised it, famously had no singular unifying end point. Each Occupy group 
consisted of a wide variety of people with a wide variety of motivations, and while 
many pointed to capitalism, strict hierarchies, or unequal economics as elements of 
the current forms of social organisation they wished to escape from, there was never 
a predetermined answer as to what the Occupy encampments should be. The forms 
of the encampments and the social relationships within them were formed in the 
moments of the interactions, not already decided upon. They were not constrained 
by claims to reach a certain end point and so avoided the from/to dichotomy.  
An exilic space is a space characterised by its creative possibilities, whether that 
lies in spaces to repair and recover from cultural slights, spaces to live, talk and listen, 
or spaces to escape from strict hierarchies and capitalist consumption. Central to 
these exilic spaces is their underdetermined nature which sees the expectations of 
dominant society distanced in subversive but not necessarily oppositional ways, 
opening possibilities for social relationships that are not bound to existing forms of 
social organisation. Importantly, each of these characterisations of exilic space are 
not areas outside our everyday lives but arise and operate within wider society; they 
are the spaces illustrated by de Certeau, the gaps between production and 
consumption. All of this work acts to open the idea of exilic space and the possibility 
of theorising the classroom as a space of subversion and transformation whilst still 
being embedded in the university. 
Exilic space offers us a way to theorise a classroom space in which social relations 
and the social change which can follow from them are not tied to pre-existing and 
dominant forms of social organisation. The notion of exilic space offers us a response 
to the limits of critical pedagogy as laid out in the previous chapters. My critique of 
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critical pedagogy began with its reliance on the state as the form of social 
organisation. Through critical pedagogy’s vision for the state as an entity of economic 
development and reform for equality I examined two important reoccurring concepts 
in critical pedagogy, democracy and critical citizen. Through these two concepts 
critical pedagogy weds its calls for social change to a continuation of the state. 
Through anarchism I argue that despite its claims critical pedagogy’s reliance on the 
state prevents it from offering a theory and practice of social change which can end 
oppressive practices. Far from offering us a response to neo-liberalism and its 
institutions of education, critical pedagogy plays at reform which ultimately leaves 
us ever more reliant on a form of social organisation which is premised on separation, 
categorisation, hierarchy, and the external definition of subjectivities. The state and 
its institutions act as a permanent and hierarchical imposition in the relations of 
people, operating to categorise, determine and shape individuals and society. In 
pursuit of an approach to education which does not contain the limits of the state I 
turn to anarchism as both a theory and practice for the freedom of individuals and 
society alike. 
The turn to anarchist education and the emphasis on the subject, action, and 
relationships leads to another critique of critical pedagogy: the context and 
relationships of the teacher. In critical pedagogy the teacher is presented in a fixed 
form as a transformative intellectual. Critical pedagogy lays out a clear understanding 
of what a transformative intellectual should do and how they relate to others, wider 
society, and knowledge. This form of relations is closely tied to critical pedagogy’s 
continued reliance on the state and revolves around teachers inculcating the values 
and practices of thick democracy in their students, aiming at the creation of critical 
citizens who are then able to hold power and authority to account and involve 
themselves in forms of participatory democracy. I argue that this fixed understanding 
of the teacher contributes to the tensions and difficulties many teachers face when 
attempting to translate the abstract work of critical pedagogy into their specific 
classroom contexts. Critical pedagogy’s unwavering understanding of the role of the 
teacher is not sufficient to help teachers deal with the multiple tensions and 
contradictions of their role, resulting in a sense of frustration. To address this I turn 
to Foucault’s work on care of the self, and suggest care of the self as an 
- 146 - 
understanding of the teacher and their role which does not define the teacher by 
their adherence to the abstract concepts and aims of critical pedagogy, but which 
locates them as an individual in relation with other individuals striving for the 
realisation of their subjectivity. Once again, this is wedded to anarchist views of 
transformation of the self and society in ways which are not connected to the state 
and dominant forms of social organisation. 
Building from the anarchist framework established so far this chapter has taken a 
more detailed look at how to enact anarchist relationships. Starting with the practice 
of everyday life and the possibilities which exist between production and 
consumption I explored la perruque as a tactic through which dominant forms of 
social organisation and the relationships they enforce can be subverted. In such an 
action spaces are created which are fleeting yet ripe with creative possibilities for 
other ways of being. The practice of everyday life was then coupled with the concept 
of exilic space to provide a deeper theorisation for the spaces created by la perruque. 
Exilic space is the creation of space within already established institutions, locales, 
and societies in which individuals and communities can enact forms of social 
organisation and relationships which arise from their own needs and desires rather 
than having such forms and relationships imposed from elsewhere. Once again these 
concepts were connected to anarchism as I showed the use of tactics and exilic space 
through the example of Occupy and highlighted the importance of subversion 
without opposition as a necessary part in the realisation of other social forms and 
relationships not tied to existing forms. 
These three chapters have come together to lead me to a consideration of my 
own teaching practice. While this thesis is a critique of critical pedagogy as I found it 
unable to help me address the issues of neo-liberal education I faced in Peru and in 
the UK, it is also a positive response. Realising that critical pedagogy could not help 
me to disentangle myself from neo-liberalism because it too seeks to give form to me 
as a subject through the identity of the transformative intellectual, I was looking for 
an approach which could, and found it in anarchism. In the previous chapters I have 
taken the reader through a anarchist critique of critical pedagogy through an 
examination of the state, democracy, the critical citizen, and the transformative 
intellectual. At each point I have argued that critical pedagogy predetermines social 
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change by fixing a form of subjectivity, a form of action, and forms of relationships. 
Along the way I have deepened anarchist calls for freedom as the subject’s 
autonomous practice through an examination of care of the self as self-governance, 
and the creation of spontaneous relationships through parrhesia. I have also 
developed anarchist understandings of the possibilities of autonomous practice in 
everyday life and the subsequent creation of exilic space in which external practices 
of governance are rejected and new forms of organisation and relationships arise. 
My aim in this project was to answer a series of questions, some concerning 
critical pedagogy, and some concerning my own practice: How radical is the social 
change called for in critical pedagogy, and how does it operate as a response to neo-
liberalism? How can we approach our own transformation without tying ourselves to 
predetermined understandings of thought and action? How can we envisage and 
enact an approach to education which does not predetermine forms of subjectivity, 
action, and relationships? And finally, how can I enact an approach to education 
which builds from anarchist understandings of subjectivity, action, and relationships? 
Chapters Three and Four have answered the first question, critical pedagogy is not a 
response to neo-liberalism. Chapter Four has also answered the second question. It 
is through processes of self-government and care of the self that we can approach 
our own transformation as subjects without predetermining our thoughts and 
actions. Chapter Five has given us an answer to the third question. We can enact an 
approach to education which does not predetermine subjectivity, action, and 
relationships by playing in the gaps between production and consumption and 
creating exilic spaces in which practices of government which give form to our 
subjectivity are distanced. What is left is the final question: how do I enact such an 
approach to education? It is my answer to this question which is the focus of the next 
chapter. As I wrote this PhD I was working in the highly constrained environment as 
described above, my project was about capturing my attempts at autonomous 
practice, care of the self, and the creation of exilic spaces through autoethnographic 
narratives. These narratives allow me to explore my attempts and the constant 
tensions arising from the institutional and student expectations of me as a teacher. 
There are eight narratives in total, each one dealing with a specific session taken from 
my second and third year teaching as a Graduate Teaching Assistant. They do not 
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capture moments of success or failure – to use such language would open me to 
accusations of predetermination which I am trying to avoid – they capture 
interactional moments as those moments which were particularly important in my 
development and (trans)formation as a subject. 
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6. Interactional Moments 
The task of this chapter is two-fold: first, introduce the context in which I was working 
as a Graduate Teaching Assistant, and second, the autoethnographic accounts of my 
attempts to enact anarchist autonomous practice as part of my teaching. 
When I returned to the UK from Peru, I first completed a Masters in Politics. It was 
during the MA that I began my engagement with critical pedagogy and my 
dissertation focused on the life and work of Paulo Freire. This interest soon turned 
into a PhD proposal, application, and finally, a position as a PhD candidate in Political 
and Social Thought. When I got my position as a PhD student, I was awarded a 
teaching scholarship which covered my tuition fees and paid me a monthly stipend 
for a period of three years in exchange for teaching four seminar groups per term, 
per year. I was now a student-cum-teacher which brought with it varying and 
overlapping identities and practices of governance, all competing to give form to me 
as a teacher and creating a highly constrained environment. There were two sources 
of teacher identity I had to navigate, one coming from the institution and the other 
from the students. 
Institutionally, my identity as a teacher was defined in part by the module I was 
assigned to teach and the module convenor I was working with. As a Graduate 
Teaching Assistant I was assigned to teaching on the basis of departmental needs, 
and in the first year of teaching had no say in what I could or preferred to teach. In 
the second and third years there was an allowance for personal preference. 
Alongside this, I had no input into the module structure or aims, the weekly content, 
or the reading the students had to complete. I was very much there to help in the 
delivery of someone else’s module, casting me in a strange position as a teacher. My 
role and the realm of action I had was defined by the module convenor, and had he 
decided to provide complete lesson plans to be followed each week, that would have 
been the action expected of me. I was lucky in this regard that the module convenor 
I worked for did not provide lesson plans for each of the seminars and so I had some 
flexibility around how I approached each topic. Beyond the module content and 
seminars, I was also subject to a number of practices of governance at an institutional 
level. Every term I was required to hold mid-term and end-of-term evaluations with 
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the students. The mid-term evaluations could be designed at my discretion or I could 
use a template provided by the module convenor. The end-of-term evaluations were 
conducted using a centrally supplied form on which students could score aspects of 
the module selected according to institutional targets, including my performance as 
a teacher. These end-of-term evaluations were then collated to draw comparisons 
across all modules within the school. The scores were reported in numerical form 
and also used a traffic-light system to highlight areas of concern or excellence. The 
institutional accounting for my practice did not stop with these evaluations as, in 
addition, my teaching practice was observed by the module convenor in one of my 
seminars each term. The observation process began with completing a form about 
what the observed session was going to be about, how it was going to be run, and 
how it fit with the module as a whole. The observation forms included spaces in 
which the module convenor and I would record our impressions of the observed 
session. These evaluations and observations aimed at ensuring that my actions as a 
teacher were in line with institutional expectations, and if not, could serve a 
corrective function. This is not to say that the evaluations and observations were 
punitive in their design, but that they both added to institutional attempts to control 
for my practice. These practices demonstrate that although I began teaching as a PhD 
student before the establishment of the TEF, the groundwork for the TEF was well-
laid. A further institutional practice to establish my identity as a teacher was having 
an ID card which was distinct from my student ID card. Not only was the design of 
the card itself different, it would allow me into different rooms on campus than those 
I could access with my student card. Rooms I required access to as a teacher had to 
be added via a centralised system and only upon receipt of confirmation from the 
administrative team in the school of politics that I did indeed need access to the 
rooms I was requesting. Through my teacher ID the institution was able to physically 
influence my movements and access. 
While these various institutional practices overlapped to give form to me as a 
teaching subject, I was also subject to the expectations and practices of the students 
I worked with. Neo-liberal practices of education, particularly in higher education, 
cast the student as a consumer of a product provided by the teacher. Various neo-
liberal practices reinforce this economic understanding of the student and the 
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teacher ranging from the focus on the employability of the student following their 
degree, to the importance of the National Student Survey in ranking the university in 
the higher education market place. These practices established my role as one in 
which I took on a responsibility to the students I worked with to provide them with 
an enjoyable and economically valuable experience. This impacted my identity as a 
teacher as there was an expectation in the classroom that everything we did built 
towards the end-goal of a high degree classification which could be exchanged for a 
high-paying job. It is a combination of these expectations of curriculum, teaching 
practice, and economic gain which condition my relationships with students from the 
outset when we enter the classroom. 
Together, the institutional expectations and student expectations of me as a 
teacher presented a highly constrained environment. I was given flexibility to teach 
only at the discretion of the module convenor, I was subject to accounting and 
observational procedures to ensure I act in ways which are congruent with 
institutional expectations, which are themselves influenced by student expectations 
of me as a teacher. To draw on anarchism, my subjectivity was given form through 
my identity as a teacher which was constructed through various practices of 
government. Simply denying the existence of these expectations would not be a 
sustainable response, and so all I could do was attempt to distance these 
expectations, roles and relationships incrementally throughout the eleven weeks I 
spent with each group. Critical pedagogy could not offer me a way to resist this neo-
liberal approach to education because it too sets out practices of government and 
identities which give form to and constrain my subjectivity. And so, I turned to 
anarchism and freedom as autonomous practice. 
Anarchist understandings of freedom as autonomous practice has repeatedly 
highlighted three areas: the subject, action, and relationships and these three areas 
form the framework for my autoethnographic narratives. 
The importance of the subject in anarchism lies in the subject’s, my, formation of 
myself through attempts to show the predetermined identities of the teacher and 
the student created by the institution as contingent and changeable. However, it is 
not as clear-cut as refusing one identity and forging another. I cannot escape my 
context as a teacher in a university, nor can I simply deny that others’ expectations 
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of me exist. Rather than establishing my identity along dichotomous lines of this and 
not that, the challenge I faced was how to fulfil the role of the teacher which came 
with institutional and student expectations, and at the same time remaining truthful 
to myself and my values in that role. At its core, it is the same tension I faced when 
working in the charity and university in Peru. What was particularly odd about my 
situation as a Graduate Teaching Assistant was that until then I had always been a 
student in this institution. I did my BA there, and then four years later my MA which 
led into my PhD. From the end of my MA in August to the start of my PhD in 
September I became a teacher in the institution alongside continuing to be a student. 
This added another overlapping identity and cast me in a strange hinterland between 
a postgraduate student and full staff member. 
Given these various overlapping identities the following narratives cannot be 
reduced to instances when I was me and instances when I was not me, but are instead 
instances which illuminate the constant tensions of the range of identities placed 
upon me at any given time in the classroom. There were numerous times when in 
attempts to form myself I relied on the identity constructed for me by others. A 
glance at such situations would write me off as a hypocrite and my actions as 
incoherent with my words, but doing so would be to deny the complexity of the 
challenges I, and many others, faced in an educational institution in which the 
formation of my subjectivity is a constantly shifting and overlapping of different 
identities in the context of my autonomous practice. Instead, these moments need 
to be unpicked and reflected upon to consider if there is another way I could have 
acted, another approach I could have taken. Only in doing this is it possible to engage 
in the process of self-(trans)formation through care of the self. 
In giving form to myself, I enter into a relationship to myself which is based in self-
care. Self-care relates to my attempts to continually account for, reflect on, and 
critically analyse my actions. This practice has no end-goal and is not about whether 
I fail or succeed to reach a certain formation of my own subjectivity. To do so would 
trap me in the determination of the subject, which is at the root of my critique of 
critical pedagogy. Instead, care for myself is about attending to my actions in a 
consideration of the extent to which they are my actions, rather than the actions 
expected of me by others. Importantly, care of the self is not a tool I enact or call 
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upon in my teaching, but teaching is part of my self-care. Teaching is an arena in 
which I am able to practice self-care through being open with others. This means 
being open to questions and challenges not only about the topics and my position 
regarding them, but about what I do and how I do it. In the context of my teaching it 
means being truthful about my faults and failures, and explaining the rationale 
behind the things I do and decisions I make. This relationship with the students is not 
entirely boundless as it finds limits in the topics we discuss in the classroom, but 
within these topics I am open to talk about myself and my position, if invited, rather 
than claiming a false objectivity and detachment. This invites students to engage with 
me in this process, questioning me and holding me to account for what I say and do. 
However, this is an invitation, not an imposition. My self care is not a demand on the 
students, but an offer. The students are also an element of my self care as I have a 
responsibility to care for them. This means offering critique of students, others and 
the world as part of my reciprocal responsibility. It means encouraging critical 
thought and establishing connections between themselves, their actions and the 
wider world. In this way, I maintain critical pedagogy’s desire for critical thinking, but 
rather than focussing it on a future-yet-to-come of a more democratic state, it 
follows the anarchist attention on the present. The critical thinking, which is a 
necessary component of care of the self and care for others, is not preparation for 
social change, nor is it a prerequisite for social change, it is social change. It is a 
prefigurative action which does away with means and ends and is concerned with 
now. 
To enact these relationships of self-care and care for others it is necessary to use 
parrhesia in my communications with students. I must be truthful and frank with 
what I say and how I say it. I cannot hide behind other people’s words nor can I speak 
with students in ways which mask what I am trying to say. Alongside this, I must be 
critical of myself and the students, pushing us all to a closer consideration of our 
actions and to reflect on how these actions are connected to wider issues. This 
criticism inevitably carries risks because no matter how well the students and I get 
along I could easily upset or annoy them with my probing and challenging. This risk 
extends beyond the immediate classroom interaction and introduces a risk at the 
institutional level. If the students are particularly put-out by my questioning and 
- 154 - 
challenging, this could be recorded in the mid- and end-of-term evaluations which 
are gathered centrally and would bring my practice to the attention of the institution. 
Finally, it is my duty to invite a relationship of self-care and the frank and critical 
communication of parrhesia. In practice parrhesia with students in a British politics 
classroom means questioning their assumptions and actions in relation to the topic 
of the week and challenging them to consider how their assumptions and actions 
regarding the topic impact on their understanding and the possibility for them to take 
different action. 
This process of questioning and challenging the students is closely connected to 
the importance of context, another element of critical pedagogy which maintains its 
influence in my teaching. The anarchist understanding of freedom as autonomous 
practice is practice now, and hence always concerns practice in context. In contrast 
to the context providing the basis for paternalistic empowerment and future social 
change in critical pedagogy, context in anarchism provides the starting point of 
autonomous practice (Heckert 2012, 71). Context in teaching about British politics 
means trying to connect the topic of each week to the lives of the students, which 
might be approached through starting sessions from students’ knowledge of a topic, 
or establishing this connection later in the session. Connecting the sessions to 
students’ knowledge and experience is easier with some of the topics than others. 
Most students have experience of general elections and even if they were too young 
to vote in the most recent election, they will almost certainly have been aware of the 
campaigns, the election itself and the result. It is also straight forward to make 
connections to the media, for example, through a discussion of the forms of media 
the students use and how they interact with media outlets. With other topics it is 
much harder to make these connections. Students rarely have any experience or 
starting knowledge of how the two Houses of Parliament work, or how the judiciary 
functions. In these cases, I need to find other ways to anchor the topic in something 
more relatable to the students. Sometimes this is easier said than done, and in three 
years of teaching I never managed to do so with the topic on parliament. 
There is a further carry-over from critical pedagogy which links to the 
methodology underpinning this thesis. Praxis, the interplay between action and 
reflection, was one of the central elements in Freire’s earliest work on critical 
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pedagogy. This interaction is also at the root of hermeneutics as developed by 
Ricoeur. It is through reading my practice as text that I was and am better able to 
understand the various identities which form my subjectivity and my responses to 
them. In order to select the moments used in these narratives, I first consulted the 
class notes I kept after each class. Over the two-year data gathering period I amassed 
nearly 40,000 words of class notes which gave me a starting point to pick out 
particular moments in the classes. When selecting these moments, I looked for 
instances which illuminated the tensions of working in a higher education institution 
and pursuing anarchist practices. With these moments selected, I listened to the 
recordings of those sessions to ensure my notes were an accurate reflection of what 
happened. Listening through the recordings also allowed me to re-visit the dialogue 
in those sessions and draw out the specific moments of practice which are important 
in the context of my thesis. This means that the narratives written here are not taken 
from a single group in a single year, but might represent the first class with one group 
from my second year teaching, and the fourth class with a different group in my third 
year teaching. These narratives are however arranged in a chronological order 
running from the beginning of term to the end. It is imperative that through these 
autoethnographic narratives I not only account for my actions in the moment but 
connect them to a reflection on being a teacher in higher education, and the 
theoretical work on anarchism, care of the self, and exilic space. Without the 
interplay of action, reading, and reflection the narratives run the risk of becoming a 
narcissistic endeavour in which I retell stories about my teaching rather than offering 
an analysis of a more general social problem in the specificity of my singular 
experience. 
Bearing the above in mind, there are several aims for these narratives. In no 
particular order, they are: a critical account of my own autonomous practice, part of 
an ongoing process of care of the self, an invitation to the reader to enter into a 
relationship of self-care, an example of the possibilities of self-formation, a 
cautionary account of the difficulties of competing identities, and a hopeful call to 
action. These narratives are all these things and more, or at least, that is the 
intention. Ultimately, as with any hermeneutic process and any autoethnographic 
account, readers will have their own interpretations of these moments.  
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Introductions 
I’m in my second year of teaching seminars on British politics, and this year I would 
like to audio record the seminars and keep class notes as part of my thesis. It’s the 
first class, although due to the way the seminars are structured it’s already the 
second week of term. With reading week in week five and a revision session in week 
twelve, a twelve week term quickly becomes only ten sessions, each being only fifty 
minutes long. We’re not going to be spending all that much time together, really. My 
heart is pounding as I make my way over to the classroom. I’m always nervous before 
meeting a new group, no matter how many times I’ve done it. Questions rattle 
through my mind: what if we don’t get on? What if I forget all their names? What if I 
forget what I’m meant to be doing? After a year teaching here and two years teaching 
in Peru you’d think the nerves would be gone by now, but they keep creeping up each 
time. I’ve been sitting in one of the campus cafes for the last few hours and it’s chilled 
me to the bone. The weak winter sunlight gives the illusion of warmth but not much 
else, and my left hand still looks a slightly unnatural colour as I clutch my coffee. 
Under my right arm I’ve got a box full of various materials that gets heavier with each 
step. Thud. Module outlines. Thud. Participant information sheets. Thud. Participant 
consent forms. Thud. Registers. Thud. Old text books. Thud. 
The purpose of today’s class is straight forward: introduce ourselves to each other 
and take a look at the module to come. Well, that’s what it’s meant to be. It’s also 
my first chance to set the scene for all of our classes to come. I’ve been practising 
how to introduce myself and my project to the students and I’ve run through the 
script in my head countless times in the last few hours. In spite of everything I’ve 
been reading and thinking about, I feel like I’m going into this blind. Maybe not blind, 
overloaded? There are so many moving parts to a class and I’m trying to think about 
them all from room layout, to where I sit, and from how I introduce the topic, to how 
I talk to the students, and all the while I have no idea what might actually happen. 
There’s a disconcerting uncertainty to how the students will react to me, to the 
project, to my request to record our sessions. 
Actually, that’s not strictly true; I’m well aware of how they will probably respond 
to my request for them to be included in my research. I need to audio record our 
sessions so that I can re-visit important moments later to enable me to write about 
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my practices as part of my thesis. There’s no other way for me to gather this level of 
data but to record it, as I can’t spend every session keeping notes. I can’t escape that 
in asking them to take part in this research I’m asking them from a position of power, 
and it’s unlikely they’ll say “no”. Granted, it may not only be because I’m a teacher, 
some may want to do it to help me out, some may be entirely ambivalent to being 
included in research, but there’s a good chance they’ll agree because of the power 
relationship which is established before any of us set foot in the classroom. Even 
then, agreeing to being included in the research is a different proposition to how they 
will react to me and my approach to teaching. It makes me a little uncomfortable that 
although I’m technically giving them a choice, it appears there’s little voluntary 
decision involved. All I can do is try and ensure that they are aware of what I’m doing 
and make it as clear as I can that they can decide to decline their participation. Adding 
another complication to this process is that I need to start the recording as soon as I 
can so that I capture as much of the session as possible, but this means asking them 
if I can record the session from the very start, and then going through the project 
information and consent forms. 
Walking into the atrium of the building I pause and try to remember where I need 
to go. The old colleges were built as original parts of the uni in the sixties, and if 
campus myth is to be believed, designed by a prison architect. The closed-in bare 
brick walls and the confusing layout make it hard for me to find my way round even 
after doing my BA and MA here. Turning to the right out of the courtyard at the 
entrance I wind my way down the stairs reasoning that if I can at least find the central 
internal courtyard, I can walk around it until I get to the right room. I did come here 
a few days ago to check the room out, but it doesn’t seem to have helped me 
remember a route to get there. Maybe by the end of term. 
Bottom of the stairs, turn left. I think this is right. An opening on my right and a 
few people standing by the double doors leading out into the courtyard. ‘British 
politics?’ I ask tentatively, hopefully. My right arm is killing me and I’m hoping 
someone can take either the box or my coffee so I can shift the weight. A few nods 
and one person who looks confused, looks at his watch, and hurries away. ‘Great’, I 
beam, ‘could you grab this for me please?’ gesturing to the coffee. ‘Cheers.’ I 
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gratefully haul the box into both arms while someone else holds open the doors for 
the few of us to pass into the room. 
Room layouts can have a huge impact on the class and it’s something I’ve become 
increasingly aware of. Some classrooms have banks of windows and high ceilings 
allowing natural light to enter and giving a sense of space. Others are not so well 
equipped and are bathed in the orange/yellow glow of fluorescent strip lights 
hanging within touching distance above your head. In my attempts to create an 
inviting space in each room, I open blinds or curtains to let in as much natural light 
as possible and, weather permitting, open windows to allow fresh air in. The layout 
of tables and chairs is an important physical aspect I can adapt and I want to take 
advantage of that whenever I can. Most rooms at the university are squares or 
rectangles of tables with an opening at the ‘head’ of the room, in front of the board 
and projector. Those that do not have an opening normally have a single table, set 
apart from the others and often used, and intended to be used, by the seminar leader 
in a clear indication of the traditional power that accompanies the title. Rather than 
rigidly adhering to the standard layout that places me as the focal point at the front 
of the room, I would like to rearrange the space in order to adapt it to whatever we 
are doing in class and to help to disrupt the expected roles we are to play as teacher 
and students. 
For most of our sessions a square or rectangle is the most useful layout. There are 
two advantages to organising the seating in this way. First, it opens the entire room 
to be used by everyone involved, challenging the notion that certain locations are 
somehow under the ‘ownership’ of the seminar leader. Second, it places each 
student within the eye-line of the others, facilitating face-to-face conversation and 
debate directly between the students, rather than them addressing their 
contributions to me, and then me, like a living echo, having to open them out to the 
class. Of course, that’s how I envisage it, but it could just as readily be read as a 
panoptic layout in which I can observe everyone at once, reasserting a hierarchy 
through a subtle policing of the space. Another advantage of starting from a square 
or rectangle is that it is an easy shape to adapt for different uses. At other times, for 
other tasks, other layouts might be more suitable: clusters of tables for small group 
discussion or face-to-face rows for debates. Each of these is quick and easy to set up 
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from a starting point of a square or rectangle, an important consideration when class 
time is short. How each of these layouts is understood and used by the students and 
I is influenced by how I act in it and this ties into another consideration of the room: 
where do I put myself? I always think of bell hooks and Ron Scapp when they wrote 
about how moving out from the front of the room to be amongst the students made 
a huge difference to how they interacted with each other. Rather than talking to the 
students from a position of control, moving around among the students makes me 
more accessible. Being among students means they are able to pick up on the way I 
move, the way I smell and myriad other details about me. I also always remember 
how unnerving hooks and Scapp found it, and how out of control they felt when they 
first did it (hooks 1994, 138). But I take inspiration from this, the classroom is the 
space in which I work, and that work cannot be reduced to intellectual labour. 
Institutionally, the expectation is that I’m at the front of the room, probably isolated 
by either a lectern or a table, and that’s probably the expectation of the students too 
given that they’re first year students and most will not have been long out of 
schooling. I know that sitting in a different place in the room isn’t going to be a 
panacea, but it is part of an attempt to disrupt some of the behaviours expected of 
me and gives me a bit of space to act differently. 
Thoughts of tables, chairs and seating are on my mind as we first walk into the 
classroom. These are strange rooms down here at the bottom of the college. 
Arranged around an inner courtyard they tuck under the floor above like galleries on 
a mountain road. The outer wall is full of large glass panes while the inner is the same 
bare brick as the rest of the building. Long and narrow they have the appearance of 
afterthoughts rather than purposely designed rooms, with the front dominated by a 
large TV doubling as a projector screen with a small white board tucked alongside. 
Two larger white boards fill the spaces in between the brick pillars that jut out into 
the room from the inner wall, making pinch points down that side of the table and 
rendering the white boards there unreachable. Although I remember having classes 
in one of these rooms during my undergraduate years in the mid-2000s, I’ve never 
taught in one before and I see it with different eyes. With the tables arranged in a 
long line filling the space there’s little room to move and wherever I’ll sit, I’ll be 
trapped, unable to move around. Moving has become an increasingly important part 
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of my teaching practice, not only for getting among the students as hooks and Scapp 
talk about, but so that I can be actively engaged with the students rather than setting 
them a task and sitting back to do nothing. It’s often in these moments of moving 
around the room to speak with individuals and groups that I get to know the students 
better and I think it helps to make me more approachable too. To be stuck in one 
position makes it much harder to build these relationships with the students. 
Mindful of wanting to remove some of the physical barriers which separate the 
students and me, I make the decision to take a seat along the long edge of the table 
by the inner wall. I’m reluctant to automatically sit at the ‘front’ of the room as it will 
put me so far away from people at the far end of the table: it must be five meters 
long. We’re not using the projector or white board today so there’s no need for me 
to sit isolated at the front. I’m unsure how the students are going to react to me not 
sitting at the front, and the first signs aren’t positive as the one student who had sat 
on the same side as me shuffles a few chairs to his left to move him round the corner 
to another side of the table. 
‘You don’t have to move’, I prompt as he’s half way through his shuffle. 
‘Oh. No, it’s OK, I’m fine here,’ he says gesturing to his new seat. 
It was said without malice and accompanied by a smile, so I don’t think it’s 
personal. I don’t blame him. I imagine I would have responded in exactly the same 
way if a seminar leader had sat only a seat or two along from me. As more people 
find their way into the room the seats to my left and right fill first, the short ends of 
the table, and then gradually the long edge opposite me. Those who are last to arrive 
are squeezing themselves past the other students and into empty chairs in some sort 
of contortionist act, all avoiding sitting on the same side as me. It feels like the room 
has simply re-orientated to make the front wherever I happen to be. We’ll see if 
things ease up over the next few weeks. It could of course be an entirely practical 
response, the students may all want to see my face throughout the session, and there 
are no doubt times when this is helpful for me too. But this comes from an approach 
to education in which the teacher is the focal point for the class, and this is one of 
the elements I’m trying to disrupt. 
Sitting in a different place is as unnerving for me as it seems to be for the students. 
I definitely feel exposed and disarmed without the normal props which accompany a 
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seat at the front of the room: the table, the whiteboard, the space to get up and 
stride about – something I have developed a habit of. I unpack all the materials, 
making separate stacks in front of me. Looking back, I wonder if this almost ritualistic 
placing of different documents in front of me acted as a way for me to rebuild a 
barrier which had been removed because of my choice of seating. Either way, my 
nerves are still sitting just under my skin. Coats are shrugged off and laptops taken 
out. I do a quick head count: fifteen people. Not everyone that should be here 
according to the register, but it’s almost five past the hour and I can’t wait for late-
comers. Time to start. 
‘Morning,’ I start, hoping to strike the delicate balance between awake and ready 
to go, and overly enthusiastic, ‘how’s everyone doing?’ I never really expect a reply, 
especially in the first week, so I just look out to hoping to catch a few nods of the 
head or even barely perceptible inclines. ‘First up, is everyone here for British 
politics?’ After asking at the door, it’s always worth double checking. Again, a pause, 
a nod or two. ‘OK, great. I’m Andy, I recognise some of your faces from the first 
lecture last week, and in a minute we’ll go round so we can all start putting names to 
faces. First up though there are a few admin bits that we need to run through.’ First 
few words done and it feels like the nerves are gone. 
‘Before we start I’d like to talk to you about my work quickly, as some of it involves 
you guys.’ I need to introduce the project right at the start of the session so I can 
capture as much of it as possible in the recording. By doing a brief introduction I’m 
hoping I can start the recorder now, as long as there aren’t any objections. This brings 
me back to the question of power and one of the most immediate tensions I face in 
the project. I want to disrupt the identities and actions of a teacher as established for 
me by the institution and the students, but in order to record my attempts to do that, 
I need the students’ permission. Securing their permission at the beginning of the 
term when we do not know each other and have no other relationship but teacher-
student relies very much on my institutionally derived power as a teacher so I am 
able to control the space, unilaterally decide that we are going to discuss my project, 
and go through the necessary ethics requirements. The irony isn’t lost on me as I 
launch into the speech I’ve been mulling over all morning, ‘…anarchism…, …teaching 
in particular ways…, …my position and role as a seminar leader…. As my work involves 
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researching my teaching I’d like to record our classes using this voice recorder,’ I 
scoop it from the desk and hold it aloft, ‘I’ll be keeping class notes that I’ll write 
straight after each class, but there’ll be stuff that I miss or forget about, so this is to 
help me. Before I turn it on, does anyone have any major objections?’ Nothing. I hit 
the record button and place the recorder on the desk in front of me. ‘Thank you, this 
is a huge help.’ 
I continue, ‘Over all of my teaching I’ll work with 100+ students this year alone. To 
include each and every one of you would be too much, so instead I’ll draw on a few 
interesting and specific moments to analyse in the project’, I explain to a sea of 
nodding heads. They seem to be following me so far. I scan the room for knitted eye 
brows or confused confidential glances to one another. The lack of either gives me 
confidence to carry on. ‘So rather than concentrate on a specific class, I’ll use a mix 
of bits from this year and next. No matter which parts I end up using, your names will 
be changed to keep you anonymous.’ I pause a moment and scan the room, ‘Does 
that makes sense?’ Most of the students nod. 
No one objected. Could they have? Not only are they facing my institutional 
identity as a teacher, they are also at the start of forming new connections as a group 
and there are issues of peer pressure at play too. It would have taken a very confident 
and strong-willed student to say “no” not only to me, but in contrast to their peers. 
To stand out and say “no” would risk being labelled as a difficult student, it would 
single them out. And if someone had said “no”? Well, I wouldn’t record the session, 
but I wouldn’t change how I teach. I’m not approaching myself and my teaching this 
way for the sake of the project. The project is an exploration of how I teach but it is 
not the reason I teach. Had this group, and all the others over the two-year period 
objected to my recordings of the sessions and not given their permission to be 
included in the write-up, I would have had to re-think the project, but I wouldn’t have 
stopped the thesis altogether. 
As part of the ethical requirements of primary research involving others I need to 
give out information sheets about the project and consent forms for the students to 
sign. This gives them the chance to indicate that the do not wish to be included in the 
research without singling themselves out in front of peers. Placing my hand on two 
stacks of paper in front of me, I carry on. ‘What I’ve got here is a short information 
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sheet giving a bit more detail about the project, that’s for you guys to keep, and a 
consent form with some tick boxes and a space for you to sign. I’ll leave the recorder 
running in each class, and if you are happy to be included in the write-up of the 
research, could you please tick the boxes next to the statements and sign at the 
bottom. If you’d rather not be included, that’s no problem, don’t tick the boxes but 
could you still sign the form please so that I have a record of it.’ I split the two piles 
of paper in two and start passing them to either side of the room. As people hand 
them out, I add, ‘If you agree now but change your mind later, that’s not a problem 
either, you just have to let me know and I’ll update my lists.’ A central part of 
informed consent is an element of ongoing consent. Up until a certain point in the 
research, normally the end of the data gathering, the participants retain the ability 
to withdraw from the research. All that’s required is a message to the researcher 
saying they no longer want to be involved. I hope a combination of the information 
sheet, the consent form, and me telling them, I can reassure the students that it’s 
not a problem if they don’t want to be part of the research, or if they change their 
minds later. As I said above, it would mean I would have to re-think parts of my thesis, 
but it wouldn’t change how I teach. 
The information sheet and consent forms are passed around. Some barely glance 
at either before ticking and signing, others are more obviously reading both carefully. 
‘Can I ask you something?’ Someone to my left. I look across and meet the eye of a 
student. I’m aware other people have stopped and are looking at us both. 
‘Of course,’ I respond with a bob of the head, ‘What’s up?’ 
‘You said you want to try and teach and interact with us using ideas from 
anarchism? Are you just experimenting on us?’ 
‘No, I’m not.’ I pause and quickly gather my thoughts. It’s a good question and 
more than anything I’m glad someone has reacted to what I’m asking them to take 
part in. I’m aware that my response, both vocal and physical, could set the tone for 
the rest of the term. 
‘There are two things I guess. First, whenever research involves other people it 
has to be reviewed by an ethics committee to make sure it’s up to the university’s 
standards. I’ve used well established ethical guidelines when thinking about the 
project, and it’s been cleared by the module convenor, my supervisor, and the 
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department’s ethics person.’ I’m not sure I can divert into an explanation of ethical 
details of autoethnography, anarchism and care for the self, it’s not really the time 
for it and I don’t think it would help right now either. 
‘Second, and perhaps more importantly, I have a responsibility as a seminar leader 
to help guide you through this course and do so in a way that means you get as much 
as you can from these eleven weeks. Not just in terms of British politics, but in a wider 
sense of learning and being challenged.’ I’m looking round the room as I say this, 
trying to address all fifteen faces in front of me, to explain my position and show the 
type of response they’ll get if they want to question me. ‘Each of your seminar 
leaders will teach in a particular way, and whether they consider it or not, there will 
be assumptions about learning, teaching, their role as a seminar leader, your role as 
a student, and what-have-you, and these assumptions will form a large part of how 
they teach. What I’m trying to do is make my own assumptions clear to you and me, 
and consciously account for them, and challenge them.’ 
‘So, no, I’m not using you as some helpless guinea pigs!’ I add with a small laugh 
which is thankfully echoed by some of the others in the room, including the student 
who asked the question. ‘Does anyone else have any questions?’ I ask, keen to keep 
this question and answer process going. 
‘Does anyone else listen to the recordings?’ someone else asks. 
‘No,’ with a shake of my head, ‘these are for my use only, and once the project is 
over, they’ll be deleted.’ I look around the room with what I hope is an inviting look, 
‘Anything else?’ With no one forthcoming it looks like it’s time to move on to some 
of the other things that we have to cover in this first class. I thank everyone for their 
time regardless of whether they’ve given consent to be included in the write-up or 
not. While introducing the project and the recording I have relied on my authority as 
a teacher but, I am hoping that the process of explanation, and more importantly, 
the questions the students have asked me, will have softened that slightly and point 
the way for our interactions to come. What’s becoming apparent is that this really 
isn’t either/or. While anarchism starts from the assertion that we are free as subjects 
to form ourselves through autonomous practice which rejects the identities created 
for us externally, it’s not that straight-forward. When I walk into that classroom, I 
bring a lot of identity “baggage” with me no matter what I do. I can choose to take 
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control of my own formation, but in doing so I add to the medley of competing and 
overlapping identities. The question then becomes how I can try and carve the space 
for autonomous practice, while still having to satisfy the requirements of the 
institution. No matter what else I do, I still have a responsibility to the students to 
help them through the module, which means covering the content laid out for us by 
the module convenor and in the order he has decided. It comes down to how I do 
this, and the almost continual transitions between different identities. 
We spend the rest of the time going round the room getting to know each other 
a little more. Most of the people in the class haven’t had classes together before, so 
it’s a good chance for us to learn names. I ask students their names, why they’re 
doing the course, and then a question about them, whether that’s connected to the 
course, to uni more generally, where they’re from, or what they do when they’re not 
studying. As they answer I take mental notes about who says what, who’s happy to 
respond and who is more reluctant, who is listening to others and who is not-so-
subtly using their phone or laptop for something else. Every now and then I re-cap 
their names out loud for my sake as much as others; I’ve found that it helps me 
remember them and picture their faces. I ask them to look at the module outlines 
and see what weeks catch their eye? I ask them if there are particular exercises from 
other seminars that they found interesting or useful? Or that they would rather 
avoid? This is part of my attempt to decentre the expectations of me as a teacher 
deciding in advance what tasks we’ll do with which weeks. By opening the how of the 
classes to input from the students I hope to create a collaborative space in which we 
all contribute to the learning process. I began doing a bit of this in my first year of 
teaching, but I was never quite sure how to integrate the students’ suggestions. It 
felt a little like I was back in the university in Peru where I wanted to try something 
different but wasn’t sure what or how. In my first year teaching I wanted to involve 
the students but I couldn’t quite work out how to do that, or how to make use of 
their input. As I got further through that first year, I got better at it, and now at the 
start of my second year I’m more confident that I can actually make use of their input 
and show them that I’ve listened. 
It’s coming to the end of the class and I thank everyone again. Bags are packed in 
a rush and people file out of the door. I put all the materials away and make my way 
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upstairs ready to have one of my office hours. It’s unlikely that anyone will come to 
see me so early in the term so the hour of quiet gives me a chance to write up my 
first impressions of the class while they’re still fresh in my head. I know that no one 
action is suddenly going to do away with the tensions of being a teacher in higher 
education and approaching my teaching practice through anarchist relationships of 
care of the self and others, but I think today may have set the tone for the term. 
Looking back on the session as I write this narrative I’m struck by the different 
competing elements, including those coming from within me. I’m reminded of 
Heckert (2013) who argues that the state is a state of mind, and the anarchist 
argument that we internalise and subscribe to the practices of government which 
give shape to our subjectivity. When we do this we become ever more reliant on the 
identities presented for us and it becomes ever more difficult to refuse them. To a 
certain extent, having spent many years of my life in educational institutions on both 
sides of the lectern, I have internalised what it is to be a teacher in the institution, 
even if I’m now trying to shake that dependency off. When I teach this inevitably 
involves some of the institutionally expected behaviours just as it involves behaviours 
of my own which are unaccountable within existing practices. And so I find myself 
returning to Heckert’s ideas regarding anarchism without opposition (2012, 71), and 
adding my own twist: what if I start from accepting everything as it is, and then ask 
myself what can I do? How can anarchy be nurtured? How can I learn to be gentle 
with myself when I realise I’m drawn to external practices of government which 
shape my subjectivity and hold me in their grasp? These are questions I kept 
returning to over the course of the following years. With the beauty of hindsight, I 
realise that I kept falling into a dichotomy of ‘I can’t be that teacher, I’ve got to be 
this teacher,’ which is only ever going to end in failure and disappointment. I think I 
realised this as I went through my teaching practice over the two years following this 
session and I got better at accepting the idea of doing what I could in the moment, 
regardless of what I should be doing according to institutional or student 
expectations. In light of this, I have thought of something I could change when asking 
for the students’ consent to include them in the write-up. Consent is something 
which is ongoing, and participants have the right to withdraw from the research until 
the data gathering finishes, but the onus is placed on the participants to speak up 
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and say they no longer wish to be included. Given the issues of authority and 
hierarchy at play in the classroom this is just as unlikely as someone initially saying 
“no” when I ask to turn on the recorder. To try and remind the students of the option 
to withdraw, I could have checked at the beginning of each session if anyone wanted 
to withdraw, or perhaps give, their consent, and I could have reminded them that 
they need to let me know in the moment, but could e-mail me if they prefer. A rolling 
reminder that I was doing the project, happy to talk about the project, and that it 
was OK to change their consent may have helped to reinforce the students’ active 
participation and their ability to say no if they wished. 
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Drawing 
‘Morning all.’ I choose a seat at random and pull a few notes and the register from 
my bag. It’s a clear bright day with light flooding into the room. This class is in one of 
the newer rooms on campus which has a lot more space and tables on wheels, it 
makes the whole thing easier to move around and adapt for different activities. At 
the moment everything is set up in a large rectangle with a gap in the middle. It’s 
nearly time to start so I pass the register round and have a quick chat with those 
nearest me, but still avoiding the side of the table I’m sat on. It gives me a chance to 
try out my memory of their names: ‘How has your week gone, Kieran?’ Picking 
someone I’m confident won’t mind responding. He tells me a little about the week 
and that he has an interview for a job at one of the campus cafes later. By the time 
we finish it’s time to start and it looks like all that are going to arrive have. 
Today is our first lesson of content in the course where we look at British politics 
in a very broad sense to help establish the political framework of institutions and 
groups we’ll be looking at over the rest of the module. The reading the students have 
been asked to do sets out key features of the British political system like the electoral 
system, the division between the Commons and the Lords, the role of the judiciary, 
etc. and compares them to other European countries. In my first year teaching this 
course I got the students to list the key features and explain them in more detail as a 
way to make sure they had done the reading and everyone was starting from the 
same knowledge base. After doing this last year I realised that there was such 
variation in the class regarding prior knowledge of British politics and that the task 
was either rehashing old knowledge for some or making quite a leap for others. 
The variation of students in the classroom is something I’ve had to learn how to 
deal with in the module. Some of the British students come straight into their first 
year of undergraduate studies having just completed an A-Level in British politics, 
which can often be as much of a hindrance as a help. Some of these students come 
to the module assuming they already know what they need to know to get through 
the module, which can mean they don’t necessarily engage with the reading or the 
module as a whole. Others attempt to dominate the class through their previous 
knowledge. Other British students come to the module not having studied British 
politics before, but having picked up on bits and pieces through the news. Aside from 
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the British students, the university and programme attracts a large number of EU and 
international students. Many of these students have never studied British politics, 
and their pre-existing knowledge is mainly the product of international perceptions 
of Britain through media outlets. This creates a diverse range of students and 
backgrounds which makes assuming a base-level of knowledge about British politics 
very difficult to do. 
During the first year of teaching I read about the work of Paul Donnelly and John 
Hogan (2013), two lecturers in Irish politics who used freehand drawing as a way to 
introduce the subject to a diversity of students. Their aim was to use freehand 
drawing to introduce a more complex and critical approach to the study of politics by 
illuminating the multiple ways a topic could be understood even from within a fairly 
small group of people such as a course year group. Inspired by this, I took on their 
ideas and transformed them to work better in my context of much shorter sessions. 
Rather than simply putting together a list of similarities and differences between 
British and European political set-ups, we’re going to begin by trying to get a better 
understanding of how each of us sees British politics and what we already might 
know about it by drawing pictures. There are many advantages to using drawing in 
this class near the beginning the course. In the first instance, it’s a very effective way 
to decentre the classroom, removing the focus from me as the teacher and placing it 
on the students’ knowledge of the topic. This engages the students as active figures 
in the collaborative construction and direction of the session, as their drawings will 
form the basis for the following discussions. This challenges the notion that it is only 
me as the teacher who should determine the content of the session. Another 
advantage to using drawing with such a mixed group of students is that, as it is non-
vocal, it is something all students can engage with at the same time, regardless of the 
level of their previous knowledge and their level or confidence with spoken English. 
This can help to level the room by putting all the students at the same starting point 
of a blank piece of paper and an open-ended request to draw British politics however 
they think of it. Granted, there can be a difference in the confidence of the students 
in drawing, but the task is set out in such a way that the focus is on the content of 
the drawing and not about making any aesthetic judgement. A bonus of using 
imagery, and pulled over from Freire’s earliest education programmes, is that it 
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enables a distance between the students and their ideas. If they were to respond 
vocally, there would be a series of responses which are much harder to capture and 
then reflect upon. By starting with a drawing, students are able to adapt and 
elaborate their response as they go, and are then able to take a step back at the end 
and see if what they have drawn matches what they were initially thinking of. This 
element of capturing the response also enables students to compare and contrast 
their responses with one another with greater consideration and complexity, as they 
are not required to respond immediately and to a single specific point. 
All of these elements come together to help disrupt the identities expected in the 
classroom. It’s no longer on me as a teacher to provide content, and beyond that, it 
gives the students an active role in shaping what and how they learn. With this, the 
students cannot only be passive consumers of information, they must step into the 
space created and take part in the collaborative responsibility for the class. Yes, I’m 
still using my position as a teacher to establish some of the boundaries for the class, 
and I’m still directing the overall course of the session, but the student-led generation 
of content encourages an environment of joint responsibility in which we all come 
together around a common topic in order to increase our individual and joint 
understandings. The drawing task encourages the creation of an exilic space in which 
I don’t have to be controlling and the students don’t have to be passive. We can each 
be something other than those identities. 
‘OK, does everyone have a piece of paper and a pen or pencil? If not, I have some 
spares here.’ People scramble around in their bags and share spare sheets of paper 
and pens. Everyone looks at me sitting with my own paper and pen in front of me. 
‘I’d like you to draw British politics.’ There’s a wave of confused and disbelieving 
faces. ‘I know it might sound strange, but trust me, there’s a point to this. What do 
you think of when you think of British politics, and can you draw it?’ 
I ask the students to trust me, but on what grounds? We’ve only known each other 
for a few weeks. Actually, what the words ‘trust me’ really mean in this context is, 
“trust that I’m a teacher with a professional responsibility to guide you through this 
module, and no matter how odd this task might seem, it forms part of a wider 
attempt to engage in discussions around political engagement,” but ‘trust me’ is a 
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simpler short hand which relies on the unspoken identification of me as a teacher 
and all the institutional power and responsibility which comes with it. 
‘Seriously?’ Pete asks. 
‘Yeah. Give it a go. I’ll do one too. They don’t have to be masterpieces, just draw 
what you can. Stick men are about the limit of my artistic abilities.’ 
A few rolls of the eyes. A few sidelong looks to each other. A few shrugs. And a 
few who just get started. ‘Let’s have about three minutes,’ I add. Pens meet paper, 
mine included, and a quiet descends on the room. I draw out my own piece, although 
it does feel a little like cheating, as I’ve done it several times this week already and it 
feels rehearsed compared to the more spontaneous responses from the students. As 
much as anything I don’t participate in the task to generate more content but to show 
the students that I am actively participating in all parts of the seminar including the 
seminar tasks. I hope that this approach contributes to the disruption of the generally 
expected teacher-student relationship in which the teacher sets a task and students 
complete it. To put it more positively, I hope that my active participation in the tasks 
I’m asking them to do helps to level some of the hierarchy of the class and introduce 
a more reciprocal relationship. 
It only takes a minute for the first peals of laughter to erupt as they catch sight of 
each other’s drawings. I look up smiling and see that others are too. More laughter. 
Another minute more and it looks like everyone has finished, so I ask some of the 
students to move their chairs to the empty space in the middle of the tables so that 
groups of about four students can see each other’s drawings and talk easily together. 
I ask them to explain their drawing to the others in their group and to look at what 
others have included and what their perspectives of British politics are. I give them 
some time to get started before I get out of my seat and manoeuvre into the empty 
space in the middle of the tables. Another advantage of doing the drawing exercise 
is that it gives me a chance to interact with the students in smaller groups, talking to 
them in more detail and getting a much better sense of who they are, what makes 
them comfortable, what makes them uneasy, or even at a more basic level, if they 
have a shortened form of their name they would prefer me to use. It all helps me 
understand them better as people in the classroom space, as well as bridging some 
of the assumed distance between seminar leader and student. I make my way to a 
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group with one of the foreign students in, Yadong from China, and squat down next 
to the table. Yadong was very quiet last week and I’d like to see if he’s more 
comfortable talking in a small group. 
Beth has just finished talking about her drawing and answering a question from 
Nathan about a strangely proportioned Houses of Parliament. Yadong is the next in 
line. Shyly, and fixing his eyes on me, he pushes his drawing forward: it’s more 
abstract than others, with a circle in the centre labelled ‘Britain’ and a series of other 
circles at different distances around it with the names of other countries on. ‘What 
is it?’ Asks Nathan. He’s softly spoken and has a way of asking questions without 
being intimidating, so he’s a good person to ask the question of the reticent Yadong. 
Yadong explains, to the page at first, and then gradually to others in the group and 
me, that when he thinks of British politics, he thinks of it primarily in terms of Britain’s 
international position. The other circles represent countries which he thinks Britain 
has influence over, and the closer they are on the page, the more influence Britain 
has. Everyone has something appreciative to say, none of us having thought of it from 
that perspective before. It certainly seems like Yadong is more comfortable talking 
to a small group than he is to the entire class and I’ll have to remember this over the 
rest of term and make sure I don’t put him on the spot. Knowing a bit more about 
how best to approach Yadong in future, I move on to another group. It’s only later 
that I realise this was a really important moment for Yadong, that collection of 
students, and me. They organised themselves, prompted and asked questions of 
each other, and supported Yadong through his reticence. I was there, briefly, and I 
joined the conversation but only as an aside not as a focal point. Although Yadong 
looked to me at first, my presence didn’t suddenly mean everyone deferred to me, 
instead they looked to each other for support and answers, taking on the 
responsibility of their own learning. Another demonstration of why the drawing task 
can be so helpful in attempting to create an exilic classroom. 
I shuffle further round the table and chat to another group who are part way 
through looking at Sabi’s drawing, another circular design. Sabi is in the middle of her 
explanation so I just wait at the side and listen for moment: ‘…and then round the 
outside, at a distance, is everyone. Like us.’ Barbara, another member of the groups 
looks up and fills me in, ‘The centre of the wheel is London and the Prime Minister 
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and ministers, and spokes are the things that connect us to them, like voting, and 
parties and stuff’. Sabi nods in confirmation of Barbara’s summary. 
‘That’s really cool. I’ve done this exercise with lots of different people over the 
years, and no one has ever drawn it like that.’ Looking at Sabi, she smiles. A little like 
Yadong, she was quite quiet last week, but seems to be more comfortable opening 
up in a smaller group. I make another mental note. 
While Yadong and Sabi’s are certainly more abstract, others include more physical 
elements in their drawings. It’s fairly common for students to draw the Houses of 
Parliament, the Queen, non-descript politicians (often wearing top-hats), and money. 
Rather than the objects themselves, it’s often the placing on the page and the 
suggestion of the relationship between these elements and everyone else, ‘like us’ 
as Sabi said, which is most interesting. Sabi’s drawing is particularly unusual in its 
circular design. Most drawings place politicians and the Houses of Parliament at the 
top of the page, with the Queen off to the side almost as an afterthought. Everyone 
else is then drawn a lot smaller and as a crowd at the bottom of the page. These 
drawings are always accompanied by comments from the students which are highly 
critical of politicians and supportive of notions of popular organisation. It always 
makes me wonder if the students realise the critical stance they represent in their 
drawings, that their approach is a critique of a form of social organisation based on 
the hierarchical position of those who represent and direct the state apparatus. I’d 
love to have the chance to explore some of these ideas with them but we don’t have 
the time. While I think it’s important for me to spend time talking with the groups 
and engaging with what they’ve drawn it’s a long process and I’m conscious of the 
limited time we have in class and the need to connect these drawings to the module 
as a whole. 
While most people take to the drawing task, even after some initial confusion, and 
end up relaxing and sharing their work with thought and consideration, some don’t. 
It turns out Az is one of those. He was vocal last week, but not in a chatty open way, 
more of a speaking-for-speaking’s-sake way. He’s in the next group round from Sabi 
and Barbara, and is busy holding forth about his drawing. As I move over, he stops 
and launches into an explanation of an image in which he crudely names politicians 
from certain political parties as a joke. ‘Right.’ I say as impassively as I can muster. 
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Determined to try and get something deeper than “All politicians are idiots” from 
him I ask if it’s just UKIP and Tories that he’s represented? Or does he think all 
politicians are the same? And why is that? He’s silent for a moment and I can’t tell if 
it’s because he’s thinking about an answer or because he has no idea what to say. 
‘I don’t know,’ he replies. 
‘OK. I was hoping for a little more really. I know I said that the drawing could be 
anything, but there doesn’t seem to have been much thought in this. Try and think 
about what it is that makes you think this about politicians? I’m not saying you should 
like them, but if you want to make a statement about something try and back it up 
with an argument.’ It feels like there’s an edge to my voice which might betray my 
annoyance. I’m not sure I’ve handled this particularly well, but I was caught totally 
on the hop and it seems like the only way to respond from within the tangle of not 
wanting to disregard his position entirely, and wanting to challenge him to think 
through his position in a bit more detail. I want to push him to think more about his 
drawing but that doesn’t seem to be getting us anywhere as he just stalls and doesn’t 
know what to say. 
My desire to challenge him stems from care of the self and care for others: he 
should be able to account for his drawing and his thought process behind it. Not 
challenging him to reflect on his position doesn’t get him, the class, or me any further. 
Challenging Az isn’t just about Az, it’s showing the class that they need to be ready 
to explain their positions. It’s the first time I can remember when I’ve felt this thrown 
during the drawing task and it’s disarming. There’s always a sense of giving up control 
with a task like this and I have to accept what the students produce and try and work 
from there, which inevitably involves needing to respond on the spot to whatever 
they come up with, but I was unprepared for Az’s drawing and response. I’m trying 
to think back to other times there has been this approach to the drawing, one which 
reduces the task explicitly to a joke, rather than using humour as part of a considered 
response. Maybe it’s that which bothers me about Az, it looks like he took the chance 
to make the task about making a joke first, and connecting this to British politics 
second. I know that I invite uncertainty with the drawing but I trust that the students 
are mature enough to take it seriously, and he hasn’t. This sort of response is always 
a possibility: I opened the space for Az to respond to the prompt, and he did exactly 
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that. More than that, he behaved in a way which was unexpected for a student, which 
is part of what I’m hoping for in our classes. What triggers such a negative response 
from me is that he then can’t expand on his answer. Ed offers to talk through his 
drawing and, consciously or not, lifts me out of needing to go further with Az. 
As the class continues we go on to link elements of people’s drawing to key 
features of the British political system that they’ve read about as part of their 
preparation, helping to lay some of the groundwork for the weeks to come. Overall, 
apart from the moment with Az, the class seems to have gone well. The drawings 
have helped us all to talk to each other on a more conversational and equal footing 
while still covering the necessary content. Hopefully with that the class has been a 
demonstration to the students for the ways in which they can shape their own role, 
and by extension, themselves, in the classroom. They don’t have to be passive 
recipients, nor do I have to be controlling. 
Revisiting this session as I write my thesis I can’t help but wonder if the drawing 
was an exercise through which we created an exilic classroom. Exilic space is space 
in which practices and identities, and with that, relationships, are created which are 
not imposed from outside the space itself. By this definition we did create an exilic 
space on that day, however fleetingly. Yes, it clearly took my institutional position as 
a teacher to get things started, but what developed from there was the result of 
eighteen people in a room interacting with one another on a topic they had come 
together to learn about. The moment with Yadong is a great example of this. 
Everyone in the group was listening to each other and Nathan recognised that 
Yadong needed a little encouragement to open up. In response, Yadong stepped into 
the space created for him and began to talk. Despite my presence the group 
continued talking with them and their drawings as the focus. We were fulfilling the 
institutional requirement to learn about British politics but did so in a way which the 
institution could not account for. This was an act of la perruque, an act of playing in 
the gap between what and how the university expects us to be in the classroom, and 
what we actually make of that space through our own actions.  
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Engagement 
This week is all about political engagement. The lecture and the reading focussed on 
how engagement has changed over time and what the links between trust and 
engagement might be. The aim of the seminar is to look at the changing nature of 
engagement and talk about why citizens’ engagement with politics might have 
changed. Both the lecture and reading gave lots of suggestions of ways to engage, 
ranging from the more traditional ways like voting and party membership to the 
more recent developments in engagement like signing online petitions. At the end of 
last week I asked the students to think about how they engage, leaving the options 
deliberately open to see what they would come up with. I’m not sure how many of 
the students will have been old enough to vote yet, and I imagine that most of the 
British students would have been sixteen or seventeen at the time of the last general 
election in 2015, so I’m hoping that we might get to hear about some of the more 
recent forms of engagement and aspects which haven’t been included in module so 
far. 
We all file into the room and take seats. There’s not a huge amount of space in 
here and the tables are standing quite close to the walls in the attempt maximise the 
capacity of the room, but they are arranged in a square which leaves an open space 
in the middle where we can move around. I take a seat at the side of the room 
opposite the door so people don’t have to try and squeeze past me. No one takes the 
seats either side of me, but no one is actively avoiding me or the side of the table I’m 
on like they did in the first few weeks. The room size and shape help here as the room 
is so small that there is little choice but to sit closer to me. 
Once the clock hits five-past, we get started. I ask about different ways to engage 
and toss a pen to Mark who’s sitting next to the small whiteboard in the corner of 
the room so he can write up the responses. For this first part I’d like to get as many 
ideas up as possible, then we can revisit them and ask about the ways the students 
themselves engage. Compiling the list first gives the students a reference point for 
the discussion about their own engagement and perhaps brings up options they 
hadn’t considered before. As the suggestions come forward, I can see Pete scowling 
at some of the less conventional ones like online petitions, and even protests. We’re 
in our fifth class together and I have a bit of an idea about each of the students now 
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and can gauge who responds to a prompt, who works well in a group or who will 
speak up no matter what. Pete definitely falls into that final category. Not one to hold 
back, I know when he’s ready to comment on whatever is causing him to scowl, he 
will. I haven’t commented on any of the suggestions yet and I haven’t really needed 
to as everyone is directing their inputs to Mark. 
As the flow of suggestions winds down, for which Mark looks very grateful, I pause 
for a moment just to look over what’s there on the board. Everyone else is either 
looking over the options too or is busy copying them down in their notes. These first 
five minutes have given us a huge amount to work with. 
As the next step, I’d like to make a connection between what they’ve read and 
heard about political engagement in the lecture and their own actions and 
experiences. ‘OK, so given this huge range of ways to engage with politics, what do 
you lot do? How do you engage?’ By taking the question of engagement and 
focussing in on them we can make a bridge between the wider social world and their 
personal lives and prompt all of us to reflect on our actions, a vital element in 
relationships of self-care and care for others. By connecting the topic to our actions 
and discussing those actions with one another, we create a space as an invitation to 
others to enter into relationships of self-care through accounting for and being held 
to account for our actions. I would like to give the students the chance to listen to 
each other, reflect on their positions and question each other’s and their own 
positions. I hope that this will help to create a relationship between the students 
which goes beyond merely using the other to increase one’s knowledge. When we 
stop, listen, and discuss, the other becomes someone with whom we enter a 
reciprocal relationship in which we learn from each other and about ourselves. What 
I would like to avoid at this point is the discussion turning into a pursuit in which we 
simply list the different ways in which we engage, and demonstrate that we all 
engage in politics in some form or another. Instead, I am more interested in talking 
about the changing nature of engagement and questions of trust in politics. 
‘I voted.’ Malikah says to me, and then to the rest of the class, ‘I live in a safe seat, 
so I know it doesn’t really make any difference, but I voted because I’m a woman.’ 
I know Malikah from last year, she’s back to repeat the year after things didn’t go 
according to plan last time. I didn’t see her too much in the classes last year, but 
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when she did come she always came across as someone open to conversation and 
debate. I weigh this up as I try and make a quick decision about whether I can push 
her on this point. I have trouble with the argument that being a woman automatically 
means you should vote and I don’t think the answer the women died to get the vote 
is necessarily a convincing one. 
I decide I can at least try, ‘Why does being a woman mean you should vote?’ 
‘Women died to get me the vote, I shouldn’t waste it.’ There’s a definite 
defensiveness here and other women in the class are nodding along in agreement. I 
know I have to tread carefully to be able to challenge the idea without being 
overbearing or patronising. It would be too easy for me to shut down a discussion 
from my position as a teacher and a man, and I need to watch my language, tone, 
and response. A miss-spoken word, an emphasis in the wrong place, anything which 
could be construed as a dismissal of Malikah’s point. This is part of the risk which 
comes with criticising and challenging others and there’s no way to avoid it. 
‘OK, but women have died for different political causes all over the world, is it just 
voting that you identify with?’ I’m worried for a moment that my use of the word 
‘just’ will be seen as belittling. There’s a definite chance that I’ll alienate and annoy 
Malikah and others in the class. It’s only in listening back to the session I realise that 
I got distracted from her point about voting. Rather asking her to think through in 
more detail about why she connects being a woman and voting, I’m drawing her off 
into questions about why she doesn’t engage with a host of other actions, but this 
isn’t what she, or I, was really getting at. 
‘What do you mean?’ 
‘Well, women fought for the vote and died for it, but at the time that was them 
taking radical action to put themselves on a more equal footing with men. That was 
several generations ago now, are there actions you could take now to continue that 
movement for radical action? Or was getting the vote enough? Sorry,’ I apologise, 
‘I’m not deliberately being an arse, I’m just interested.’ I hope it’s clear that I’m not 
trying to attack Malikah, I just want her, and others, to think about their position. 
‘No, it’s OK.’ I let out I silent sigh of relief. ‘I guess I never thought about it,’ 
continues Malikah, ‘I think I just always thought that I should.’ 
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A couple of people shift slightly in their seats, balancing on the edge of speaking. 
I don’t say anything in an attempt to leave the space for someone else to voice their 
opinion. I’m conscious that this has been an exchange between Malikah and me so 
far. The pause is a split-second. 
‘Voting is the only thing that counts anyway,’ interjects Pete before anyone else. 
‘Voting is the only way to make a difference, and because people don’t trust 
government, they don’t vote. That doesn’t make sense. They should vote if they want 
to change things.’ It appears that this is what Pete has been holding onto so far in the 
class, and why he seemed so negative towards many of the suggestions of 
engagement. 
‘Look,’ he continues, brandishing two graphs that he’s printed out from the 
lecture, ‘trust has gone down, voting has gone down, so we have to say that 
engagement has gone down.’ 
Those who looked like they might speak a moment ago have settled back into their 
chairs. Pete has just introduced a lot of points at once and I’m not sure which way to 
go with it. Do we follow on with the statement that we should vote because it’s the 
only way to make a difference, or do we explore the connection that Pete has made 
between trust and voting? I decide for the connection between trust and voting, as 
there’s an essay question on it, and I’m wary of people making the same correlation 
between trust and engagement without being careful about what they are actually 
referring to. Students in other classes have already made the same spurious 
connection so I’ve had versions of the conversation before now. I try and explain that 
what the graph about trust might be able to help us explain is any changes in why 
people engage, but it can’t tell us if they engage or not. 
‘No,’ Pete responds belligerently, ‘it can tell us about engagement because if 
people don’t trust government, they won’t vote.’ 
‘No,’ I try keeping my voice level but I think there’s an edge creeping in, ‘what if I 
really distrusted government and so I wanted to get them out of power? Or, going 
the other way, I really trusted government and was happy just to sit back and let 
them continue?’ 
Addressing the rest of the room as well as Pete, ‘You may want to argue that 
voting is the only engagement that counts, OK, that’s an argument you can make, 
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whether I agree or not doesn’t matter. But trust alone can’t be a measure of voting 
as engagement.’ 
‘OK, so how would you argue that engagement has gone down then?’ Delivered 
dripping with challenge. 
‘First up, make it clear what you mean by engagement, and why that is. In your 
case, Pete, it would only be voting. Then try and find some specific turnout figures 
from somewhere, as we’re talking about British politics, you could look at local, 
national, and even MEP elections as examples of voting. Then you can say, “Voting is 
engagement, here’s data that shows voting is decreasing across different types of 
elections, and so engagement is going down.” You just have to leave aside the trust 
part.’ I finish with a shrug. 
Pete looks at me. A pause. He nods, ‘OK, yeah. That makes sense, I guess.’ 
We carry on talking as a class about various types of engagement, voting included, 
and how things have changed over time, how we might account for that change, and 
how we might engage more, should we choose to. Our conversation takes us from 
party politics, to single-issue pressure groups, to online campaigns. Nearing the end 
of the class, Victoria, who until now has been very quiet, casually throws a sentence 
into the conversation, ‘I’m going to run for the SU election. I think I’d make a good 
President.’ I glance at the clock and it’s five to the hour, time to finish. I can’t believe 
that she only told us now, or maybe it was deliberate as there’s no time left to talk 
about it. ‘I can’t believe we’ve run out of time, but I’d like to hear more about it next 
week?’ Victoria nods and packs her bag along with everyone else. 
Sitting down to write up my class notes later I’m not sure what to make of this 
session. We drew out some of the links between ourselves and society, particularly 
with Malikah and her approach to voting. Although Pete’s interjection cut this 
conversation slightly short, we did begin to link personal action to larger social 
questions which is an important part of reflecting on how we act. It would have been 
good for others to add to the conversation, and it looked as if some were about to. 
Although we weren’t able to continue the discussion in depth I hope that it got 
people thinking about voting and their reasons for doing so. I’m trying to think if I 
would do anything different when I’m next in the position of challenging a student, 
but it’s hard to second guess. What does come through on a second reading of the 
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class notes and listening to the recordings is that I didn’t articulate my position 
regarding voting, and so it was hard for me to challenge Malikah constructively. It 
comes across as a personal response to the link between voting and being a woman, 
a link that many people make and a conversation I’ve had with others before, but 
such a quick and unconstructive response masks my difficulty with the argument. It’s 
not that there is a conflation between being a woman and needing to vote because 
of this, nor is it about the gendered element although I’m very conscious of being a 
white male challenging a woman about voting. It’s that in the recourse to voting 
because of the history of suffrage people often do not then consider the act of voting 
itself. I’ve had conversations similar conversations with male students in the past 
who vote because the UK is a democracy and people died in the World Wars to keep 
it that way. Male or female my problem with the argument is the non-critical 
acceptance of the act of voting. There are parallels here to my time in Peru, 
particularly in my work with the charity where we were teaching the children the 
rules to play in a crooked game. Without considering voting beyond the historical 
narrative, either through the suffragettes or the World Wars, students stop at the 
acceptance of voting and representative democracy as an unquestionably desirable 
act. I think this is why I had such a reaction to Malikah and really felt like I have to 
push her, so that all of us in the class could take a closer look at our actions and our 
interactions with society. But this didn’t come across in the moment. 
Looking back, there were elements of parrhesia in my interactions with Malikah. I 
was having a frank and honest conversation about her reasons for voting and that I 
find her argument ill-thought-out. In pushing her, and being critical of her 
explanations, there was a real risk that I would end up offending her and others who 
shared her position in the class and shutting down the chance to talk, and risking 
future conversations. Frankness, truth, criticism, risk, four of the five characteristics 
of parrhesia. Duty? Well, I certainly felt like I had to challenge her, but I was aware of 
the danger of doing so. Parrhesia would mean a duty no matter what, and indeed 
risk is an unavoidable element, but when in the context of the classroom it is not as 
clear-cut. In bringing parrhesia into the classroom I have to be careful as there is the 
necessity for an ongoing relationship between the students and me until the end of 
term. Both parties walking away from the relationship is not an option when we still 
- 182 - 
have six or seven weeks to go. We’re institutionally bound no matter what for the 
duration of the term. Where some modules may have more than one seminar leader, 
for British politics I am the only one, it isn’t possible for a student to join another 
group. This places an unavoidable constraint on parrhesia in the classroom as I need 
to constantly balance challenging students and maintaining a relationship which 
enables us to work together. This does not mean refraining from speaking the truth 
to students, nor necessarily limiting what I say, but it does mean being aware that 
when I am frank and challenging, there is more at risk than our one-to-one 
relationship and that there are other intervening factors. It’s not that this is an 
either/or situation, but there is a point at which challenge could irreparably damage 
a relationship which has to be maintained. 
The conversation with Pete was an interesting one. He tends to be quite 
combative and I find it hard to judge how to respond. There have been a number of 
times in the last few weeks when I’ve had to intervene in group discussions as it 
sounded like he was brow-beating another student. I don’t know if other students 
have any difficulties with his approach. I know it gets my back up and I can’t help but 
see it as the assertion of dominance on his part, so I need to find a way to address 
the points he’s making without putting up my own combative front. I think what I 
struggle with is that he is over confident without seeming to have thought through 
his point, and then when he’s challenged he tends to double-down rather than listen 
to what others say. I wouldn’t be doing my job, nor would I be inviting relationships 
of self-care if I didn’t respond to the errors in Pete’s challenges and assertions, but I 
need to find the most constructive way to do that. By pushing back in an equally 
assertive way I think all I would achieve is to set us at loggerheads, and that won’t 
help either of us understand the other’s position or learn from it. 
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Miserable Sessions 
It’s 1pm on a Friday and my third class in a row: I’m exhausted and hungry. I know 
the timing is nothing more than a consequence of timetabling, which is no doubt 
done by algorithms based on class size, etc., but the impact it has on our class is very 
real. Running from room to room and session to session is incredibly draining and I 
can feel myself slowing down already. The next group always gets a bit of a bad deal 
as I can never say I’m truly at my best by the time I get to their class. I’m tired, and I 
can’t think as quickly as I would like, which means I find it hard to string their ideas 
and points together and present the students with challenges and invitations to 
develop ideas and points they’re making. When I feel that tired, I’m much more likely 
to repeat what I’ve just done in one of the previous two classes rather than focusing 
on the group in front of me and think about what will work best for them. Another 
knock on is that I sometimes forget what I’ve said in which class and to who and I get 
worried that I’m going to repeat myself over and again in this third group. This group 
is quite talkative and in a way this enables me to set off a task and then sit back. 
Usually and thankfully, these students organise themselves and discuss the topics 
with very little prompting. Their engagement makes the classes easier despite my 
tiredness. How we get there might not be great, but the result is that I’m rarely 
fulfilling the institutional role of a teacher providing content and knowledge, and the 
students take on a lot of the responsibility for the sessions themselves. 
It’s mid-way through the term and miserable weather hangs over campus. It’s not 
that cold really, but it’s the kind of weather that feels like it reaches deep inside you. 
The kind of weather that no amount of layers keeps out. I’m early to the class and for 
the first time this term we need the lights on in the room. There’s been a class in here 
before us and the room has that close, musty smell of wet bodies and warm radiators, 
condensation fogging up the glass. Despite the cold, I crack open a few of the 
windows to try and get some air in the room and take a seat away from the radiators 
which have a furnace-like intensity. 
People start to head in. I try and rouse myself with a few cheery ‘hellos’ and start 
to chat with one of the students about how his new job is going, but his usual 
buoyancy is not there today. He replies with a few short answers and it’s clear he’s 
not really in the mood to chat. Casting a look at the others coming through the door 
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cold and wet none of the faces look like they want to chat, and I doubt mine does 
either today. Coats are shrugged off and the blue glow of laptop screens adds to the 
fluorescent white-yellow of the strip lights giving everything and everyone in the 
room a sort of washed-out pallor. It’s five past the hour and we should be starting, 
but the room is surprisingly empty, only eight of us in all. It’s hard to not take the 
turnout a little personally. Despite knowing that we get on well as a group to see only 
half the class in a session mid-way through term is disappointing. This isn’t the only 
class to have such a low turnout, some of the other classes this week had a low 
turnout too. I ask if anyone knows about other students who are on their way or are 
held up and I’m met with a few deflated ‘no’s and shakes of the head. Sometimes 
when the numbers are this small it’s worth holding on a few minutes to see if 
anymore head in, but it doesn’t look like this is going to happen today. 
Today, we’re talking about different electoral systems, particularly contrasting the 
Single Member Plurality system of the UK with more proportional forms. As a topic 
it follows nicely on from the week before when we talked about political 
engagement, with the voting system of national UK elections being touted by many 
in the class as a key reason for people disengaging. The lecture gave more detail on 
how the two different systems work, and some of the material on the reading list 
gave great examples of different countries’ electoral systems and issues around the 
topic. What I would like to do today is to ask the students to debate the relative 
merits and drawbacks of different electoral systems with one part of the class arguing 
for reform and the other part arguing for keeping the system we have. Considering 
the assignments at the end of the term, I’m hoping that alongside consolidating their 
knowledge about electoral systems, this will also provide some practice in 
constructing arguments and supporting them with academic data.  The essay for this 
module is due on the very last day of term but as all the submission deadlines are 
staggered, this means their first essays will be due in in a few weeks. If we don’t start 
addressing some of the skills they need to demonstrate in the essay now, they’ll be 
swept along with their other assignments and it will be harder to do so later. They 
will either stop coming to class because they are working on their other assignments, 
or their attention and engagement in class will drop off. At the beginning of the week 
I e-mailed the students and asked them to prepare for a debate on the merits and 
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drawbacks of the two different voting systems, allocating people to a position on the 
basis of their surname, which was the only way to ensure that we don’t end up with 
a room full of people arguing for the benefits of a more proportional voting system. 
Given the low turnout today there’s no guarantee that we won’t have ended up with 
that divide anyway. Although the debate task has worked well in the past with other 
groups, it really needs a good number of people to work and hopefully eight students 
will provide us with enough different ideas and arguments for a lively discussion. 
The room is one of the bigger ones in an extension to one of the original college 
buildings. There’s plenty of space in here to move around and with only eight people 
it feels cavernous. People shuffle around and organise themselves into their 
respective groups on each side of the tables and I reach over to put a chair in the gap 
in the middle so I can speak easily with both groups. It comes out at five for reform 
and three against, a reasonable balance of the sides. 
They start with a few minutes to gather their thoughts as a group, think about the 
key points they want to make, and how they might argue against points coming from 
the other side. Where normally conversation would have picked up quite naturally 
by now, today it’s faltering. The group against reform are quietly talking about a few 
ideas, the other group is as good as silent. I wait a moment to see if they start of their 
own accord but there’s a lot of staring at notes and screens and not a lot of talking. I 
catch someone’s eye and move over. The stilted response to my suggestions of points 
they might want to consider feels like pulling teeth as I resort to trying to take them 
step by step through constructing an argument. This is tough today. For all of us. I’m 
reluctant to give them all the answers, but what do I do if they’re not prepared to do 
the debate? At the moment I’m not sure if they’re not prepared as in they haven’t 
done the reading, or not prepared as in they’re not willing to discuss. Without much 
conversation it’s hard for me to get a sense of whether it is the one or the other or 
indeed both. 
I try and think of other ways to approach the topic but I’m drawing blanks. Could 
I run through some of the key points first? No, particularly not now I’ve given them 
the task and got them started. Perhaps I could make the two groups switch sides and 
have them defend the other position? It might force them to think a bit more about 
the stances? No, given the mood in the room I’m not convinced that will work any 
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better. Could I scrap the debate altogether? But what are we going to do then? Part 
of me thinks I should just end the seminar now and save us all the remaining forty 
minutes of slogging through this, but I don’t think that would go down well with the 
students, or anyone else at the university if they found out. Unsure of what best to 
do I resign myself to the debate. 
After a few minutes I check in with the other group arguing against reform, and 
when both sides reluctantly say that they’re ready I take a seat and invite those 
arguing for reform to open the debate. The apathy in the room hasn’t lifted and it’s 
a lifeless back-and-forth of different points with little engagement or connection 
from one point to the next. I’m dulled as well today, and it really isn’t helping. 
Whereas normally I might be able to string the different points made together, 
nudging the opposite side to think about their responses and trying to keep some 
sort of momentum going, today I just can’t. My thinking is slow and rather than 
helping to move the debate on it’s like I’m a side-line spectator watching it lurch from 
one side of the room to the other and back again. 
It doesn’t take too long for the groups to look like they’re winding down and 
rapidly running out of points to make. I decide to change tack. ‘Ok,’ I interject, ‘it feels 
like this has run aground a bit, so how about if you step out of your assigned 
positions. Do you think the voting system should be changed?’ I’m hoping that by 
bringing it back to them we might be able to inject some life into it. Surely, they have 
an opinion on this? Nearly everyone does. If we can get started with their opinions 
maybe we can then tie these back to the evidence they’ve got from the reading. 
Silence. 
I’m waiting. Once again unsure what to do. I don’t mind silence when I can see 
that people are forming an answer, but this is an awkward silence which lingers. 
Silence certainly has a role to play and as part of embracing uncertainty in the 
classroom. I’m normally perfectly comfortable to let a silence sit undisturbed in the 
middle of a room. Silence can give people time to think and if I clamour to fill that 
space with a reformulated question or my own answer or explanation it shifts the 
responsibility for the space and session entirely back onto my shoulders. The 
students have a role to play too, and silence can give them the space to play it 
(Forrest 2013). But this isn’t that kind of silence. 
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Eventually, one student offers his opinions, and then another adds hers and the 
class seems to find a little more rhythm with ten minutes to go. The class ends and 
we all exchange sympathetic looks as we pack up our things. We all seem to know 
that this has been a far from ideal class, and quite unlike any other class we had in 
the term so far. Coats on, umbrellas ready, and people file out back into the mist. I’m 
drained. This was an archetypal “bad class”, no conversation, no engagement, no life. 
In my reluctance to fall into simply repeating elements of the lecture, re-transmitting 
what I thought the people should know, the class stumbled from one point to the 
next. I take solace in hooks’ reminder that creating an engaging space can’t be done 
by force of will on my part alone. hooks (1994) reminds me that the classroom is a 
communal space which necessitates a collaborative effort from all involved. If 
students are resistant during a class, I can’t force them to participate as to do so 
would be to force my own understandings and concepts onto them. I have to give up 
notions of controlling the space and open myself to the uncertainty of what will arise 
from the group itself. Today, my force of will wasn’t there anyway. I was in no 
position to try and shape the task differently. 
I wonder what I could have done differently. Revisiting the session in my notes 
and recordings gives me a distance to the event, and actually, I think there’s plenty I 
could have changed. In the first instance, it would have helped to have gone through 
some of the key points of each of the electoral systems as a whole class first. I’ve 
done something similar before with other topics and I’m not sure why I dismissed it 
during this class. It might have broken up the flow of their conversations while they 
were preparing their debate positions but there weren’t any conversations to break 
up in the first place; that was precisely the problem. Adding some of the key features 
to the board would have given the students a reference point to start from, and 
would have helped me to see if they had done any of the reading. Not having done 
the reading wouldn’t have been the end of the world, but knowing that would have 
at least allowed me to address it and help the students get started. The debate itself 
could also have been set up differently. Doing a structured debate isn’t necessarily 
something the students know how to do. I know I’ve never done one with them and 
I don’t know if they’ve done one in another class. Because of this, I really think I 
should have provided more of a framework: how structured debates function, the 
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point-response process, the need for opening statements, etc. Without this 
introduction I threw them in the deep-end and expected them to swim. Providing 
this structure would have helped us take a better look at constructing arguments as 
part of the debate preparation which, hopefully, would have carried over into their 
assignments. I’m cautious of planning a class too tightly and not allowing sufficient 
space for the students but leaving it entirely unbounded like it was in this session can 
be disarming and counter-productive. 
There’s nothing to say that had I done these things in this particular session it 
would have been any different. There was something about this day and we all 
seemed to be absolutely drained. Ultimately, I think this bad session helped me. In 
going back over my class notes this session really stood out as a difficult one, and it 
has forced me to go back through it and try to unpick why it didn’t work. In giving up 
some of the control in the classroom I introduce a large degree of uncertainty, which 
comes with the risk that days like this might occur. I don’t think the response is to try 
and strive for or create certainty about the classroom space, the relationships, the 
direction of the session as doing that would be imposing myself and my ideas on the 
students, running roughshod over their contributions to the class. But that doesn’t 
mean I can’t work to try and create a space in which this uncertainty can be used 
creatively by all of us. Sometimes that won’t work, and today was a good example. 
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Role Play 
I’m quite nervous walking up the hill to campus today. Each term that I teach, the 
module convenor has to come and observe one of the classes, and today is the day 
we’ve arranged for this term. Each observation session is accompanied by paperwork 
for both me and the module convenor. The observation form focuses on how the 
session is delivered rather than broader concerns with the development of my 
teaching practice or innovation in the techniques used. It is separated into sections 
which capture the immediate and short-term gains for the students and asks what 
the aim of the session is, how it fits with the rest of the module, and how I plan to 
deliver the content. The observation form, in fact the entire observation process, 
strikes me as a largely bureaucratic exercise which perfectly demonstrates the 
institutional understanding of my role as a teacher and reminds me of Readings’ 
(1996) and Rolfe’s (2013) work on excellence in the university. Readings, and Rolfe 
following him, argued that universities have been increasingly corporatized and are 
now operating as businesses which sell products. In order to promote and sell 
themselves to their consumers, the students, universities use a range of accounting 
procedures to capture what they, and their staff, do and hold these actions to a 
standard of excellence. The difficulty with the notion of ‘excellence’ as a standard is 
that it’s an ambiguous term which has no fixed meaning and one person’s idea of 
excellent teaching could be entirely different to another’s. Part of the process in 
establishing and accounting for excellence is the assessment of staff performance 
through observations like mine today, and student feedback mechanisms like mid- 
and end-of-term reviews and the much maligned National Student Survey. This sense 
of the observation as a bureaucratic and governance process is further reinforced by 
the module convenor’s approach. He seems to view the process as a technicality, 
although I’m unsure whether this is because he has seen me teach in the previous 
two years, or because he sees this as an arbitrary institutional requirement. It could 
be both, of course. 
Today’s class is about the role of the judges in British politics and focuses on the 
judges’ status as unelected position holders. In the lecture, the module convenor 
introduced some of the basic information about the roles of the judges and the main 
arguments for and against an elected judiciary. In tandem with a bit of reading 
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everyone should have a good grounding for the class. If not, it’s not the end of the 
world as I’m planning to do a role play with the students which everyone should be 
able to take part in with a bit of preparation time in class and some of the supporting 
materials I’ve prepared. I tried the role play for the first time last year and it worked 
well as a way of addressing the topic in a dynamic and interactive way. Assuming we 
don’t all clam up in the module convenor’s presence, I hope that it will result in a 
lively discussion today. Last week I let the students know that the module convenor 
would be there today and reassured them that he was there to observe me, not 
them, hoping that being forewarned they won’t be too nervous, if they’re nervous at 
all. 
I’ve learnt from other sessions over the years that when handing over the control 
of the seminar to the students I cannot simply let them get on with it but have to 
provide some sort of framework to guide them. This does not mean putting limits on 
what they can do with the seminar, but creating an entirely blank space in the past 
has sometimes been a disarming and overwhelming experience for the students. I’m 
also aware that, observed or not, this seminar needs to discuss the role of judges in 
British politics and I do have a responsibility to both the institution and the students 
to make sure we do this. The question then becomes, how best to create a space in 
which we can satisfy institutional requirements and student requirements but still 
offer space in which the students and I can behave in ways which we determine for 
ourselves, rather than falling into patterns of behaviour and relationships which only 
satisfy institutional expectations of consumer-provider, or critical pedagogy’s critical 
citizen and transformative intellectual. The answer for me, today at least, is to 
establish a classroom space which deliberately replaces these roles with different 
ones. In this instance, the roles put into that space are only loosely formed and leave 
plenty of scope for the students to make of them what they will. It’s an interesting 
class as it carries a great deal of uncertainty for all of us. I’m not sure what the 
students will do with the roles, what arguments they’ll make, or even how long the 
role play will last. Sometimes, if a group hasn’t taken to it, it’s been over within 
minutes, at other times groups have really stepped in to the different positions and 
I’ve had to draw it to a close so we could make some connections between what 
they’ve just experienced and the reading they’ve done. The students know nothing 
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about today. I haven’t told them about the role play or asked them to prepare for 
specific positions as it’s always a bit hit-and-miss who will turn up. It’s no good having 
a well-prepared judge if she’s not in class. 
Based on the real-life trial and eventual deportation of a foreign national wanted 
in his home country on terrorism charges, the role play allows us to explore the roles 
of various sectors of British society, and in particular the tension between the 
decisions of an unelected judiciary and the will of an elected government. In the real 
case the accused successfully appealed the first deportation attempt with judges 
ruling that it would be against his human rights for him to be deported. This caused 
an outcry with some members of the public arguing for his immediate deportation, 
and the Home Secretary at the time agreed, appealing the decision. Other members 
of the public and human rights groups argued for the original decision against 
deportation to be upheld. The conflict between the judges and the Home Secretary 
brought the question of an unelected judiciary to the fore, which makes this example 
an excellent case study for the purpose of this session. Exploring the topic through a 
role play can ground the issues surrounding the judiciary in the concrete actions and 
decisions of the participating students and enables the students to assess the 
arguments from various positions. For our purposes today, I’ve set up five roles for 
the students to take on, the judge, the accused, the government, a human rights 
group, and the public. The judge is a ‘free’ position which means that whoever takes 
on this role will need to direct proceedings and make a judgement at the end. The 
accused and the human rights group will be arguing for the accused not to be 
deported, while the government will be arguing in favour of deportation. The public 
is a group which can decide their stance as they go along, and in fact, the individual 
members of this group do not need to agree with one another. Apart from these 
initial positions I have not prepared any more input and do not intend to take part in 
the role play unless things go off course. 
I spot the module convenor on the way to the classroom and we have a quick chat 
about the lesson. He’s looking forward to seeing how it plays out. So am I, although I 
don’t say this out loud. There are a few people in the room already and the module 
convenor pulls up a seat inconspicuously in one corner. I sit down and have a quick 
chat with some of the students. Alongside the brief role descriptions the students 
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can take, I’ve also prepared two short handouts. One is a shortened copy of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the other is a timeline of the real case 
the role play is based on. The timeline stops on one side of the page at the point at 
which we’re running the role play and the remainder is on the reverse side for the 
students to follow up in their own time later. I hand out a copy of each to everyone 
and a spare set to the module convenor. 
‘So, we’re going to be doing a role play today, which means you guys need to 
choose your roles! Who wants what? We need a judge, an accused, a government, a 
human rights group, and a public.’ 
Adam snaps up the role of judge before I can finish my sentence. Sally surprises 
me by offering to be the accused, and Mark and Barbara firmly stake their claim to 
the human rights group. Malikah, Pete, and Jack join forces as the government. Sabi, 
George, and Nathan settle as the public. Everyone shifts tables and chairs to make 
some space for themselves and the groups huddle together to discuss the positions 
they want to argue. Each group can use the European Convention on Human Rights 
to help them prepare their arguments, and some have laptops and phones they start 
using to get other ideas. As they start to discuss their positions, I move around the 
room chatting to each group to make sure they’re OK with what they’re meant to be 
doing. I’ve forgotten the module convenor sat in the corner. After a quick chat with 
Adam to make sure he’s happy with his role and understands that, for a large part 
how the class unfolds will be up to him, I retake my seat out of the way but from 
where I can see everyone. I make sure a pen and paper are within easy reach to note 
down the flow of the session should we need to return to anything or connect points 
with a bit more detail later, and then, with a natural lull in the conversations in the 
groups Adam theatrically clears his throat. 
‘I’d like to bring the court to order and get this hearing underway,’ he starts. ‘You’ll 
each have the chance to lay out your positions in opening statements of no more 
than three minutes, and then I’ll ask questions of you as I see fit, and allow you to 
cross-examine each other.’ 
Whether this is how a court room functions or not, Adam has taken on the role of 
a judge without a moment of hesitation, and everyone else responds in kind. I watch 
as the room transforms and people take on characters quite at odds with what I’ve 
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come to know of them throughout this term. Sally becomes loud and eloquent, 
stringing together an impressive opening statement and getting very creative with 
her use of the European Convention, demonstrating quite a change from her normal 
quiet demeanour. Barbara is assertive and confident in challenging the government 
position of deportation, taking the lead in the group when I would have assumed it 
would be Mark who is quietly and confidently feeding advice and arguments to her. 
Malikah, Pete and Jack certainly are a formidable government presence and are 
presenting strong arguments based on the European Convention. The public is in 
slight disarray, arguing amongst themselves as much as with the other positions 
about the right things to do, with Sabi strongly standing ground against deportation 
and George arguing fiercely that Sally should go without a delay, a position I have no 
doubt he does not personally believe in. And Adam sits at the front keeping track of 
it all, calling on people to elaborate points, or questioning them in more detail. 
Laptops and phones are out on the desks, but rather than the sometimes obvious use 
to check social media, each time today is to add research or an example to a point 
they want to make. 
Throughout the weeks we have spent together so far, I’ve tried to let go of the 
idea that I am a teacher there only to provide information, to confirm student 
knowledge, and to prepare them for the essay, all parts of an identity which 
establishes and reinforces a strict separation between teacher and student. This 
separation creates an instrumental relationship between teacher and student in 
which the teacher is knowledgeable and is there to take the students through the 
module, contributing towards the end-goal of a degree for the student and a higher 
chance of employment success. The same criticism is applicable to critical pedagogy, 
which envisages the teacher as a transformative intellectual who teaches students 
how to become critical citizens in order to reach the end-goal of a more democratic 
society. In line with postanarchism, I have attempted throughout the terms so far to 
act not as the teacher envisaged by the institution nor as a transformative intellectual 
conceptualised in critical pedagogy but as me-who-teaches. This has meant trying to 
create space in the classroom in which I can put the authority and hierarchy which 
comes with the role of the teacher and the transformative intellectual at a distance 
and in which I take control of my own actions. This is about trying to open a space for 
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us to meet as people coming together to explore a topic of interest without solely 
relying on the authority and hierarchy of being a teacher. There are times when this 
occurred, for example in the opening sessions with each group in which we drew 
British politics or the frank exchanges with students about their and my actions 
regarding a particular topic. The tension of my position as a teacher is never lost on 
me because in order to create the foundation for such spaces I use my position as a 
teacher to prepare and design a task which is specifically aimed at creating such a 
space. What is important for me in this design and the hope that I have for it, is that 
I don’t cling doggedly to it. If my ideas aren’t working in the classroom, I need to be 
ready to change them, to listen to the students and create space for them to have an 
input into the sessions and demonstrate that they have an active role to play in the 
way our sessions unfold. 
The role play allows me to step back from controlling a large part of the session 
and hand it over to the students to develop their arguments and dictate the pace of 
the session. I might be providing ready-made roles for the student to take on, but 
beyond the direction of their stance towards deportation, how they fulfil this role, 
which arguments they make or how they interact with opposing positions is down to 
them. I’m reminded of something I once read about the use of anecdote in the 
classroom, and how by drawing on anecdote students are able to try out their ideas 
and approach discussion without directly exposing themselves (Elliot 1992, 22). The 
use of anecdote, and in this case, role play, creates a kind of “safety net” for students, 
allowing them a fall-back position of pointing to the anecdote or the role play 
character as the source responsible for the positions put forward. For me, the role 
play means I can remove myself from the process and observe the session whilst 
remaining ready to step in to help bring a different perspective to the process once 
students have decided that the role play has run its course. The role play becomes 
an example of wiggery in practice. We’re in the institution, and we’re still satisfying 
the institutional aims of dealing with the role of the judiciary in Britain, but we’re 
doing so in ways which are not accounted for by the institution. On top of this, while 
we’re fulfilling institutional aims, we are, in parallel, doing something else, something 
entirely different. We, or more accurately, the students, are creating a space and 
relationships which have nothing to do with the economic logic pervading higher 
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education. In this moment they are not here to individually add to their stocks of 
information from me or each other, they are working collaboratively to explore an 
issue which they find interesting. At the same time, my expected role as a teacher is 
reduced to nothing. I have no input here what-so-ever. To make a direct link back to 
de Certeau, the classroom was produced with a particular use in mind, but it is being 
consumed in an entirely different way today. 
Adam delivers a verdict, no deportation for Sally. Some cheers, others groan, I 
can’t tell if they’re still in character or not. Almost seamlessly a conversation picks up 
about how it’s not right for Adam to make that decision as he wasn’t elected. 
Although I have some questions I’d like to ask, I try not to move, not to draw any 
attention to myself. I’m interested to see how long the conversation will continue 
and develop of its own accord without my intervention. When there’s a slight lull I 
ask a question to the room rather than anyone in particular. Nathan answers. Then 
Sally asks him a question. And Sabi takes on the answer. And I offer an answer too. 
The conversation rolls on. Although I had set out the framework and identities used 
in the role play this following conversation emerged spontaneously. I didn’t need to 
step in to direct their attention to a particular point as they picked up on their own 
ideas and issues around the unelected judiciary grounding what they were saying in 
their reading and the role play. This is a moment of autonomous practice on all of 
our parts: we are collectively giving form to our own subjectivities in the process of 
interacting and learning from each other, and in doing so, are creating a relationship 
in the classroom based on mutual exchange of ideas, respect for one another’s 
positions, and a joint desire to discuss something which has intrigued us. 
Regrettably, it’s almost time to finish. I hold on as long as I can before having to 
break the spell and bring the class to a close, and unfortunately I have to do it by 
stopping someone from responding to a challenge: ‘I’m really sorry, but we’re out of 
time. And the next class is massing just outside,’ I add with a gesture of my head. 
‘Today has been really interesting, thank you all.’ A round of ‘Thank you’ and ‘See 
you next time’ as we all gather our stuff, put the room back to how it is mapped out 
on the diagram on the door, and head out. The module convenor waits for me 
outside the room and we fall in to talking about the session as we walk towards our 
offices. He says how much he enjoyed the class, and asks if this was a particularly 
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exceptional session. I’m not sure why I answer the way I do at first, false modesty 
maybe: ‘Yeah, I guess it was. They’re a nice bunch.’ And then I pause. ‘Actually, no. 
This wasn’t exceptional in terms of engagement and levels of interest. A lot of our 
classes together are animated and interesting, I’m very lucky to work with such a 
group.’ 
My notes later reveal just how lucky I was with this session. I ran the role play a 
total of fourteen times over the two years of keeping class notes, and while each one 
was interesting and enjoyable, none took off in the way this session did. Creating a 
framework for such a session can help to create a space for autonomous practice, 
but it is by no means a guarantee. Using my position as a teacher to set up the 
seminar is an important part in enabling me and the students to then take other 
actions. What I’m coming to realise is that the tension between the desire to act 
autonomously and the need to cover certain topics needn’t necessarily be a disabling 
tension but can also be a hugely creative impetus. It forces me to think and re-think 
sessions constantly, reviewing what I’ve done before, reading more about others’ 
experiences of teaching, and thinking of new ways to tackle the topic. That is my 
freedom in my context of a Graduate Teaching Assistant. This session was 
exceptional, but not because of engagement and interest. It was exceptional because 
it was one of the longest periods of an exilic classroom I have experienced. For forty-
five minutes the classroom was a space of our own collaborative construction in 
which we gave shape to ourselves, the room, and our relationships without 
dependence on the expected identities of teacher and student and the relationship 
which accompanies them. 
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Conversations 
I’m running a little later than normal this morning, not late for the class, just later 
than I would normally arrive. I’ve been enjoying the walk up to campus too much, 
basking in the sun that, for what feels like the first time in months, has some warmth 
to it. I stroll through the corridors of the college and down to our small courtyard 
room, today, bathed in light from the long bank of windows. It’s almost five past the 
hour and coming into the room I’m met with five faces. ‘Is this all of us for today?’ I 
ask to no one in particular. 
‘There’s an essay deadline later, I guess most people are working,’ offers Graham 
with a shrug. 
‘Well, cheers to you guys for coming along. It would have been a boring fifty 
minutes without you!’ Picking a spare seat on one side of the tables I unpack a few 
things and pass round the register. We’re all seated at one end of the long table, no 
need to spread out when they are so few of us. 
‘Have you voted in the Student Union elections?’ asks Melissa. 
I shake my head slightly, ‘No, I haven’t. The Union elections don’t really interest 
me. Although I did look through the candidates’ manifestos for President.’ I pause, 
wondering how blunt I can be, ‘I wasn’t impressed.’ 
‘You know all the adverts everywhere saying that if you vote you get free food at 
Nando’s, you don’t!’ Exclaims Kieran, I’m not sure if the exasperation is genuine or 
not. ‘You still have to buy stuff, and spend, like, a tenner or something, then they’ll 
give you something for free. That’s rubbish.’ 
‘I think a bigger problem is incentivising voting by offering free Nando’s, to be 
honest. Isn’t there a danger that people will just go along and tick a few boxes in 
order to get the food?’ I ask to the room. 
‘Yeah,’ replies Kieran, ‘but if they’re going to offer free stuff, they should be 
upfront about what it really involves.’ 
‘Yeah, if they’re going to do it, you’re right, they should be clearer.’ I glance at my 
watch, ‘Well, I guess between SU voting and a deadline no one else will be here today, 
so we might as well get started. How did you all get on?’ 
Today we’re taking a look at the relationship between Britain and the EU, and as 
it’s such a hot topic, I thought we could start with checking out some of the main 
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campaigns in the build up to the referendum for Britain to leave or remain a member 
of the EU. By using the lecture and some of the suggested readings we’re going to try 
and assess the claims made by the leave and remain campaigns with regard to the 
Britain/EU relationship. At the end of the last class we came up with a list of the 
campaign groups and then people chose which one they wanted to do some research 
on. I e-mailed the list to the group too so that anyone who wasn’t in the class knew 
what we would be up to today. I thought we could start from their research and their 
impressions of the campaigns and see how things developed from there. This week 
gives us a chance to make an explicit link between the academic study of Britain’s 
relationship with the EU and the experiences of the students here and now. The 
build-up to the referendum is pervasive and inescapable for the students, and it has 
also become clear in the recent weeks and months that there is a lot of wrong 
information being published and argued by the main campaigns. Taking a closer look 
at these campaigns enables us to turn our critical attention to the immediate political 
landscape and reflect on how we as members of the public interact with and respond 
to the possibility of being involved in a decision as pertinent as membership of the 
EU. As politics students in a British politics module the timing presents us with a rare 
opportunity to examine these questions in ‘real-time’ rather than after the event. 
‘They’re ridiculous,’ starts Beth, as she opens up her laptop and spins it round to 
show the rest of us. ‘I was looking at Vote Leave, but there isn’t really anything there 
to read or research.’ Peering over the top of her laptop screen Beth clicks on one of 
the photos and headers, ‘You think this is going to open up a piece giving you more 
detail, but all it does is send you to a new page with the same photo and sentence.’ 
‘Yeah, I found it really hard to find information about Stronger In,’ adds Nathan, 
‘they just don’t really have anything up.’ 
‘Same with Grassroots Out’, joins Alex. ‘I tried finding interviews with people that 
might give more information, but that didn’t really help either.’ 
Given the lack of substantive content from any of the campaigns people had 
looked into, a problem I also had when I was preparing for the class, we talk instead 
about whether some of the grand claims that have been made match up to what 
we’ve read for the course. After some time, Beth stops and simply says, ‘I don’t even 
know any more if I’ll vote.’ 
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‘At least you can vote’, quips Alex. As a German citizen in the first of three years 
studying here, he has no option to. 
‘You know what, you should vote, Beth.’ suggests Nathan. ‘Even if you don’t like 
the campaigns, and they’re not really helpful, are they, you still think we’re better off 
staying as part of the EU, and you should vote for that. It’ll make a difference.’ 
‘I guess, but if we’ve found it hard to get good information about it, and we’re 
Politics students, what’s it going to be like for other people? I’m worried they’ll see 
stuff like “Blah blah millions more for the NHS” and just think, “yeah, that sounds like 
a great idea” without thinking about whether that’s believable.’ 
‘It does seem mad that there isn’t more good information for all you guys.’ Barbara 
is from the US, and only here for the term. She’ll be gone before the vote takes place, 
watching from a distance back home. ‘Are you going to vote?’ 
It takes me a second to realise she’s talking to me. I’ve been listening to the 
conversation unfold and thinking about a similar one I had with my mum about her 
trouble finding useful information. ‘It’s tricky’. I start, and stop, trying to gather my 
thoughts before I reply. ‘As an idea, as another form of overarching government and 
set of institutions, no, I have no love for the EU. But, as you say, I don’t for Britain 
and structures of government here either. But, I am concerned about some of the 
noises being made by people that are campaigning to leave about the repeal of the 
EU Convention of Human Rights, about free movement, things like that, which feel 
more immediately worrying to me. That, and in a more personal sense, I met my wife 
here because she came to Kent as an Erasmus student and then stayed on to do a 
PhD. Without the EU, it’s unlikely that would have happened. Sorry, a slightly long-
winded answer and I haven’t actually answered yet. Yes, I will vote, and yes, I’ll vote 
to remain.’ 
‘We asked the module convenor in the lecture which way he would vote, but he 
wouldn’t answer. He said he didn’t think it was appropriate and didn’t want to 
influence people. You obviously don’t agree?’ asks Barbara. 
‘No, I don’t. Teaching is a political act, and if he tells you or not, the choice of 
course content, the way he approaches topics, it can all reveal a political position, 
even if you’re trying to be as objective as possible.’ I shrug, ‘I have a political position, 
you guys already know that, and I would feel disingenuous if I tried to hide it.’ 
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‘I was thinking about this last time, don’t you have a duty to vote in elections and 
things too, because you’re a British citizen, you live here, you work in a university, 
you have to obey the laws, shouldn’t you vote too?’ challenges Beth. 
This is interesting for me. We’ve touched on my position before in other classes 
as and when it’s come up, but it’s always been brief and handled with a slight 
trepidation by whoever has asked the question. Whether it’s the amount of time 
we’ve now spent together, the lack of people in the class, or perhaps both of those 
things and more, but this is the first time a group has been this direct in asking me 
questions. We are clustered around one end of the table, relaxed and at ease with 
each other. 
‘No, I don’t think I should automatically vote because I happened to be born in the 
UK. You’re right though that there is obviously a tension between my personal 
politics and the position I hold at the university, but that’s what my thesis is about, 
that’s why I record all our classes.’ I say, waving the voice recorder. ‘I’m trying to find 
out how I can work with, or around, or through, I’m not really sure what the right 
word is, those tensions.’ 
‘And what do you think so far?’ Asks Kieran. 
‘I think I’m still trying to find out!’ I say with laugh and a smile. ‘I feel, I hope, that 
these classes, for example, haven’t been “normal” for want of a better word, when 
it comes to how we relate to one another. Sure, there are times when I have had to 
be a “seminar leader,” but there are also times, like now, I guess, when we’ve all 
been able to sit and talk and learn together as ourselves, not only as a teacher who 
provides information and students who learn it. And hopefully, in us doing that we 
haven’t jeopardised your progress through the course. We’ve been able to do things 
differently while somehow still doing what’s expected. Or needed. Maybe that’s a 
better word.’ I pause, proud of what we’ve managed to do in the last nine weeks, this 
is the first time I’ve said it out loud. ‘I guess I try and do the same in all other areas of 
my life too, Beth, to answer your question. Yeah, there are things I have to do that I 
might not agree with, but simply denying them won’t get me anywhere or make them 
go away. I have to think about how to deal with each one as it comes up. Voting is a 
good example. Normally I wouldn’t vote full stop, but the referendum is an 
opportunity in which my vote will count towards the outcome, I’ll be an active and 
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more direct participant in a decision which impacts me. That’s quite different to 
voting in the general election from a limited choice of representatives, assuming you 
can ever really be represented by someone else anyway.’ 
‘The classes have been interesting,’ starts Barbara, ‘you can be a little 
confrontational at times!’ She adds with a laugh. ‘In a good way, I mean. You push 
us, and although it’s obvious you don’t agree with some of what we say you still take 
it, and us, I guess, seriously. These classes have been really different, different from 
those at home and my others here. I’ve enjoyed them a lot.’ 
‘Thanks Barbara.’ 
The others all nod and agree and I’m elated. ‘Thank you so much, it means a huge 
amount to know that.’ I sigh a contented sigh and look at my watch. ‘Well, we may 
have veered off topic slightly, but at least we know that both the Leave and Remain 
campaigns should be treated with caution, and whatever we personally may feel 
about Britain’s relationship with the EU, it’s more complicated than most people 
allow for. Cheers guys, and I’ll see you next week.’ We all pack up and leave, and I 
head to the office to write down some notes. As I write it strikes me how much it 
means to have Barbara say those things. I know I can be confrontational and it seems 
to be clear to the students that I approach the seminars from a particular political 
position, even if we haven’t talked about it at length. What this seminar seems to 
have affirmed for me is that it is possible to hold these positions and not get trapped 
by them. So many critiques of critical pedagogy revolve around the difficulties of 
teachers trying to balance their own stance with the positions of the students and 
they seem to get caught in the tension between the need to be a transformative 
intellectual with a specific end-goal of social change, and the need to have 
democratic teaching practices which allow the space for students to act in ways 
contrary to the social change sought. While there are certainly still tensions at work 
in my own teaching, I don’t share that same sense of being stuck. I do what I can and 
I hope that in my attempts to form more open relationships with students I can show 
that other ways of approaching education are possible, we don’t have to follow the 
provider/consumer model, but there is no attempt to impose an alternative 
relationship. It stands more as an invitation to the students to enter into a 
relationship of care of the self and others through the critical questioning and 
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accounting for our positions and actions, but ultimately it is on the students to decide 
to engage with that. Elsewhere I’ve written of how teaching forms part of my self-
care through my being open and honest with students about my actions and 
decisions, and today was an excellent example of that in practice. Beth’s questions 
encouraged me to stop and think, and to account to her, and the others in the room, 
for my position not only about the EU, but about what I do as a teacher in a university 
and about what I do as a citizen in Britain. This process of accounting for myself to 
others and considering what I do is self care, as it not only opens my actions to the 
criticism of others, it also encourages me to consider if there is anything I could or 
would do differently.  
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Critical Thought and the Media 
I’m hot, uncomfortable, and thirsty. Trudging up the hill with eight daily papers in my 
backpack along with my usual things for the class is no easy task, especially on a day 
as bright as this. It’s the kind of day it would be great to take the class outside, if only 
we could. There’s always the danger that someone arrives late and can’t find us, or 
that we lose a portion of what little time we have in relocating to somewhere 
different. Instead, I make do with the room, one of the seminar rooms in a newer 
building on campus which has, thankfully on days like today, a large bank of windows 
down one side and looks out into woodland. It’s a deadline day for another essay so 
I’m not expecting a huge turnout, but the six people in the room is even lower than I 
expected. In fact, three of those, Barbara, Ed and Victoria are from a different group, 
but they had e-mailed me to ask if they could join the seminar today so they had 
some time to submit their essay this morning. I don’t know if these six have had other 
classes together, but from the way they’re chatting when I come in I assume they 
have. These are a great six to have a class with. They are all thoughtful and prepared, 
and it should make for a good class. They are clustered around two tables in the 
corner, so I pull a chair over to join them. 
‘OK, so this week is about the media, and so,’ I heave the stack of papers from my 
bag and they land on the table with a satisfyingly solid thud, ‘here’s a selection of the 
main daily newspapers in the UK!’ 
George laughs, ‘Did you carry those up from town?’ 
‘Yeah.’ Rolling my eyes. ‘I wasn’t sure the campus shop would have all I wanted, 
so it was safer to get them in town before I walked up. Before we start with these 
though, do any of you read the newspaper? As in, a physical copy like this?’ 
‘I do,’ replies George while the others shake their heads, ‘I normally get The Times. 
I know I won’t agree with it, but I think that means I read it a bit more carefully.’ 
‘That’s interesting. None of the rest of you do though? No. OK, where do you get 
your news from?’ 
We spend a bit of time talking about various news sources, their perceived 
reliability, and the reasons we use them, we also talk about why we still tend to use 
newspapers in discussions of media influencing people and politics, as well as 
outlining four theories of media impact. Then it’s time to turn the papers over to 
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them. As only George reads a physical copy, and because Claire, Barbara, and 
Quentin aren’t British, I take a moment to lay out the copies and divide them roughly 
into Red Tops and Broadsheets. I brought with me copies of The Sun, The Mirror, The 
Express, The Mail, The Independent, The Telegraph, The Guardian, and The Times, 
and offer them the choice of whichever they would like to take a look at. 
Everyone has made their choices and I’m about to explain what I’d like us to do 
when… 
‘What on earth…’ Claire is holding up The Sun open on Page 3. 
‘That, I’m afraid, is the biggest selling daily newspaper in the UK.’ I reply. ‘I’m sorry, 
I entirely forgot about it, I should have warned you.’ 
‘I can’t believe it. That’s ridiculous. This is 2016 in the UK and people still think it’s 
OK to have women like that in a newspaper?!’ Barbara is just as incredulous. 
Victoria joins in, ‘I’ve always known about Page 3, but I’ve never looked at it, 
obviously. It is a bit unbelievable that people think this is OK though.’ 
‘They don’t though, do they? Not everyone anyway. There’s a campaign against it 
isn’t there?’ 
‘There is, or there certainly was,’ I reply to George’s question. Quentin has just sat 
there and shaken his head so far in disbelief. 
‘Sorry,’ starts Claire to me, looking quite apologetic, ‘I didn’t mean to shout. It just 
caught me off guard.’  
‘No apology necessary, I’m sorry I didn’t give you a heads up.’ 
‘What were you about to say before I shouted?’ 
‘Oh, right. Yeah. There are stories in each of these papers about immigrants and 
crime, some more obviously placed than others’, I say, gesturing at Victoria’s copy of 
The Mail, with its front-page coverage. ‘Take a read. See what’s said, the tone of the 
piece, the words used, it’s location in the paper, other stories that surround it. We 
all know that different places report with different biases, but as we rarely read 
things we’re likely to strongly disagree with, we may not appreciate just how 
differently the same thing can be presented. This gives us a chance to look at that for 
one story across quite a wide range of sources.’ Newspapers in this way can act as a 
great tool for self-reflection. How do we respond to others’ versions of truth, 
particularly those which challenge our own? 
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Everyone turns their attention to the papers and starts reading, me included. After 
a few minutes we begin to talk through the various presentations of the same stories, 
as people highlight certain wording or pictures’ placements that are particularly 
evocative, or the inclusion of information which isn’t really relevant to the story, but 
has found its way in there none-the-less. 
‘I had no idea that some papers were quite so biased,’ Victoria, shaking her head, 
‘and it’s made even worse by these three,’ gesturing to her own, The Sun, and the 
Mirror, ‘are such big sellers.’ 
‘It’s not that the information isn’t correct, or at least not in this story, but it’s so 
inflammatory.’ Adds Quentin. ‘When I go home to the States I’ll take a look at the 
papers, I’m sure the same thing happens.’ 
‘Do any of you think the papers are playing an important role here, in providing 
us, or perhaps challenging us, with the truth?’ I ask, hoping to be contentious. 
‘No, of course not.’ Replies Claire, somewhat angrily, ‘If this has shown nothing 
else, it’s that there’s not really as simple a thing as “the truth”. Even we strip it down 
to the bare facts that some men, who happen to be immigrants, have committed 
some crimes, that is barely the truth, and some of it is irrelevant. It doesn’t matter to 
the story that they are immigrants, does it? I’m sure other people who are British 
have committed similar crimes at a similar time too, but there aren’t stories about 
them in the paper.’ 
‘They’re clearly just trying to sell papers,’ states Barbara, ‘and I thought the news 
back home in the States was sensationalist!’ 
‘It’s not just about selling papers though, is it?’ George counters, ‘This isn’t just 
what people want to read about, this is what newspapers want us to read about. I 
think they operate much more along the ‘Framing’ lines: giving us issues to think 
about, and the language we use when we talk about them.’ 
‘Ok,’ I interject quickly, ‘Try and remember that these are theories we apply to 
newspapers to try and help us understand the relationship between newspapers and 
the public, they’re not necessarily deliberate paths taken by the newspapers 
themselves.’ 
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‘OK, fair enough,’ continues George, ‘but I think it’s important to be aware of the 
tricks that papers use, like we’ve looked at today, and be able to say that they aren’t 
being plain. They dress up a story with loads of other stuff.’ 
‘Yeah, but everyone does that I guess. When you tell a story, you try and make it 
more interesting.’ 
‘Maybe, but there’s a difference between you telling a story, Barbara, and a 
newspaper selling millions of copies.’ 
The conversation rolls on as we cover everything from truth telling, to media 
regulation, to free speech. A general consensus emerges that newspapers, and media 
outlets more widely, should be more honest, more truthful, but there are precious 
few ideas on how we might make that happen. We divert and talk about the 
problems of telling the truth in our lives, how difficult it can be sometimes. We talk 
about the difficulties of telling the truth to people who don’t want to hear it, or won’t 
listen to it, and I’m immediately reminded of parrhesia. It seems everyone has a story 
of being torn between telling someone what you think of their actions and wanting 
to spare their feelings. We talk about the ways we try to dress up our criticism, to 
soften it and take the edge off, to not offend those we’re speaking to. We talk about 
the distance which sometimes exists between what we see in a situation and what 
others see in it, and again how difficult that can make it to talk about. This brings us 
full circle back to the news stories we started with and the problems of telling the 
truth and uncritically accepting what we read. 
‘I feel like people don’t shop around enough for their viewpoints. They just stick 
to one viewpoint and find news which confirms that.’ Barbara continues, ‘Instead it 
would be better if people reached to the other side of the aisle and said, “well if this 
is so bias, and if that is so bias, can I find the truth in the middle somewhere?” But 
people don’t really do that.’ 
Claire chips in, ‘If people could be more critical about what they read, it would be 
good. If they could read between the lines of what’s being said, and where this 
opinion is coming from.’ 
‘So do you guys do this?’ 
There’s a slight pause, and then Ed speaks up. ‘I’ve got to be honest with you Andy, 
I don’t read the news.’ 
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‘You don’t read newspapers?’ I ask, unsure quite what he means. 
‘No, I don’t read the news at all.’ There’s a sharp inhale from the other five in the 
room. ‘I mean, what’s the point? I know who I’m going to vote for, and the rest of it 
is all stabbings, shootings, war, politicians that have done something wrong. What’s 
that got to do with me? It’s all rubbish.’ 
The shock in the room is palpable. Victoria takes up the argument, ‘How do you 
know who you’ll vote for is you don’t read the news?’ 
‘Well, I did politics at A-Level, and I’m doing a politics degree now, so I think I’ll be 
alright,’ replies Ed defensively. 
‘But we haven’t talked about party politics or party positions at all in this course.’ 
I add. 
‘How do you know which candidate stands for what?’ asks Barbara, ‘How do you 
know their stance on policies? Do you research it?’ 
‘I don’t, no. I don’t want the Conservatives to win.’ Adds Ed. 
‘Why not, though?’ Claire asks. ‘You have to read in order to know why you don’t 
support them.’ 
‘Why? Why do I have to?’ Ed says this quite sharply, but I think I know him well 
enough to know he doesn’t mind being questioned like this. 
Barbara takes up the reply, ‘Because then you’re an ignorant voter.’ 
‘OK, so I’m an ignorant voter.’ 
‘But then you’re exasperating the problem of people not being critical about who 
or what they vote for.’ 
‘Well the problem is people not voting.’ 
‘Uninformed voters probably present more of a risk than people who don’t vote,’ 
argues Barbara, continuing to challenge Ed. 
‘I’m interested that you know you absolutely won’t vote Conservative, but can you 
articulate why?’ I ask. I’m keen to see if Ed can work this through and we can all get 
a better understanding of what’s going on, him included. 
‘I just don’t agree with them.’ 
And then almost in unison George, Claire and Victoria ask, ‘But why?’ 
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‘I’m not trying to say I don’t know anything about anyone. I know things, like from 
the past that they’ve stood for. When I say I don’t read the news, I mean I don’t look 
for it. But if someone sends me an article I’ll read it.’ 
‘So, it’s quite passive then?’ I ask. 
‘Absolutely.’ 
‘You see,’ Barbara intervenes, ‘I find power in being informed. I’m better able to 
take decisions about things. Don’t you feel vulnerable? Like it’s totally out of your 
control?’ 
‘I don’t think being any more or less informed is going to make me any less 
vulnerable, or make me feel like I have more of say in anything.’ Replies Ed. ‘We have 
the right to vote, but that’s where it ends. We do that once every five years, and so 
once every five years I get to put a piece of paper in a box saying I’d rather have this 
person than that person, but that’s it. I get no control over anything else.’ 
It’s interesting to hear someone making this point, and I agree with him, but I’m 
keen to ask about other areas of control. ‘OK, about control of the country, I agree. 
But you have control over other things. You have control about how you live your 
life.’ 
‘Do I?’ interjects Ed. 
‘About how you interact with people. The things you believe in, the things you 
stand or stand up for.’ I continue. 
‘I don’t know,’ replies Ed. ‘I guess I don’t really feel like I have control over a lot of 
those things either.’ 
‘I think you do,’ offers Victoria. ‘I think we do.’ 
Everyone is quiet for a moment, digesting the last ten minutes. I look at my watch 
and it’s gone over the hour. We’re lucky that there’s not another class in here and 
none of us have to run off to another class. We all thank each other for the session 
and agree that it’s been really interesting. I think back to previous attempts to make 
the bridge between the social and personal levels of analysis and how it’s been tough 
to do. It seems to have occurred today almost naturally with no particular direction 
or prompting from me. Maybe it’s because we’re most of the way through the term 
and the students have come on in their thinking, or maybe it’s simply that the link 
has come from them rather than through a direct intervention from me. It was 
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fascinating to watch them all respond to Ed and pick up the questioning, holding him 
to account for what he does, or more accurately, doesn’t do. Although the questions 
were mostly directed at Ed, there’s definitely the sense that the session has made 
everyone think about what they do. We covered such a wide range of ground today 
and everyone came together to make a space of free-flowing conversation and ideas. 
The odd mix of students from different classes really worked as a combination in a 
way that none of the other classes on the media either before or since have.  
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Personal Choice 
It’s the final week of term in my final year of teaching. So far this week there have 
been very few people in the classes. It’s also deadline day for their British Politics 
essay and I’ve been fielding frantic e-mails for the last week. This year the essay for 
this module has fallen on the last day of term, after all the others, which 
understandably pushes it to the bottom of the to-do list for most people until they’re 
cleared their other three end of term essays. The result of it being left till last though 
is that it then becomes a frantic rush to get something written in a week. Throughout 
the term I’ve been offering to talk about their essays, reminding the students of my 
office hours and e-mail address, and letting them know the days I’ll be on campus 
and where I’ll probably be if they need to find me. We’ve also put a bit of time aside 
in one of the classes to talk about the essays. All in, very few people have spoken to 
me about them though, with some deciding to leave it until last night to ask me what 
I thought of their essay plan. I know colleagues may say I shouldn’t, but I’ve replied 
to each and every one over the course of the week, regardless of when I’ve seen it, 
be that first thing in the morning over tea or last thing at night before I went to bed.  
I’m greeted with an empty room. Sunny, bright, in fact, the nicest I’ve seen it 
looking. But empty. I glance at the clock on the wall already knowing that it’s getting 
quite close to five past the hour, only a few minutes to go. I pull my laptop out of my 
bag and log on to my staff e-mail account. I might as well use the time to reply to 
anymore last-minute essay e-mails. There are a few that I respond to straight away, 
and some from people in the class to let me know that they won’t be attending today 
either due to the essay or having already gone home. Essay deadline, last day of term, 
no other classes. It’s looking like the class will be a write-off. I decide to use the time 
to start writing up some reflections of the class and term as a whole and settle in for 
a quiet fifty minutes. 
I hear the door open and look up. Half past the hour and I see Umar coming into 
the room. I can scarcely believe it. 
‘I’m sorry I’m late. I wanted to submit the essay before class but I got a bit held 
up.’ He apologises. ‘I guess there’s not really a class?’ 
‘Nope. You’re the only person who’s come. Thank you, though.’ I add with a smile 
and a laugh. ‘Do you want to stay for a class for the last twenty five minutes?’ I offer. 
- 211 - 
I should hold a class really, even if it’s only him, and with less than half the time to 
go, but this really is his decision. 
He pauses looking at me and then steals a glance at the door, as if weighing up his 
options to escape. 
‘It’s entirely up to you Umar, it’s your class and you can decide if you stay or not. 
I won’t be offended if you decide to go. Heck, you turned up, so feel free to sign the 
register if you like.’ I say, passing it to him across the table from where I’m sitting. 
‘If you really don’t mind, I’ll go. I’d like some sleep.’ He says with a sheepish grin. 
‘Thank you though. I don’t think I really like British politics, but I’ve enjoyed these 
classes a lot. I think Politics was the right degree for me to do. Are you teaching 
anything next year?’ 
‘It’s unlikely, my scholarship ends in September, and I want to concentrate on 
finishing the thesis then. I’m glad you’ve enjoyed the classes, so have I.’ Umar comes 
around the table and offers his hand, as I stand up and take it, he thanks me again, 
and I him, and he leaves the classroom with a wave. 
I’m a little disappointed that three years of teaching on this module ends with a 
hand-shake from a single student on the final day of term. It’s only when I write this 
down that I realise that actually, this was an interesting moment and perhaps a fitting 
end to all I’ve been trying to do in the last few years. I don’t know why Umar came 
to class, maybe it was because he enjoyed the classes and just wanted to come and 
say goodbye, but I find it unlikely that he would have come in part way through just 
to say that. Instead, his demeanour and approach make me think he came to class 
because he felt like he had to, that’s his role as a student. He was then presented 
with a choice and a personal responsibility about what to do. There was no 
compulsion to stay or go, there was no pressure from me for either, the decision was 
his to make, he couldn’t defer to the authority of another. He could have easily stayed 
out of deference to the institutional expectation that that is what a student should 
do, but he chose not to. He chose to be open and frank with me and to take his leave. 
There were no mumbled excuses, just an explanation as to why he wanted to leave. 
Could or would this have occurred with other seminar leaders? I don’t know. The 
point is that it did occur with me. I think this moment is the culmination of eleven 
weeks of getting to know one another, eleven weeks of establishing a classroom and 
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a relationship which was not entirely dependent on institutional and student 
expectations of me as a teacher and them as students. And it’s for this reason, as 
anticlimactic as it seems, I think this was actually a fitting end to my three years of 
teaching here, and my two years of the project. 
 
  
- 213 - 
Student Perceptions 
These narratives have so far focused on me and my actions, reactions, and 
interpretations of what happened during the course of the project. This has given me 
the opportunity to explore these moments in detail, offer an analysis of them, and 
connect my practices to the theoretical work which informed my actions along the 
way. To bring this collection of narratives to a close I finish with others’ 
interpretations of my practice by examining the end-of-term module evaluations 
completed by the students. As part of the formal processes of the university students 
are asked to complete end-of-term evaluations of each module. These evaluations 
have both quantitative and qualitative sections, asking students to rank the module 
according to four areas: General observations; Module organisation and 
management; Teaching, assessment, and feedback; and Learning resources. While 
some of these sections do not relate to my practice, any questions concerning 
teaching, assessment and feedback do, and so the student responses in this section 
can be revealing of their perceptions of my teaching. For each question in these 
sections students rank the module on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, and 
are also given the opportunity to provide longer written feedback. The results of 
these anonymised evaluations are then passed to the seminar leaders, me in this 
case, and the Director of Education, who looks through the results in order to 
highlight and address any problems which may have arisen. The evaluation process 
is an excellent example of the formal procedures of the institution at work, reflecting 
the high value placed on student satisfaction. Alongside this, the end-of-term 
evaluations provide an element of external recognition that my teaching was 
satisfying institutional requirements. While the quantitative responses are 
interesting and offer a snap-shot of student satisfaction with my teaching, it is the 
space available for qualitative responses which provides me with a way to 
understand if the students saw any differences between my teaching practice and 
that of other seminar leaders, and what it was that they liked or did not like. While 
satisfaction generally is a poor proxy measure of teaching quality given the wide 
range of possible motivations and desires of students attending university, the 
written comments can offer an insight none-the-less, as without the constraints of a 
fixed numerical scale students are able to express their opinions more freely. 
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I recently sat down to revisit the end-of-term evaluations of my teaching practice 
hoping to find some evidence from the students themselves that being in my 
seminars had, in some way, been different to their experiences with other seminar 
leaders. The module on British politics ran in the second term of the first year 
undergraduate programme, so the students I worked with had already experienced 
four different seminar leaders. Alongside their classes with me in the second term, 
they would also have another three seminar leaders, making a total of eight in their 
first year. This variety of different Graduate Teaching Assistants meant that by the 
time the students were asked to complete the end-of-term evaluations for my classes 
they had experienced a range of teaching practices and style and so were able to 
draw some comparative conclusions, even if they were not specifically asked or trying 
to do so. I remember getting my first set of student feedback following my first year 
of teaching and recognising myself in the remarks of the students. More accurately, 
the comments of one student which I recognised as being entirely applicable to a lot 
of my teaching in that first year. In my first year I seemed to ignore the more positive 
comments and fixate on the negative, something I’ve since tried hard not to do. 
Among the normal array of those comments saying that I was a good teacher there 
was one which stuck out. One student had commented that I often look at the clock, 
realise there is time left in the class, and repeat myself to fill that time. It may have 
been one comment among many, but it struck me as true, and even more, I could 
vividly recall the times I had done it: the panic that I was out of things to say and tasks 
to do, the realisation that there was five, or even ten minutes of class time left, the 
blundering re-hashing of a summary of the class while the students looked on, all 
seemingly aware of my panic like it was written all over my face. The memory was 
razor sharp. The experience of receiving the negative comment stuck with me, and 
as I went into my second year of teaching having read more on pedagogy I wanted 
to make sure I would not repeat the mistakes of the previous year, even if it was only 
the comments of one student. In the two years since then the end-of-term 
evaluations provided a useful barometer of how I’ve got on during the term and how 
my practice has been received and perceived by the students. 
There are three statements in the evaluations which directly addressing me as a 
seminar leader: ‘Overall, the seminars were interesting and informative’; ‘My 
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seminar leader encouraged participation’; and ‘Discussions with my teacher, during 
office hours and via email, about my work were helpful’. For each of these 
statements I received average scores of 4.61, 4.78, and 4.48 respectively. In each case 
these scores were higher than the departmental average. While not suggesting that 
these scores themselves validate my teaching practice, they do demonstrate that for 
all intents and purposes of the formal procedures of the university, I was not only 
fulfilling institutional requirements, I was exceeding them. These scores, along with 
the positive observation reports by the module convenor meant that as far as the 
institution was concerned I was doing my job well, and so warranted no further 
attention or concern. This approval through the universities own formal processes 
meant I was effectively ignored. I complied with the necessary steps to evaluate my 
performance throughout the year, and at each stage was shown to be performing 
well, therefore the university paid me no mind when it came to the how of my 
teaching, as all the measures pointed to successful outputs. 
Along with the favourable scores, the students’ written comments revealed that 
something different was indeed occurring in my seminars. What I was looking for in 
revisiting these evaluations is something from the students which indicates that, 
from their perspective, their seminars with me were different in some way. Ideally I 
was looking for evidence that my attempts at anarchist practice, at disrupting the 
expected roles and behaviours, and in opening the possibility of other student-
teacher relationships had been noticeable and positively received by the students. 
Having seen the extent of student comments previously I wasn’t expecting detailed 
explanations: many student comments on end-of-term evaluations are barely a 
sentence long. Instead, I was looking for evidence, however small, that the classes 
had not simply been enjoyable or interesting, as you would hope these would be 
responses to all classes regardless of the seminar leader, but that students felt there 
was a difference enough to leave a comment to that effect. More specifically, I was 
looking for evidence of the impact of my approach to addressing the content of the 
classes, and the impact of my approach to the students and the classroom 
relationships I attempted to develop. If students were reporting that there was 
something particular in how I approached the topic and them, it serves as support 
for my own interpretations of what happened throughout the two years of the 
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project. Completion rates of end-of-term evaluations are quite low, and the numbers 
who then decide to leave a written comment are even lower, so I make no claims 
that what I found in the comments included here are universally representative of 
the 200+ students I worked with during the two years of the project. However, these 
comments can be used as indications from beyond my own narratives that my 
teaching practice was distinguishable and beneficial to the students while still 
meeting institutional requirements. 
In a later conversation with the Director of Education, he recalled looking through 
the evaluations at the end of the year and reading through all of the comments, as 
he was required to do. He mentioned that while the scores I received for my teaching 
were indeed good, it was the student comments which stood out to him. Among 
these comments were a range of generally positive statements that I’m a good 
teacher and that my seminars were enjoyable and interesting. While these 
comments and feedback are lovely to receive and certainly made me very happy to 
read, they didn’t offer any insight into whether these student’s perceived our classes 
any differently to those they had with other seminar leaders, or if they noticed 
anything particular about the ways I interacted with them or approached the 
content. 
It is the comments which dealt more specifically with me and my teaching practice 
which are the most revealing and helpful. Most of these comments addressed my 
demeanour and manner in the classroom and my interactions with the students, with 
one student commenting that I was ‘relaxed, friendly [and] positive’ and another 
pointing out that because of this relaxed environment it was easy to participate in 
the sessions ‘without pressure of fear of embarrassment.’ These comments 
demonstrate the students’ response to my attempts to create an environment which 
was open and sessions which built from their knowledge and experiences of the 
topic, enabling them to participate without the fear of providing the “wrong” answer. 
Others pointed to my ability to create engaging and interactive sessions, noting that 
my seminars are ‘always inventive.’ These comments are evidence of my attempts to 
engage students through the creation of exilic spaces in which their active 
participation and role in the creation of knowledge and the direction and tenor of 
the classes are placed at the forefront of what I do. Alongside this, these comments 
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reflect my ongoing commitment to interacting with students in ways which seek to 
support and take seriously their contributions, and to develop new ways of 
addressing the topics of the module. The comment regarding the inventiveness of 
the seminars is particularly interesting as it suggests that I was doing something 
unusual or unexpected in my teaching practice, but more than that, that this 
inventiveness was well received. 
That there is something specific to my way of interacting with the students was 
captured in the following two comments, both of which highlight my attempts to 
engage students in a consideration of their position through parrhesia, prompting 
them to reflect on their actions. 
Andy is a great seminar leader. He pushes the students to develop 
succinct points, yet encourages a relaxed and inclusive environment. He 
is supportive of a diversity of opinions, with comments of a left and right 
leaning persuasion taken seriously. 
Made the seminars engaging made us look at things from a different 
perspective, can tell he has strong conflicting views to his students 
especially his right winged ones but remains political neutral a compelling 
skill. 
These comments are particularly important in light of my attempts to engage 
students in practices and relationships of self care and care for others. Challenging 
the students to consider and develop their position and arguments is a key element 
in encouraging the students’ self care as we are encouraged to account for our 
position, the actions we have taken and the decisions we have made. By pushing the 
students to develop succinct points I engaged them in a process of a closer 
consideration of their position. In addition, in making them look at issues from 
different perspectives they were able to sharpen their own understandings of a topic. 
As they are challenged to consider others’ positions the students are encouraged to 
revisit their own position through an others’ eyes, creating a critical distance which 
enables a more detailed examination of their initial ideas. I found the comment 
regarding my political neutrality especially interesting, as throughout both terms of 
teaching I made no attempt to hide my own position. Reading the comment over, I’m 
left thinking that perhaps I missing something in the student’s meaning, as they first 
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suggest I have strong conflicting views, and then that I am politically neutral. In light 
of the earlier comment regarding my ability to take all positions seriously, regardless 
of political leaning, I think this student may mean something similar. 
While all of the above comments hint at students recognising that their 
experiences of seminars is different in my classes, there is one student who makes 
this point explicitly: ‘Was taught differently to my other modules but really enjoyed 
learning about the ins and outs of British Politics.’ Unfortunately the student does 
not expand on exactly what was different about my teaching practice, but it is the 
most direct statement that I was indeed doing something differently. When I began 
the data gathering I was hoping to capture those moments in my teaching practice 
in which I addressed the tension of subverting the dominant understandings of 
education while working within a neo-liberal university. What these student 
responses demonstrate is that my attempts to disrupt expected identities and 
behaviours of teachers and students by engaging with the students as active 
participants in the creation of knowledge, and inviting them in to relationships of self 
care and care for others, did not go unnoticed. More than this, these attempts have 
been highlighted in student comments as positive attributes of both me and my 
teaching practice. Although these examples are limited in number because of the 
comparatively small number of students who complete the qualitative portion of the 
end-of-term evaluations, they do stand as evidence to support my interpretations of 
my practice as explored in the narratives above.    
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7. Subversion in the Classroom 
The beginning of this thesis can be traced back to my time working for a charity and 
a university in Peru and the question, how I could work in institutions which have 
different values and understandings of the world to my own? This question became 
my focus when I was awarded the position as a PhD candidate and a Graduate 
Teaching Assistant at a university in the UK and had to learn to navigate my way 
through a neo-liberal educational institution which perceived education as a means 
to an economic end. 
My position as a Graduate Teaching Assistant was organised via the Graduate 
Teaching Assistant Coordinator who is a permanent member of academic staff tasked 
with organising the teaching allocation and supporting the Graduate Teaching 
Assistants within the department. It came with a raft of contractual obligations, 
including completing various training sessions, an initial probation period, and 
regular reviews. The teaching was allocated on the basis of departmental need and 
suitability, and once my teaching had been allocated, I was assigned to a number of 
seminar groups, and the Timetabling Office organised the room allocations and 
timings. My duties as a Graduate Teaching Assistant included teaching up to 288 
contact hours over the three years of my contract, preparing seminars, marking 
students’ coursework, exams, and submitting end of year reports. An intrinsic part of 
this position was complying with various bureaucratic procedures which included 
keeping students’ attendance and performance records, preparing students’ mid- 
and end-of-term evaluations and having my seminars observed by the module 
convenor on a regular basis. For the first year of my contract I was on probation, 
subject to review and assessment, and if deemed necessary, targeted training. If I 
was seen not to be performing to a suitable standard, the allocated teaching hours 
would be redirected to other duties (University of Kent 2016).  
Working as a Graduate Teaching Assistant brought with it all manner of 
bureaucratic requirements of a neo-liberal university as initially addressed by Bill 
Readings (1996). Readings explored the need for universities to constantly measure 
and record practice in quantifiable ways so that they, as institutions, could be 
understood by others. The increasing need to design and maintain data related to 
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universities’ performance resulted in an increasing bureaucratic structure and the 
focus of universities on formal procedures for capturing and measuring their 
performance and ranking their performance against the ambiguous term 
“excellence” – a standard Readings considered as unsuitable because it is not 
anchored in a specific set of criteria. The change in universities’ focus towards 
bureaucratic procedures to capture and account for action and in an attempt to 
determine “excellence” has resulted in universities being less concerned with the 
specifics of how courses are taught, as long as these courses are judged to be taught 
excellently. As Ball argues, the neo-liberal bureaucratic university is complex, 
incoherent, unstable and sometimes contradictory. It establishes itself through a 
prioritisation of universal market-based social relations which have a crucial impact 
on an academic’s relations with students and colleagues, her knowledge production, 
and her flexibility, innovation, and productivity (2012, 17-18). In the neo-liberal 
university, the role and expected behaviours of the teacher is ‘performativity’ – a 
practice of governance which links teachers’ 
‘effort, values, purposes and self-understanding to measures and 
comparisons of output. Within the rigours and disciplines of 
performativity we are required to spend increasing amounts of our time 
in making ourselves accountable, reporting on what we do rather than 
doing it’ (Ball 2012, 19).  
This effort of constantly having to account for our and others’ performance drives 
teachers in universities towards a focus on capturing and promoting performance in 
the name of transparency while paying less attention to the detail of our 
performance. The focus on bureaucratic procedures to capture performance makes 
no account for the substance of teaching and learning. On the contrary, as long as 
the outcomes are favourable for the students and the institution the substance is 
almost irrelevant. Each module has an outline and form which has been agreed to by 
the institution which contains learning outcomes, assessment criteria and 
assessment methods. As long as the results from the term match the expectations 
established in the module outline, the details of how the students achieved this 
outcome and why a teacher’s performance is judged to be excellent are of no interest 
to the institution.  
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This meant that the realm of my action as a Graduate Teaching Assistant was left 
largely open, with no specific direction about my teaching practice other than that it 
had to be judged as excellent. The means by which my performance was assessed 
was a combination of my compliance with the formal procedures, student 
evaluations taken at two points throughout the term, and the module convenor’s 
observations of my seminars. While a range of different procedures operated in the 
background to establish my realm of action and ensure my compliance with 
procedural norms, the mid- and end-of-term evaluations and the observations by the 
module convenor were procedures through which the university could check if I was 
acting in a way that would lead to the preferred outcome. The mid- and end-of-term 
evaluations included questions about what the students enjoyed in the seminars, 
what they would like to see changed, how interesting and informative the seminars 
were, and how engaging I made them. The fact that my performance as a teacher 
was judged through the lens of students’ satisfaction with their seminars vividly 
demonstrates the economic model which underpins neo-liberal education and the 
crucial importance the institution places on student-consumer satisfaction with the 
service and product they have received throughout the term.  
This creates a situation in which the desired outcome acts to determine the means 
by which it is reached. Rather than “excellence” being based on the substance of 
classes, the university focuses on the end-point of student perception and outcome, 
and in doing so creates an environment in which the excellence of my teaching 
practice is determined by student satisfaction. While the formal procedures 
themselves do not directly establish behaviour, they act as part of a larger ensemble 
in which the desired outcome is predetermined. Working in a higher education sector 
saturated with the logic of the free-market and increasingly governed through 
institutional-level performance indicators such as the Research Excellence 
Framework and the Teaching Excellence Framework, these outcomes are 
determined as students’ successful degree completions and their employment 
destinations following their degree. These formal procedures can be understood as 
practices of government which attempt to give shape to my subjectivity through 
establishing realms and patterns of behaviour which are deemed to be institutionally 
desirable and which will achieve the desired outcomes. The core of my problem with 
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both my work in Peru and my work at the university in the UK came down to neo-
liberal attempts to form my and others’ subjectivity. As a teacher, my subjectivity 
was cast by the institution as a provider of an education product and experience 
which aimed at increasing the economic potential of the students I worked with. 
Disagreeing with the economic logic of education, I was looking for a way to escape 
these institutional attempts to form my subjectivity and to assert my freedom to 
determine for myself what teacher I wanted to be. I was looking for a way to work in 
the university in which I could expand the ways and means by which I took control of 
my own subjectivity and actions in the present and in my context. 
Initially I thought that critical pedagogy and its critiques of dominant approaches 
to education, its nuanced understandings of oppression, and its calls for education 
as part of social change provided me with an approach by which to understand my 
situation and practice resistance to it. When I first read Freire’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed (1993), it offered a language and critique of dominant educational 
approaches which addressed many of the challenges with education I had 
experienced in Peru and the UK. As I began to explore critical pedagogy and the work 
of Henry Giroux, I was struck by his description of his first time reading Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed: 
I was a high school teacher and I found myself in a class trying to do all 
kinds of innovative things, and the vice principal came up and he said, 'I 
don't want students sitting in a circle, I want them in a straight line, and 
blah blah blah.' And I didn't have an answer for him. I didn't have the 
theoretical language. And ironically, the week earlier, someone had given 
me a copy of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and I was so frustrated that I 
went home, read the book, I stayed up all night, got dressed in the 
morning, went to school; I found my life had literally changed. I mean, I 
felt it had changed as I had a language that all of a sudden seemed to say, 
to speak very directly, to the kinds of issues I was involved in. But more 
importantly, they gave me a way of theorising that experience and 
practice, rather than just saying, 'I think it works', or 'I think it's good', or 
'students seem to like it'. Something was going on that was quite profound 
for me, it was the beginning of a movement from a position of being 
voiceless to having a voice. (FreireProject 2007) 
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My first response to Pedagogy of the Oppressed echoed Giroux’s. Paulo Freire’s 
critique of the banking model spoke to my experiences and offered a theoretical 
framework through which I could better understand my discomfort working in the 
education sector and presented a language which enabled me to better articulate my 
desire to try different teaching approaches. Critical pedagogy offered an approach to 
education which prioritised the empowerment of citizens through greater 
democratic involvement in society. It offered an approach to education and social 
change which went beyond attempts to make students better economic performers 
and claimed to address the conditions which caused social oppression and 
exploitation. However, the deeper I engaged with critical pedagogy, the more I came 
to realise that it could not offer me the freedom I was looking for. At a first reading 
critical pedagogy offered a response to an education system which focused on 
procedure, performance, and end-goals by emphasising the importance of context, 
the ways in which education can be used as a tool to empower, and the possibilities 
for me as a teacher to act differently. However, through predetermining social 
change, the form of social organisation, and the behaviour of individuals, either as a 
critical citizen or a transformative intellectual, critical pedagogy fixed an end-point to 
which all my actions must aim. In short, rather than offering freedom, critical 
pedagogy offered the appearance of freedom by defining a wide realm of action, and 
yet maintaining that action must occur and must be directed toward a particular end. 
If I was to follow critical pedagogy, my response to working in a university and the 
ultimate aim of that response had already been decided for me, and this meant a 
constraint on my freedom.   
Looking for an approach to education which does not predetermine forms of 
subjectivity, action, and relationships, I turned to anarchism, and particularly the 
lessons anarchism has learnt from poststructuralism. Drawing on the term 
postanarchism to denote a particular focus in anarchism rather than suggest 
something distinct from anarchism, I explored a theory and practice which focuses 
on the present and makes no attempt to predetermine my subjectivity or future 
social change. Anarchism and the focus on the subject, action and relationships, 
highlights freedom as autonomous practice and calls for the subject to take control 
of her own (trans)formation not by directly resisting the practices of governance of 
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external agencies, but by starting from the transformation of the immediate situation 
she finds herself in. This transformation is rooted in the ever-present possibility of 
freedom through action in which the subject gives form to her own subjectivity and 
her relationships, and freedom is therefore contextualised by the subject’s position 
and surroundings. The autonomous practices called for by anarchism place the 
emphasis on the actions of the subject without arché, that is, without predetermined 
ends or an overarching ideal of subjectivity and relationships to which the actions of 
the subject are directed. For anarchism informed by poststructuralism, the formation 
of my subjectivity comes about through various practices of government enacted by 
different external governing agencies, with education being one of them. In 
response, anarchism suggests autonomous practice as a form of prefigurative action 
which carries no predetermined end and which works to invent and form my own 
subjectivity without reliance on external expectations. In forming my own 
subjectivity through prefigurative action, I also create new forms of relationships 
with others. The poststructural influences in anarchism argues that in (trans)forming 
my own subjectivity, I change the basis of my relationships with others. I no longer 
solely relate to others through the behaviours expected by the complexities of 
governing agencies but take control of my own subjectivity in forming relationships 
with others in the moment of interaction. As with subjectivity, these anarchist 
relationships cannot be predetermined but are the response of the subjects entering 
the relationship. This anarchist approach to the subject, action, and relationships 
provided me with a framework for my critique of critical pedagogy and a basis for my 
response to my particular context of working as a Graduate Teaching Assistant. To 
practice my teaching informed by anarchism, and to subvert the formal bureaucratic 
procedures of the institution and forms of subjectivity which accompany them, I used 
la perruque and created exilic spaces. 
La perruque, or wiggery, is a disguise we can use to create space for ourselves in 
our everyday lives. Taken from the French term “the wig” it applies to the actions we 
can perform which make use of the tools, spaces, roles and expectations of 
institutions to create something different and unaccounted for by the institution. 
This does not mean refusing to work, nor is it attempting to step out of any structures 
and practices of governance, nor is it the attempt to take political power or to reform 
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systems of power. Instead, la perruque, as understood through anarchism, is about 
side-stepping the system through actions and the creation of spaces which are 
unconceivable and unintelligible to the systems in which they are embedded, and 
which form the realisation of freedom of the subject and her relations and bonds to 
others. La perruque is a tactic used to find and exploit the gaps created by the 
institution itself. 
 In my context of higher education, there is a gap between the production and 
consumption of the classroom space. For all the institution’s accounting procedures, 
there was no attempt to capture the substance of teaching practice, only the 
outcome, and this created a gap to be exploited through la perruque, disguising my 
work as that desired by the university while my teaching practice operated in ways 
which were unaccountable for by the formal evaluation procedures. With the 
university’s concentration on formal procedure and the measuring of performance, 
the classroom is produced as a place in which the performance measures are realised 
through the administration of attendance records, evaluations and observations, but 
that is not necessarily the way in which the classroom is consumed. In the classroom, 
I am able to use this gap left by the focus on procedure and measurement to subvert 
this focus with a concentration on the substance of my teaching practice. La perruque 
in my case meant taking the timetable, classroom space, and module content 
provided to me and using them differently whilst still complying with the formal 
evaluation requirements of the university. As long as I continued to satisfy 
institutional procedures regarding performance, as shown in the student evaluations 
discussed above, the university had no cause to look more closely at the substance 
of my teaching. To an outside observer I held my seminars at the times I was allocated 
and in the rooms I was allocated to. Each session ran to time, no session was missed, 
student attendance records were taken and submitted to the university each week. 
Alongside this, the topics for each week matched those of the lecture, the readings 
the students did were those readings set by the module convenor and were used by 
us for the discussion in the sessions. In short, I was doing everything I was meant to 
be doing. By complying with and meeting university procedural requirements 
regarding performance, I created space for myself and my teaching practice. In my 
teaching practice I concentrated on subverting the performance oriented 
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understandings of teaching and learning which establishes a one-way relationship of 
knowledge exchange on provider-consumer lines. In my attempts to subvert this 
approach I attempted to establish a different student-teacher relationship which 
started from the collaborative creation of knowledge. While the topic, and often 
specific questions, were set by the module convenor, I could decide the angle from 
which we approach the content and addressed the topic through approaches which 
subvert the expectation of the teacher as the arbiter of knowledge. One example of 
my attempt is found in the autoethnographic narrative Drawing, where the set task 
was to establish the basic framework and institutions of British politics and compare 
these to other European countries and the reading for this session specifically 
addressed this comparison. However, in the class itself we approached the content 
from a different starting point, that of the students’ existing knowledge and 
understanding of British politics. I was therefore able to focus on the elements of 
specific knowledge the students already had of British politics, and how to bring that 
knowledge to the fore using the drawing exercise. From there, we could use this 
student-generated content as the basis for the rest of the session, bringing out 
connections between what the students already know and the module topics 
decided on by the module convenor. This was a small act of subversion in which the 
knowledge of the students was approached as the corner-stone of the session rather 
than an add-on to the information gleaned from the set reading. This subversive act 
focused on the substance of the class, using the gap afforded me by the institutional 
concentration on procedure and performance measurement. 
There is a tension here between this subversive practice and the issue of student 
achievement which is highlighted at several points throughout the autoethnographic 
narratives. This tension is revealed in the first narrative when one student asks if I 
am using the class as an experiment, and my assurances that no matter how I 
approach the class, I have a responsibility as a staff member to help them through 
the module and learn along the way. At the time I did not make direct reference to 
student achievement as I did not want to shift the focus of the discussion about the 
project to an emphasis on grading. Indeed, this was exactly something I was trying to 
create some distance to. However, due to the various practices of government 
established by the institution and society at large regarding my conduct as a teacher 
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there was an expectation regarding student attainment, as well as an understanding 
of the student-teacher relationship and aims of higher education brought to the 
classroom by the students. What came to the fore in this interaction was the tension 
between pursuing my own understandings of self and education in parallel with 
latent student expectations of achievement. Importantly, what is revealed in this first 
narrative and throughout the subsequent seven encounters is that through 
embracing the creative possibilities inherent in le perruque it is possible to satisfy 
both student expectations and my own attempts at subversion: they are not mutually 
exclusive even if they are not directly complementary. Playing in between this 
tension is also compatible with the broader anarchist underpinnings of my subversive 
action. While there may be a temptation to simply reject institutional and student 
expectations of student achievement in a directly oppositional approach, to do so 
would mean running rough-shod over the student understandings of higher 
education and their and my roles within it in favour of my predetermined and reified 
understanding of what higher education should be. To follow this path would be 
contrary to the anarchist and poststructuralist influences at the heart of my work. 
Once again we are brought back to the discussions of direct opposition and 
subversive action, and the nuance and complexity required to deal with and partake 
in both. When dealing specifically with institutional and student expectations of 
student achievement to strike a directly oppositional stance would be to curtail 
possibilities of subversion before starting. It would also require a lack of recognition 
on my part that for many, high student achievement in the form of high grades and 
degree classification is a central motivation for going to higher education. Instead, in 
these narratives I proposed, and practiced, the more elusive forms of subversion as 
captured in the notion of la perruque, enabling the students and I to accommodate 
a wide range of actions and motivations within the classroom, including, but crucially 
not limited to, autonomous practice of subject, action and relationships alongside 
the achievement of high student grades.  
Part of the university’s accounting procedures of my teaching practice were the 
observations of my seminars by the module convenor. In these observations the 
details of my teaching practice were laid bare to be judged by a member of the 
institution, one more embed in the procedures and system of the university, 
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although with a different range of priorities. For the module convenor, in much the 
same way as for the institution at large, as long as my teaching practice is meeting 
the requirements of the module the module convenor is content. This goes someway 
to making the module convenor complicit in my teaching practice. De Certeau wrote 
of those who turn a blind-eye to la perruque, and the module convenor did just that. 
Rather than addressing my teaching practice as a subversion of the institution, the 
module convenor focussed on the outcomes of my teaching practice, their 
compliance with university expectations and requirements and students’ 
engagement in class. Because of his position in the university, the module convenor 
had a vested interest in turning a blind eye to my practice, as to raise any challenge 
to it would be to draw attention to me and my practice and him and his module, 
increasing his own workload. In using la perruque I was able to play in the gaps left 
by the institutional concentration on formal procedure, exploiting the blind-spot in 
which the university paid no mind to the details of my teaching practice, as long as I 
was outwardly compliant with expected behaviours and outcomes. In this gap and in 
using la perruque I was able to create, however fleetingly, exilic spaces in the 
classroom. 
Exilic space is space in which people come together and create their own 
subjectivities and relationships while remaining within the dominant frameworks of 
society. We have seen such spaces arise most recently in the various Occupy 
encampments in which collections of people gathered of their own accord and for 
their own reasons, and created spaces which were typified by behaviours and forms 
of relationships which cannot be accounted for by the practices of wider society. In 
the case of Occupy people came together and created spaces through practices of 
mutual aid and collaboration, leading to the establishment of temporary medical 
centres, libraries, education centres, and kitchens. Although these encampments 
were present and highly visible in the centres of cities, being in the encampments 
offered a form of escape while within. These exilic spaces are always temporary and 
fragile constructions. They form, collapse and renew as different people establish 
them in different contexts, and so as with la perruque, exilic space is unpredictable, 
unplanned for, and undetermined. Also like la perruque, exilic spaces are subversive. 
Exilic space is space where the expectations and pressures of society can be 
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distanced, subverting dominant expectations of behaviours and relationships 
through establishment of a creative space for the formation of subjectivities and the 
development of relationships. 
Through la perruque I was able to create exilic spaces in the classroom, escaping 
the pressures of the institution while remaining within it. I used the gap afforded me 
by the institutional concentration on formal procedure to attempt to create a spaces 
in which the students and I could create our own subjectivities and form different 
student-teacher relationships to the ones envisaged by the institution. These exilic 
classrooms were not entirely free from the university, as they relied on the university 
structures for their creation. The exilic classroom needs the classroom, the timetable, 
and the module to bring the students and I together, and so it is not possible to create 
the space entirely apart from the university as an institution. Instead, the exilic 
classroom incrementally creates space apart from the university focus on formal 
bureaucratic procedure through an emphasis on the substance and detail of the 
content and approach in the classroom. This shift in emphasis acts to incrementally 
undermine the university and its focus. Exilic space is always temporary and fleeting, 
and the exilic classroom is no different. The creation of the exilic classroom always 
finds a limit in the fifty minutes allocated to the session, so that even if we were able 
to create exilic space in the first few minutes of a class, it would come to an end only 
fifty minutes later. In using la perruque and exilic space as part of my teaching 
practice I was able to create the conditions in which the students and I would take 
responsibility for our subjectivity and work collaboratively to form new student-
teacher relationships. 
Following anarchism and the lessons of poststructuralism I approached 
subjectivity not as singular, unified, and universal, but as an ensemble of overlapping 
identities shaped by various practices of governance, often from sources external to 
the subject. The anarchist call is for subjects to approach freedom as an ever-present 
possibility, and therefore to practice freedom through the assertion of subjectivity as 
taking responsibility for actions and relationships in the here and now. This anarchist 
freedom is a subversion of those identities and pressures placed upon the subject 
from external sources which seek to give form to subjectivity through practices of 
governance. In using la perruque and creating exilic spaces we use the rules and 
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expectations of the institution to create environments in which those rules and 
expectations are made to look contingent, malleable, problematic, subject to change 
and deliberation, agency and choice. In the classroom when we distance the 
traditional understandings and relationships of students and teachers we are asked 
to take responsibility for our own practice rather than fall back on the external 
expectations. Taking responsibility involves care of the self and the ability to reflect 
on and account for our practices. Care of the self is a process by which the subject is 
able to consider her actions in the context in which they occur and to tell the truth 
of those actions to herself and others. In giving an account of the substance of her 
actions the subject engages in a process of self-criticism through which she is able to 
reflect on the extent to which the actions were her own, and consider how she might 
act differently in future. Care of the self extends beyond the single subject to include 
those around her, both in a consideration of her and their actions. This involves 
others telling the subject the truth of her actions in that moment, and it involves the 
subject reciprocating. This establishes a relationship between people engaging in 
care of the self, and establishes care of the self as a form of truth-telling. The process 
of truth-telling is established through various practices of governance of the self, by 
the self, helping to give form to subjectivity. Care of the self therefore acts as a 
subversion of the practices of governance of governing agencies, which attempt to 
establish different forms of subjectivity through which the subject acts. This is not a 
grand casting-off of all external expectations and behaviours, but a subtle and 
gradual process through with the subject is able to overcome her attachment to 
external referents in her particular context. In my context as a Graduate Teaching 
Assistant, care of the self was a process of self (trans)formation in which I continually 
attended to my actions and the actions of those around me as they related to the 
specific context in which the action occurred. This context was decided in a large part 
by the topic of discussion for that week. The aim of care of the self was for me to 
gradually and increasingly take control of and responsibility for my actions rather 
than relying on the expectations of others to guide me. In this process I had to 
account for and reflect upon my actions and the actions of others in order to 
understand the actions taken and learn how I might act differently. In the classroom 
this meant a consideration of my actions to subvert the bureaucratic procedural and 
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measurable performance focus of the institution through an approach to teaching 
which emphasised the collaborative construction of knowledge and the 
responsibility we all took for our learning. This involved considerations of my position 
in the room, my body language, my tone of voice, how I challenged and questioned 
students, and how I opened myself to being challenged and questioned in turn. 
Instances of this questioning and challenging of actions can be found throughout the 
autoethnographic narratives. For example, in the session Engagement as we 
discussed Malikah’s decision to vote, or in Conversations as the students questioned 
me about my decision not to vote and my work in the university. My self-care also 
involved an approach to knowledge which understands knowledge as a collaborative 
creative process, and one which builds from the students’ contexts and existing 
knowledge of a topic, disrupting the more traditional understanding of the teacher 
not only as the provider of knowledge, but as the extension of practices of 
governance designed to inform and regulate students behaviour: sit still, no mobile 
phones, talk calmly, do the reading, ask questions, engage with your peers, respond 
to teacher prompts etc.. These are not necessarily insidious behaviours but they are 
behaviours expected of the students none-the-less. In the pursuit of self care and 
care for others I attempted to create a distance to these expected behaviours and 
invited students to take responsibility to fill that space. This resulted in a variety of 
responses ranging from Az’s decision to make a joke of the drawing exercise, to the 
collapse of the debate and to the free-running conversation about Ed not reading the 
news. 
While the specific theory around care of the self was explored in the fourth 
chapter, as discussed in the second chapter, this thesis as a whole presents my 
account of my actions and ongoing process of self care. Not only does it plot the path 
of the development of this thesis in both the theoretical and practical dimensions, 
through the narratives it presents a re-telling of particular moments of my practice 
which stand out as moments which highlighted my ongoing attempts to practice self 
care. In recording, analysing and presenting these moments, I opened myself and my 
actions to the considerations of others, inviting them into an anarchic relationship of 
self care and care for others. My aim here was to establish spaces in which the 
students could also consider their actions from a critical distance and to explore the 
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ways in which external expectations shaped their actions. There is not a claim here 
that the external referents of the students disappeared because of this critical 
distance, but that like my own practice, this distance allowed the students to think 
about and take responsibility for their practice in the classroom. If students were able 
to do this in the space of the exilic classroom, learning to account for and take 
responsibility for their actions to themselves and others, then this too was a gradual 
subversion of both the university focus on performance and a similar focus found in 
wider society. 
To be able to follow such practices of self care required the students to be not 
only involved, but complicit, and this meant the development of a new relationship 
between each student and me as their teacher. In creating exilic space and taking 
responsibility for my practice and subjectivity, and encouraging students to take 
responsibility for theirs, a new student-teacher relationship was formed. Rather than 
being a student-teacher relationship based on the exchange of knowledge and the 
measuring of performance, care of the self invites a student-teacher relationship 
which is rooted in collaboration and mutual development; a subversive relationship 
in the face of social relations forged through the lens of performance, procedure and 
market economics. Importantly, such a reconfigured relationship relies on the free 
cooperation and input of the students and cannot work otherwise. While I can create 
certain conditions and invite students into relationships of self care and care for 
others, I cannot impose these relationships on them. To do so would be to undermine 
the calls at the heart of anarchism and care of the self for subjects to take control of 
and responsibility for their own subjectivities. Were I to impose a particular form of 
relationship on the students I would simply be adding to the external pressures and 
practices of governance I claim to be trying to distance. There are several key features 
in the collaborative creation of new student-teacher relationships which can be 
found throughout the autoethnographic narratives, including the co-creation of 
knowledge and the role of questioning and challenge. The collaborative approach to 
knowledge is an important element in the reoriented student-teacher relationships 
as it helps to disrupt some of the traditional authority which comes with being a 
teacher, and encourages the active participation of the students not only in 
knowledge creation, but in the design and direction of the sessions. However, 
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attempting to establish a new student-teacher relationship involves risk, which 
brings us back to care of the self, and more specifically, parrhesia. 
Parrhesia is a particular form of truth-telling connected to care of the self. It is a 
quality in the interaction between subjects which contains five key elements, 
frankness, truth, criticism, risk, and duty. Frankness addresses the mode of 
interaction between subjects, in that the speaker must be clear and concise in what 
she says, so as not to confuse and misdirect the listener. What the speaker says must 
be the truth regarding her own or the listener’s actions in the context of the practice. 
This truth is critical, not simply as the criticism of action, but as part of an invitation 
to the listener to reflect on the action from a critical distance, and therefore assess 
the action in relation to themselves. To this end, it is the duty of the speaker to speak 
the truth to the listener and help create that critical distance. These elements were 
present in my interactions with students and in their interactions with each other 
and necessitated the formation of new student-teacher relationships in which such 
parrhesiastic interactions could take place. However, there is a final element of 
parrhesia which warrants careful consideration, and that is the element of risk. In 
following practices of care of the self and care for others and inviting students to 
form new student-teacher relationships there was always the risk that the students 
would not respond to my attempts at all, or that they would find my practice 
irritating, confusing, and a potential barrier to them achieving the grade they want 
from university. Were this to occur not only would it alter my teaching practice, there 
would be the risk of students reporting their concerns to the university, and bringing 
me and my practice to the attention of the institution. I know from the end-of-term 
evaluations that this was not the case, but it is easy to imagine a situation in which 
students are unhappy being called on to take responsibility for their learning and 
practice in the classroom, carrying the expectations of a teacher who transfers 
knowledge and achieving their own high performance measures through 
assignments, and ultimately their final degree classification. In such a scenario, the 
formal procedures of the university and the performance measures involved in my 
role as a Graduate Teaching Assistant would act to shut down any attempts at 
subversion through the intervention of the university or, at the extreme, the removal 
of any and all teaching responsibilities. An example of this tension coming to the fore 
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in my teaching practice is found in Engagement as I challenged Malikah over the 
reasoning behind her decision to vote. In this session I wanted to challenge Malikah, 
and others in the room who may hold a similar position, to think beyond their initial 
decision regarding voting because of the historic events which led to the vote. My 
concern was that an uncritical consideration of the decision to vote would avoid any 
discussion of the act of voting itself. I wanted to prompt Malikah to think through her 
position and if there was anything about the act of voting which made voting 
important, rather than the historical events which led to the suffrage. In pushing 
Malikah on this point there was a risk that I would annoy and alienate her and others, 
a risk enhanced by my position as a white male teacher questioning the decision of a 
woman to vote because of the actions of the suffragettes. From a position of 
parrhesia this risk is part of the parrhesiastic interaction which is rooted in telling the 
truth of the actions of that subject in that context. Through parrhesia it was entirely 
appropriate to question and challenge Malikah in an attempt to bring critical distance 
and consideration of her actions. Simultaneously this interaction acts as an example 
of the new student-teacher relationship and the necessity of student complicity and 
active participation in a parrhesiastic interaction, as without Malikah engaging with 
the challenge the reoriented student-teacher relationship would have collapsed. A 
key part in establishing and building the parrhesiastic interaction is the formation of 
trust in the classroom. In the first of my autoethnographic narratives I reflected on 
asking the students to trust me, and that there was no basis for them to do so other 
than me being a teacher and staff member of the institution. However, I asked the 
students to trust me not only on my status as a teacher, but on the basis of my words 
and actions in the classroom with them. Throughout my teaching practice I worked 
hard to ensure a coherence between my words and my actions, from the opening 
session when I asked about student preferences for particular tasks, to acting on 
student feedback from mid-term evaluations. When I invited and encouraged 
contributions to discussions and the session I did not then shut down student 
responses in preference for a different answer. At each turn in my interactions with 
the students I aimed to develop a trust between us which was based on more than 
my institutional status alone, as achieving this level of trust is crucial in pursuing 
parrhesiastic interactions.  
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And so this element of risk connected to my attempts to form my own subjectivity 
through care of the self, and my invitation to students to do the same leads to a series 
of interesting tensions and questions regarding parrhesia. Much like the tensions 
when considering my subjectivity, the tensions involved in parrhesia in my practice 
cannot be reduced to a dichotomy of “this was parrhesia” and “this was not 
parrhesia”, and we are encouraged to think through the complex interactions which 
occur in the neo-liberal bureaucratic university and my position within it. There was 
a constant element of balance at work in my use of parrhesia throughout my teaching 
practice as I needed to ensure an ongoing relationship with the students whilst 
pursuing anarchist practice of care of the self. There was always the risk that in 
pushing the students to account for themselves and their actions they would feel 
attacked and complain to the university, or they would simply stop attending the 
classes. In either case this would have been a problem for both the institution and 
me. Institutionally, it would bring me and my practice to the attention of the 
university, and under the pursuit of performance metrics my teaching practice would 
have been subject to greater scrutiny, decreasing the possibilities for teaching 
differently. Personally, it would have severed the chance to continue fostering 
chances for the students and I to take responsibility for ourselves in the classroom: 
the self-formation of subjectivity and a new student-teacher relationships cannot 
occur without the student in the room. 
This element of risk and balance which comes with parrhesia begs an important 
question about compromise of my anarchist practice to satisfy university formal 
procedures of accounting and performance management, but such an approach is in 
danger of falling into a dichotomy of “parrhesia” or “not parrhesia”. Instead, I argue 
that parrhesia in combination with la perruque and the creation of exilic spaces is not 
about compromise, but about exploiting the existing gaps and weakness of the 
institution. With an institutional focus on procedure and performance measurement 
blind-spots are created in which the university has no interest. As long as the various 
procedures are being followed and nothing untoward is raised through performance 
assessments, the university shows no concern for the substance of a teacher’s 
practice. In effect, this allows the university’s own practices of governance to be used 
as part of the very means of subversion of those practices. 
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In Vaclav Havel’s essay ‘Power of the Powerless’ he addressed precisely this 
interaction and question of compliance with procedure, subversion, and truth 
through the allegory of the greengrocer who displays a slogan which reads ‘Workers 
of the world, unite!’ (Havel 1990, 41). Havel argues that the slogan was hung in the 
window by the greengrocer not because the greengrocer feels particularly strongly 
about the workers of the world uniting, but because it is the expected action for him 
to perform. He displays the slogan because it has always been done this way, because 
everyone else does it, and because it is the way it has to be. The message of the 
slogan is not the words ‘Workers of the world, unite!’ but the greengrocer’s action in 
placing the slogan in the window. The message is a message to the system at large 
that the greengrocer knows what is expected of him and therefore deserves to be 
left in peace (ibid., 42). The slogan in the window of the greengrocer is unlikely to be 
noticed by people passing or shopping, and so it is not, in isolation, a message to 
others with any particular impact. It is however part of the larger ensemble of slogans 
found everywhere which create a panorama of everyday life as displays of peoples’ 
obedience. The greengrocer, and everyone else who displays the slogan, has adapted 
to the conditions they live in, and in so doing help to reinforce and recreate those 
conditions (ibid., 51). The greengrocer’s slogan, along with all others, is proof that 
the procedure of the system is being followed (ibid., 45). Havel argues that in 
adhering to procedure, the greengrocer is taking no responsibility for himself and his 
actions and is living a lie established by the system he lives in which aims at the 
perpetuation of itself (ibid., 62): the greengrocer is at the same time a victim and an 
instrument of the system (ibid., 52). 
However, the greengrocer has another option available to him, a way to stop living 
a lie. He can stop putting up the slogan in his window. By refusing to display the 
slogan in his shop window, the greengrocer breaks the rules of the game and takes 
responsibility for his actions. He acts from a position of freedom and asserts this 
freedom through the action itself, his revolt, Havel argues, ‘is an attempt to live 
within the truth’ (Havel 1990, 55. Original emphasis). Living in truth is a broad realm 
of action which can encompass those direct and open moments of defiance against 
the system, but also includes any attempts by people, individually or collectively, to 
‘revolt against manipulation’ (ibid., 59). In pushing against an enforced position 
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people attempt to take control and responsibility for their behaviours in a system in 
which adherence to procedure is the only behaviour sought. This attempt to live in 
truth carries an ethical dimension, as it not only concerns the actions of the 
individual, but also acts as a demonstration to others of the possibilities of taking 
responsibility for their own action and the fragility of the focus on procedure (ibid., 
62). The greengrocer’s attempts to live in truth are not only confined to not doing 
the things expected of him, but can also include more concrete actions which go 
beyond the immediate response against manipulation into actively working to 
subvert the system through organising others to act, or speaking out publicly (ibid., 
84). In these concrete actions a coherent attempt at ‘conscious, structured and 
purposeful work’ (ibid., 85) may emerge, at which point living in truth for the 
greengrocer is no longer simply a negation of living a lie, but is a particular way of 
living and taking responsibility for his actions. 
We can use Havel’s greengrocer as a way to address my position as a Graduate 
Teaching Assistant. Havel was writing in the context of Soviet controlled 
Czechoslovakia, and so was addressing a system he termed ‘post-totalitarian’ (Havel 
1990, 40) but there are features of his critique of living a lie which are present in my 
context. First, there is the concentration of the system on the adherence to 
procedure. For Havel’s greengrocer this was through displaying the slogan, saying the 
right things at political meetings, and voting in elections, for me it was completing 
mid- and end-of-term evaluations, having peer observations, and orientating my 
practice around the notion of excellence. Second, the greengrocer placing a single 
slogan in the window is not, by itself, an action which denies freedom to the 
greengrocer, but it is part of a larger ensemble of practices of governance which seek 
to give form to the subjectivity of the greengrocer as someone who does what is 
expected. The mid- and end-of-term evaluations that I must go through with the 
students are not by themselves procedures which give form to my subjectivity, but 
as with the greengrocer’s display of the slogan prompting the question, ‘what’s 
wrong with the workers of the world uniting?’ (Havel 1990, 42), the performance 
procedures of the university prompt the question, what’s wrong with wanting to 
know where I can improve? However, these evaluations form part of a larger network 
of practices at work in the complex neo-liberal university and beyond which all 
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implicitly prioritise behaviour through the lens of the free-market and individual 
competition and gain. Third, the greengrocer’s compliance with procedure, the 
hanging of the slogan in his shop window, meant he was left in peace, while my 
compliance with procedure through mid- and end-of-term evaluation ensured the 
same. In each of these ways we can say that through my work at the university I was 
living a lie, just as the greengrocer was through displaying the slogan. Through my 
compliance with the formal performance oriented procedures of the university I was 
allowing the expectations of the system to be the reference point for my actions. 
However, continuing to draw on Havel’s allegory, both the greengrocer and I have 
the possibility of living in truth through taking responsibility for our actions, 
subverting the procedures we are expected to follow. In the greengrocer’s case this 
was removing the slogan from his window, speaking out at political meetings, and 
encouraging others to act by showing them that another way to live was possible. In 
my case this was by placing the emphasis in the classroom on the collaborative 
creation of knowledge, the disrupting of expected behaviours, and the attempt to 
create space for others to take responsibility for their actions. As with the 
greengrocer, my attempts to live in truth became a structured and purposeful work 
which formed a central part of my practice as a teacher. 
Returning to the greengrocer, there is however a risk involved in his attempts to 
live in truth, one which is already familiar to us through parrhesia. If the greengrocer 
is to remove the slogan from his window, and even more, begin actively and publicly 
living in ways which defy the procedures of the system, he will pay a price. He will be 
relieved of his job, his pay will be reduced, his family will be effected, his neighbours 
will mistrust him. This will not occur because anyone else necessarily believes in the 
system the greengrocer is threatening, but because it is the behaviour and response 
the system requires towards those who do not follow procedure. This will occur 
because of the very same procedures and conditions which compelled the 
greengrocer to display the slogan in the first place. The greengrocer will be isolated 
and ejected from the system as an anomaly (Havel 1990, 55). Equally, if my 
performance is found lacking or I do not comply with the procedures of the university 
I too will be isolated and ejected from my role as a Graduate Teaching Assistant. 
Returning briefly to Readings’ warning about the notion of excellence as a measure 
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of performance, one of the impacts of using “excellence” as a standard in the 
bureaucratic procedure focussed university is that its ambiguous nature leaves the 
university with sufficient flexibility to identify, isolate and remove anyone under the 
banner of pursuing excellence (Readings 1996, 32-33). So what is the greengrocer to 
do? And what am I to do? Havel’s proposal to live in truth and take responsibility for 
my actions finds its parallel in anarchism and parrhesia, and yet in doing so I would 
risk being identified and removed ending any possibilities to pursue my teaching 
practice. And so a more nuanced reading is needed, one in which the interaction of 
compliance, subversion and truth looks instead to the use of procedure against the 
system itself. What if the greengrocer kept the slogan in the window, for all intents 
and purposes adhering to the procedure of the system, and then used the peace this 
afforded him for subversive action elsewhere? What if I meet all the formal 
procedural and performance requirements of the university, enabling me to use the 
space left behind the procedure to practice subversive, anarchist forms of teaching? 
And so my proposal is this, continue to meet the formal procedural requirements of 
the system in which you live and work and in so doing, be left in peace. Then use this 
peace and the space created by the focus on procedure to pursue subversive action 
in which you live in truth, subversive action in which you use parrhesia to question 
and challenge, subversive action in which you use la perruque to create exilic spaces, 
subversive action in which you take responsibility for your own actions, subversive 
action in which you create new relationships with others. Find your own ways to use 
the rules of the system to exploit the gaps these very rules create, and in these gaps 
take responsibility for yourself and your actions. 
It might be suggested that such an approach means you are still living in a lie, and 
that the only way to create distance and space for you to take responsibility for your 
own subjectivity and relationships would be to leave those systems which attempt 
to condition them. I argue that fleeing would not be taking responsibility or 
addressing your conditions or the conditions of those around you. Fleeing would be 
an insular act and would do nothing to address your freedom: I am reminded of 
Bakunin’s argument that he cannot be free if those around him are not free (Bakunin 
1964c, 267). It is this belief in a social bond through freedom which underpins 
anarchism, care of the self, parrhesia, and living in truth, and it manifests in each of 
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these in taking responsibility for your actions in the present, in the context: 
‘responsibility is ours, […] we must accept it and grasp it here, now, in this place in 
time and space […], we cannot lie our way out of it by moving somewhere else’ (Havel 
1990, 104). 
While this thesis has dealt with my experiences working in a higher education 
institution, the possible implications of my work stretch far beyond this context. This 
thesis deals with the possibility and practice of subversion in any institution in which 
formal processes, procedures and practices of government aim to constrain the 
subject. With this, the thesis also invites larger questions regarding ourselves and our 
ability to live with the truth of ourselves in institutions and systems which 
increasingly seek to determine that truth for us. A anarchist understanding of 
freedom as practice as put forward here and captured and explored through my 
autoethnographic narratives offers one possible set of notions which can assist in 
understanding and challenging constraints on freedom without predetermining 
practice, subjectivity, relationships, or social change.  
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